blanket rule in Florida

2011This distinction “requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision.” Id. at 1021 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352, 360-61 (1968)).

2011This distinction “requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision.” Id. at 1021 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352, 360-61 (1968)).

2024Cf. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118 , 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R.

2003However, the supreme court in M.B., 701 So.2d at 1162 , referred with approval to the following statement made (in dicta) in Anderson v. State, 655 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla.1995): "[W]e decline to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony." Cf. Williams v. State, 714 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, section 90.801(2), is a firmly rooted exception because the circumstances under which such statements are made "eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation," and t

2019See Saunders , 103 So.3d at 881 (holding error where trial court found loss-of-consortium claim inextricably intertwined based on defendant's legal argument and not based on evidence); Blanton , 98 So.3d at 612 (holding the party who moved for attorney's fees failed to meet his burden of either presenting evidence that the claims were inextricably intertwined or allocating his time, and declining to adopt a blanket rule that loss-of-consortium claims are always inextricably intertwined).

2019See Saunders , 103 So.3d at 881 (holding error where trial court found loss-of-consortium claim inextricably intertwined based on defendant's legal argument and not based on evidence); Blanton , 98 So.3d at 612 (holding the party who moved for attorney's fees failed to meet his burden of either presenting evidence that the claims were inextricably intertwined or allocating his time, and declining to adopt a blanket rule that loss-of-consortium claims are always inextricably intertwined).

2019See Saunders , 103 So.3d at 881 (holding error where trial court found loss-of-consortium claim inextricably intertwined based on defendant's legal argument and not based on evidence); Blanton , 98 So.3d at 612 (holding the party who moved for attorney's fees failed to meet his burden of either presenting evidence that the claims were inextricably intertwined or allocating his time, and declining to adopt a blanket rule that loss-of-consortium claims are always inextricably intertwined).

2019See Saunders , 103 So.3d at 881 (holding error where trial court found loss-of-consortium claim inextricably intertwined based on defendant's legal argument and not based on evidence); Blanton , 98 So.3d at 612 (holding the party who moved for attorney's fees failed to meet his burden of either presenting evidence that the claims were inextricably intertwined or allocating his time, and declining to adopt a blanket rule that loss-of-consortium claims are always inextricably intertwined).

2018For this reason alone, a new trial is required on the intentional tort claims. 10 See Jacobs v. Westgate , 766 So.2d 1175 , 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ("A jury instruction which tends to confuse rather than enlighten the jury is cause for reversal if it may have misled the jury and caused them to arrive at a conclusion that they otherwise would not have reached ... regardless of whether it has actually been misled."); see also McPhee v. Paul Revere Life Ins.

2018For this reason alone, a new trial is required on the intentional tort claims. 10 See Jacobs v. Westgate , 766 So.2d 1175 , 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ("A jury instruction which tends to confuse rather than enlighten the jury is cause for reversal if it may have misled the jury and caused them to arrive at a conclusion that they otherwise would not have reached ... regardless of whether it has actually been misled."); see also McPhee v. Paul Revere Life Ins.

2012See Hayes, 952 So.2d at 505 ("[S]tanding to bring or participate in a particular legal proceeding often depends on the nature of the interest asserted."); id. at 508 (rejecting "bright-line rule" adopted by district court that would preclude an heir from participating in a proceeding for guardian fees or attorney fees).

2012See Hayes, 952 So.2d at 505 ("[S]tanding to bring or participate in a particular legal proceeding often depends on the nature of the interest asserted."); id. at 508 (rejecting "bright-line rule" adopted by district court that would preclude an heir from participating in a proceeding for guardian fees or attorney fees).

2009This distinction "requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision." Id. at 1021 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352, 360-61 (1968)).

2009This distinction “requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision.” Id. at 1021 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352, 360-61 (1968)).

2019The Reasoning and Result in Coalition Defeat Petitioners' Challenge In Coalition , this Court upheld a dismissal with prejudice of a blanket challenge to the "adequacy" of the entire K-12 system-a challenge that bears a close resemblance to the challenge here. 680 So.2d at 402 .

2019Holmes did not involve a blanket "adequacy" challenge and did not remotely address the issue of whether the entire K-12 system was "efficient" or of "high quality." Instead, Holmes addressed a "narrow question," id. at 397 , involving a specific voucher program and turned on other language in article IX, primarily "system of free public schools." In other words, Holmes in no way answers the question presented. 8 Looking to the language of article IX, section 1(a), we conclude that the term "high quality" in and of itself does not have "straightforward content," Coalition , 680 So.2d at 408 , a

1997See Anderson v. State, 655 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla.1995) (“we decline to enunciáte a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see also State v. Green, 667 So.2d 756 (Fla.1995).

1997In Green , we explicitly noted that our prior decisions barring criminal convictions “based solely on the prior inconsistent statements of the victim ... [do] not mean that inconsistent statements admitted under section 90.803(23) can never be used as substantive evidence when other proper corroborating evidence is admitted.” Green, 667 So.2d at 761 .

2024Cf. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118 , 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R.

2003However, the supreme court in M.B., 701 So.2d at 1162 , referred with approval to the following statement made (in dicta) in Anderson v. State, 655 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla.1995): "[W]e decline to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony." Cf. Williams v. State, 714 So.2d 462, 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, section 90.801(2), is a firmly rooted exception because the circumstances under which such statements are made "eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation," and t

2004It also resolved the conflict certified to it between the first district in the Brown case and decisions of this court in Vallieres v. Givssman, 573 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) and the third district in Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the latter two cases which had announced a blanket rule that a motion for exceptional circumstance extension can only be granted if filed during the 175-day speedy trial period.

1997Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So.2d 196, 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (holding that “an extension of speedy trial time cannot be obtained for ‘exceptional circumstances’ after expiration of the 175 days”); Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642, 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“The fifteen-day window period provided the State by rule 3.191(i)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to proceed with a trial of the defendant after the speedy trial period has expired and a motion for discharge has been filed, may not be extended for exceptional circumstances by a motion filed within the window period.”).

2004It also resolved the conflict certified to it between the first district in the Brown case and decisions of this court in Vallieres v. Givssman, 573 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) and the third district in Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the latter two cases which had announced a blanket rule that a motion for exceptional circumstance extension can only be granted if filed during the 175-day speedy trial period.

1997Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So.2d 196, 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (holding that “an extension of speedy trial time cannot be obtained for ‘exceptional circumstances’ after expiration of the 175 days”); Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642, 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“The fifteen-day window period provided the State by rule 3.191(i)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to proceed with a trial of the defendant after the speedy trial period has expired and a motion for discharge has been filed, may not be extended for exceptional circumstances by a motion filed within the window period.”).

2024Cf. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118 , 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R.

2024Cf. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118 , 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R.

2024The relationship between the LLC and the Club is different from that of a landlord and tenant, where the lessee “holds an outstanding leasehold estate” in the leased premises “which for all practical purposes is equivalent to absolute ownership.” Rogers v. Martin, 99 So. 551, 552 (Fla. 1924).

2024Cf. Anderson v. State, 655 So. 2d 1118 , 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R.

2019Cir. 10 1984); Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that a deponent must make a specific objection to a particular question instead of asserting a blanket privilege).

2019The Florida Supreme Court in McCray rejected a blanket rule prohibiting a belated withdrawal of a peremptory challenge, recognizing that it 7 may be appropriate in “rare circumstances.” Id. at 1126 (“[T]here may be rare circumstances where the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge after the party has exhausted all peremptory challenges may be appropriate.”).

2017Our rejection of a blanket rule prohibiting in all instances the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge after a party has exhausted its.peremptory challenges must be considered, however, against the backdrop of our previous emphasis that “[peremptory challenges merely are a ‘means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.’” Jefferson v. State, 595 So.2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Batson v. *1127 Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)).

2017In other words, we emphasize that the rare instance when the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge is granted after a party has exhausted its peremptory challenges must not be the design of gamesmanship, as “[established case law rejects the proposition that a defendant is entitled to have a particular composition of jury.” Rich, 807 So.2d at 693 (citing Kibler, 546 So.2d at 712-13 ); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692 .

2017In other words, we emphasize that the rare instance when the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge is granted after a party has exhausted its peremptory challenges must not be the design of gamesmanship, as “[established case law rejects the proposition that a defendant is entitled to have a particular composition of jury.” Rich, 807 So.2d at 693 (citing Kibler, 546 So.2d at 712-13 ); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692 .