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31 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reed v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Forty years ago, Professor Wigmore, widely considered the “foremost authority in the field of evidence,” Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 403 (1978), recognized the limited utility of the accomplice corroboration rule. 2019Forty years ago, Professor Wigmore, widely considered the “foremost authority in the field of evidence,” Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 403 (1978), recognized the limited utility of the accomplice corroboration rule. | 3 | 3 |
Attorney Grievance v. Moawadgreen2 sentences2022Mr. Taniform traces our statement in Riely about the vulnerability of immigration clients to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011) (quotation omitted), where we recognized that the Maryland Immigration Consultant Act was enacted to “offer simple protection to extremely vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend themselves, from being preyed on.” According to Mr. Taniform, our recognition that immigration clients are generally vulnerable and need protection does not translate to a blanket rule that the aggravating factor of the victim’ 2022Mr. Taniform traces our statement in Riely about the vulnerability of immigration clients to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011) (quotation omitted), where we recognized that the Maryland Immigration Consultant Act was enacted to “offer simple protection to extremely vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend themselves, from being preyed on.” According to Mr. Taniform, our recognition that immigration clients are generally vulnerable and need protection does not translate to a blanket rule that the aggravating factor of the victim’ | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brisbongreen2 sentences2022Mr. Taniform traces our statement in Riely about the vulnerability of immigration clients to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011) (quotation omitted), where we recognized that the Maryland Immigration Consultant Act was enacted to “offer simple protection to extremely vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend themselves, from being preyed on.” According to Mr. Taniform, our recognition that immigration clients are generally vulnerable and need protection does not translate to a blanket rule that the aggravating factor of the victim’ 2022Mr. Taniform traces our statement in Riely about the vulnerability of immigration clients to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brisbon, 422 Md. 625, 642 (2011) (quotation omitted), where we recognized that the Maryland Immigration Consultant Act was enacted to “offer simple protection to extremely vulnerable people, largely unable or unwilling as a practical matter to defend themselves, from being preyed on.” According to Mr. Taniform, our recognition that immigration clients are generally vulnerable and need protection does not translate to a blanket rule that the aggravating factor of the victim’ | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2022We rejected the argument that the vulnerability of the victim factor should not be considered, stating: This Court has emphasized a need to protect the public by “impress[ing] upon . . . lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate communication in immigration cases.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294 , 352–53, 132 A.3d 196 (2016); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014). 2022We rejected the argument that the vulnerability of the victim factor should not be considered, stating: This Court has emphasized a need to protect the public by “impress[ing] upon . . . lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate communication in immigration cases.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294 , 352–53, 132 A.3d 196 (2016); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014). | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weissgreen2 sentences2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev 2013The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to deviate from the original jurisdiction’s sanction, and in this case we do so.” 389 Md. at 546-47 , 886 A.2d at 615 . 6 Having stated the general rule, we attempted to give guidance as to when we should or would withhold deference to the sanctioning court’s judgment. | 1 | 4 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whiteheadgreen2 sentences2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev 2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev | 1 | 3 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordongreen2 sentences2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev 2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev | 1 | 1 |
Noonan v. ZONING BD. OF BARRINGTONgreen1 sentence2015It is a well-established principle in reciprocal discipline cases that “we are prone or inclined, but not required to, impose the same sanction the original jurisdiction imposed.” Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gordon, 413 Md. 46, 55 , 991 A.2d 51, 56 (2010); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Whitehead, 390 Md. 663, 671 , 890 A.2d 751, 756 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Weiss, 389 Md. 531, 547 , 886 *159 A.2d 606, 615 (2005) (“The explicit reluctance of the Court to adopt a blanket rule of reciprocity provides that we must look at each case individually and decide whether to dev | 1 | 1 |
Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Educationgreen2 sentences2009Dep’t of Educ., 338 Ark. 505 , 995 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1999) (ordering rebriefing on the issue of sovereign immunity in light of Alden); Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. 2009Dep’t of Educ., 338 Ark. 505 , 995 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1999) (ordering rebriefing on the issue of sovereign immunity in light of Alden); Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Melinda Erickson, United States of America, Intervenor v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois Universitygreen1 sentence2009Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2000) (recognizing that states may “implement a blanket rule of sovereign immunity”); Jacoby v. Ark. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vasquezgreen1 sentence2003To apply the inevitable discovery rule, on the Stevens rationale, whenever there is a valid warrant, to render admissible, any evidence seized in execution of that warrant in violation of the knock and announce rule is, in effect, to create a blanket exception to that rule for all cases involving valid search warrants, see Vasquez, 602 N.W.2d at 378 (“In light of our recent decision in People v. Stevens, 460 Mich. 626 , 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999) we need not decide whether the police violated the constitutional and statutory knock-and-announce-requirement under the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1 |
| Godwin v. County Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2005The United States Supreme Court affirmed but held that the Fourth Amendment does not allow such a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule. 520 U.S. at 387-88 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 . 2005The United States Supreme Court affirmed but held that the Fourth Amendment does not allow such a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule. 520 U.S. at 387-88 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 . | 3 | 2003–2005 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Landeo
green
2 sentences2022We rejected the argument that the vulnerability of the victim factor should not be considered, stating: This Court has emphasized a need to protect the public by “impress[ing] upon . . . lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate communication in immigration cases.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294 , 352–53, 132 A.3d 196 (2016); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014). 2022We rejected the argument that the vulnerability of the victim factor should not be considered, stating: This Court has emphasized a need to protect the public by “impress[ing] upon . . . lawyers, the importance of diligent representation and adequate communication in immigration cases.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Landeo, 446 Md. 294 , 352–53, 132 A.3d 196 (2016); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 558 , 103 A.3d 629 (2014). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Crawford
green
2 sentences1993Cole, J., speaking for the Court in Crawford , after tracing the history of the handgun control legislation, noted that § 36B(b) “sets forth a blanket rule,” 308 Md. at 693 , 521 A.2d 1193 , “designed to discourage and punish the possession of handguns on the streets and public ways,” id., at 695 , 521 A.2d 1193 . 311 Md. at 611-612 , 536 A.2d 1161 (footnote omitted). 1993Cole, J., speaking for the Court in Crawford , after tracing the history of the handgun control legislation, noted that § 36B(b) “sets forth a blanket rule,” 308 Md. at 693 , 521 A.2d 1193 , “designed to discourage and punish the possession of handguns on the streets and public ways,” id., at 695 , 521 A.2d 1193 . 311 Md. at 611-612 , 536 A.2d 1161 (footnote omitted). | 2 | 1988–1993 |
Mahnke v. Moore
green
1 sentence2022REV. 521 (1960) (“hereafter “McCurdy II”). 14 In Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 66–67 (1951), the Court of Appeals characterized Dunlap as a “landmark” decision that “repudiated” the “absolute rule” enunciated in Hewlett v. George. 18 the mid-20th century, jurisdictions began to reexamine the blanket doctrine” announced in Hewlett. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Nolasco v. Malcom
green
1 sentence2022Nolasco, 949 N.W.2d at 205 .15 What makes the Nolasco opinion useful for us is the Nebraska Supreme Court’s analysis of the development of the parent-child immunity doctrine beginning with Hewlett. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Feigley v. Baltimore Transit Co.
green
2 sentences2018The Feigley Court recognized that a blanket rule allowing the remainder of a conversation could spur additional evidentiary issues, and implemented limits "as to the scope, and limits of the right." Id. at 10 , 124 A.2d at 827 . 2018The Feigley Court recognized that a blanket rule allowing the remainder of a conversation could spur additional evidentiary issues, and implemented limits "as to the scope, and limits of the right." Id. at 10 , 124 A.2d at 827 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Collins Kusi Sakyi
green
2 sentences2017We decline to follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead in Sakyi, 160 F.3d at 169 , and create a presumption of reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk an occupant of a vehicle with multiple occupants based on an odor of marijuana alone. 2017In Sakyi, id. at 169 , the Fourth Circuit did the inverse, essentially creating a presumption of reasonable suspicion, which could be overcome by circumstances allaying a law enforcement officer’s safety concerns. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Phillips v. General Finance Corporation of Florida
green
1 sentence2014The Garnishments and Safeway’s Response The relevant evidence in this case comes from stipulated facts and a few undisputed 3 See also First National Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corporation, 499 P.2d 1163 (Col. 1972); In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998); Phillips v. General Finance Corp., 297 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1974); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2014The Garnishments and Safeway’s Response The relevant evidence in this case comes from stipulated facts and a few undisputed 3 See also First National Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corporation, 499 P.2d 1163 (Col. 1972); In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998); Phillips v. General Finance Corp., 297 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1974); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re the Marriage of Eklofe
green
1 sentence2014The Garnishments and Safeway’s Response The relevant evidence in this case comes from stipulated facts and a few undisputed 3 See also First National Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corporation, 499 P.2d 1163 (Col. 1972); In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998); Phillips v. General Finance Corp., 297 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1974); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bernstein v. Kapneck
green
2 sentences2014Bernstein, 290 Md. at 459 , 430 A.2d at 606 . 2014Bernstein, 290 Md. at 459 , 430 A.2d at 606 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
First Nat. Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corp.
green
1 sentence2014The Garnishments and Safeway’s Response The relevant evidence in this case comes from stipulated facts and a few undisputed 3 See also First National Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corporation, 499 P.2d 1163 (Col. 1972); In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998); Phillips v. General Finance Corp., 297 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1974); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Willhite v. Willhite
green
1 sentence2014The Garnishments and Safeway’s Response The relevant evidence in this case comes from stipulated facts and a few undisputed 3 See also First National Bank of Denver v. Columbia Credit Corporation, 499 P.2d 1163 (Col. 1972); In re Marriage of Eklofe, 586 N.W.2d 357 (Iowa 1998); Phillips v. General Finance Corp., 297 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1974); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2011In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 , 108 S.Ct. 864 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988), the Supreme Court provided another exception to the blanket rule of inadmissibility of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. 2011In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 , 108 S.Ct. 864 , 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988), the Supreme Court provided another exception to the blanket rule of inadmissibility of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Faulkner v. State
green
2 sentences2004Writing for this Court, Judge Adkins said: "[W]e do not read [the trilogy] as a blanket instruction to grant new trials whenever the police interview a suspect before presentment." Id. at 652 , 847 A.2d 1216 . 2004Writing for this Court, Judge Adkins said: "[W]e do not read [the trilogy] as a blanket instruction to grant new trials whenever the police interview a suspect before presentment." Id. at 652 , 847 A.2d 1216 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences2004This is exactly what the High Court has said we may not do.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. at 303 , 821 A.2d at 938 . 2004This is exactly what the High Court has said we may not do.” State v. Lee, 374 Md. at 303 , 821 A.2d at 938 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Odum v. State
green
2 sentences2004Neither Williams, Hiligh, Facon, nor our recent decisions in Perez and Odum v. State, 156 Md.App. 184 , 846 A.2d 445 (2004), sweeps so broadly. 2004Neither Williams, Hiligh, Facon, nor our recent decisions in Perez and Odum v. State, 156 Md.App. 184 , 846 A.2d 445 (2004), sweeps so broadly. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Colter v. State
green
1 sentence2003While the State agrees with appellant that “when a trial court has discretion to act, it must exercise that discretion,” see State v. Rodriguez, 125 Md.App. 428, 445 , 725 A.2d 635 (quoting Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983)), it contends that the record demonstrates that the court did so in this case. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
In Re Application of George B.
green
1 sentence2003While the State agrees with appellant that “when a trial court has discretion to act, it must exercise that discretion,” see State v. Rodriguez, 125 Md.App. 428, 445 , 725 A.2d 635 (quoting Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426 , 466 A.2d 1286 (1983)), it contends that the record demonstrates that the court did so in this case. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Stevens green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wells v. Smith green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Dowling v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Mayor of Baltimore v. Burke green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Webb v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Frye v. Frye green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gibson v. Gibson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Mena green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.