blanket rule in Washington

2017In City of Seattle, UW argued "that a blanket rule of immunity applies to exempt state property from municipal regulations unless the legislature specifically provides otherwise." 94 Wn.2d at 166 .

2017To that end, WSAMA contends that the plain language ofRCW 28B.20.130(1) shows that the legislature "acted conclusively to rein in the UW and put to rest the UW's blanket immunity claim in [City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162 ]." Id. at 10-11.

2013Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 , 102 S. Ct. 2613 , 73 L.

2013Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 , 102 S. Ct. 2613 , 73 L.

2009Examining the cases cited by LeFaber and the underlying logic for the blanket rule, we hold LeFaber's per se rule is no longer justified and appellate courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether an unpreserved claim of error regarding a self-defense jury instruction constitutes a manifest constitutional error. ¶ 18 In stating erroneous self-defense jury instructions are constitutional and presumed prejudicial, the LeFaber court relied upon two cases: McCullum, 98 Wash.2d 484 , 656 P.2d 1064 and State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

2009Examining the cases cited by LeFaber and the underlying logic for the blanket rule, we hold LeFaber’s per se rule is no longer justified and appellate courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether an unpreserved claim of error regarding a self-defense jury instruction constitutes a manifest constitutional error. ¶20 In stating erroneous self-defense jury instructions are constitutional and presumed prejudicial, the LeFaber court relied upon two cases: McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484 and State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

2009Examining the cases cited by LeFaber and the underlying logic for the blanket rule, we hold LeFaber’s per se rule is no longer justified and appellate courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether an unpreserved claim of error regarding a self-defense jury instruction constitutes a manifest constitutional error. ¶20 In stating erroneous self-defense jury instructions are constitutional and presumed prejudicial, the LeFaber court relied upon two cases: McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484 and State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

2009Examining the cases cited by LeFaber and the underlying logic for the blanket rule, we hold LeFaber’s per se rule is no longer justified and appellate courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether an unpreserved claim of error regarding a self-defense jury instruction constitutes a manifest constitutional error. ¶20 In stating erroneous self-defense jury instructions are constitutional and presumed prejudicial, the LeFaber court relied upon two cases: McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484 and State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wash.App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶ 34 Reading RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) together, there is no statutory authority for the trial court's decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶ 35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW

2009App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶34 When read together, RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) provide no statutory authority for the trial court’s decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW 26.09.490 states that “[u]n

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2005App. 258, 269 , 118 P.3d 935 (2005), and “decline to adopt a per se rule ... that all excited utterances cannot be testimonial.” (Emphasis added.) ¶42 Although the blanket rule adopted by the majority here works under the facts of this case, I can conceive of a hybrid situation where a predominantly excited utterance might contain testimonial elements that run afoul of Crawford.

2005But I write separately to express my disagreement with their adoption of a blanket rule *997 that every excited utterance is non-testimonial and, therefore, does not run afoul of constitutional confrontation rights as recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. [7] Instead, I would follow Division One's opinion in State v. Walker, 129 Wash.App. 258, 269 , 118 P.3d 935 (2005), and "decline to adopt a per se rule ... that all excited utterances cannot be testimonial." (Emphasis added.) ¶ 57 Although the blanket rule adopted by the majority here works under t

2005But I write separately to express my disagreement with their adoption of a blanket rule that every excited utterance is nontestimonial and, therefore, does not run afoul of constitutional confrontation rights as recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. 5 Instead, I would follow Division One’s opinion in State v. Walker, 129 Wn.

2005But I write separately to express my disagreement with their adoption of a blanket rule *997 that every excited utterance is non-testimonial and, therefore, does not run afoul of constitutional confrontation rights as recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. [7] Instead, I would follow Division One's opinion in State v. Walker, 129 Wash.App. 258, 269 , 118 P.3d 935 (2005), and "decline to adopt a per se rule ... that all excited utterances cannot be testimonial." (Emphasis added.) ¶ 57 Although the blanket rule adopted by the majority here works under t

1998City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471 , 82 P. 747 (1905) (Dunbar, J.) (cited in Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash.2d 929, 931-32 , 481 P.2d 9 (1971)); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 53 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) ("Municipalities can regulate or even extinguish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate public goal."); see also Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) ("vested rights doctrine is not a blanket rule requiring cities and towns to process all permit applications acco

1998City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471 , 82 P. 747 (1905) (Dunbar, J.) (cited in Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash.2d 929, 931-32 , 481 P.2d 9 (1971)); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 53 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) ("Municipalities can regulate or even extinguish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate public goal."); see also Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) ("vested rights doctrine is not a blanket rule requiring cities and towns to process all permit applications acco

1998City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471 , 82 P. 747 (1905) (Dunbar, J.) (cited in Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash.2d 929, 931-32 , 481 P.2d 9 (1971)); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 53 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) ("Municipalities can regulate or even extinguish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate public goal."); see also Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) ("vested rights doctrine is not a blanket rule requiring cities and towns to process all permit applications acco

1998City of Seattle v. Hinckley, 40 Wash. 468, 471 , 82 P. 747 (1905) (Dunbar, J.) (cited in Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash.2d 929, 931-32 , 481 P.2d 9 (1971)); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 53 , 720 P.2d 782 (1986) ("Municipalities can regulate or even extinguish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate public goal."); see also Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.2d 864, 873 , 872 P.2d 1090 (1994) ("vested rights doctrine is not a blanket rule requiring cities and towns to process all permit applications acco

2021No. 1, 100 Wn.2d 188, 196 , 668 P.2d 571 (1983). -8- No. 81583-1-I/9 Here, the trial court refused to allow H.W. to testify regarding Wagner’s alleged abuse of the children based on a blanket rule that “[t]he Court does not hear from children.” The court later explained that “the Court does not hear testimony from the children themselves because the Court does not want to put a child in the position of testifying either quote ‘for’ or quote ‘against’ either parent.” But as a general matter, “[e]very person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding.” RCW 5

2021No. 1, 100 Wn.2d 188, 196 , 668 P.2d 571 (1983). -8- No. 81583-1-I/9 Here, the trial court refused to allow H.W. to testify regarding Wagner’s alleged abuse of the children based on a blanket rule that “[t]he Court does not hear from children.” The court later explained that “the Court does not hear testimony from the children themselves because the Court does not want to put a child in the position of testifying either quote ‘for’ or quote ‘against’ either parent.” But as a general matter, “[e]very person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding.” RCW 5

2014Id. ¶24 The defendants maintain that Upjohn recognized a blanket privilege for communications between corporate counsel and corporate employees at all levels, regardless of a given employee’s relationship to potential corporate liability.

2013As our Court of Appeals has observed, “it is a well-established principle in bad faith actions brought by an insured against an insurer under the terms of an insurance contract that communications between the insurer and the attorney are not privileged with respect to the insured.” Barry, 98 Wn.

2013Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 , 102 S. Ct. 1 United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 1000-03 (9th Cir. 2012) (detailed discussion of application of experience and logic test to competency proceedings as a matter of first impression; holding that they are presumptively open, in accordance with the holdings of the majority of courts that have to consider this issue). 2 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 , 102 S. Ct. 2613 , 73 L.

2013Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 , 102 S. Ct. 1 United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 1000-03 (9th Cir. 2012) (detailed discussion of application of experience and logic test to competency proceedings as a matter of first impression; holding that they are presumptively open, in accordance with the holdings of the majority of courts that have to consider this issue). 2 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 , 102 S. Ct. 2613 , 73 L.

2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wash.App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶ 34 Reading RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) together, there is no statutory authority for the trial court's decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶ 35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW

2008These sections are not relevant, however, because they pertain to forcible entry to arrest or apprehend a person and the circumstances under which one entering the land for these reasons may make a forcible entry of a dwelling. [10] For example, in Hamilton v. King County, 195 Wash. 84, 92-93 , 79 P.2d 697 (1938), this court applied the doctrine of trespass ab initio when holding that a county was liable for loss of a property owner's season's mink crop when it entered the property without authority and constructed a drainage ditch, and the resulting disturbance in close proximity to the minks

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash

2008A blanket standard of good cause for categories of cases conflicts with the standards set forth in those rules. [25] Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d at 37-39 , 640 P.2d 716 . [26] Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 547-48 , 114 P.3d 1182 . [27] See Clerk's Papers at 58-59, 74-75 (listing the documents Treadwell moved to seal or redact). [28] See State v. Meas, 118 Wash.App. 297 , 303 n. 6, 75 P.3d 998 (2003) (Appellate courts do not consider matters argued in briefs that are not included in the record.). [29] Clerk's Papers at 4-5, 8-9. [30] See Clerk's Papers at 102, 111. [31] Clerk's Papers at 114-33. [32] 154 Wash