blanket rule in Connecticut

2023In other words, the written opinion must state the similar health care provider’s opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider’s conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care’’ because ‘‘a blanket requirement mandating a more onerous or stringent standard would serve to deter not only frivolous lawsuits but some meritorious ones, as well, a result that the legislature did not intend to achieve.’’ Wilcox v. Schwartz, 303 Conn. 630 , 643–44, 37 A.3d 133 (2012); see Dias v. Grad

2023In other words, the written opinion must state the similar health care provider’s opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider’s conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care’’ because ‘‘a blanket requirement mandating a more onerous or stringent standard would serve to deter not only frivolous lawsuits but some meritorious ones, as well, a result that the legislature did not intend to achieve.’’ Wilcox v. Schwartz, 303 Conn. 630 , 643–44, 37 A.3d 133 (2012); see Dias v. Grad

2022Instead, based [on] the tradi- tional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

1999Instead, based upon the traditional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.” State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990); see also Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 (2d Cir. 1994) (declarant’s dual inculpatory statement made during “a formal police interrogation . . . cannot be introduced against a defendant as evidence of his [or her] guilt unless other evidence demonstrates that

2022Instead, based [on] the tradi- tional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

1999Instead, based upon the traditional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.” State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990); see also Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 (2d Cir. 1994) (declarant’s dual inculpatory statement made during “a formal police interrogation . . . cannot be introduced against a defendant as evidence of his [or her] guilt unless other evidence demonstrates that

2022Instead, based [on] the tradi- tional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2022Instead, based [on] the tradi- tional analysis of trustworthiness, such statements are inadmissible when made after the crime is complete and when made in a custodial environment to a custodian such as a law enforcement officer.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Lynch, 21 Conn. App. 386, 396 , 574 A.2d 230 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 806 , 580 A.2d 63 (1990).

2026See, e.g., id., 198 n.14 (discussing trial court’s discretion to instruct jury with respect to scientific facts that contradict “common misperceptions” about eyewit- ness identification in emphasizing court’s discretion, “in appropriate circumstances, and when the defendant requests it, [to instruct] the jury on the meaning of the statistical rarity of a [DNA] match”); see also, e.g., State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn. 255 , 299–300, 257 A.3d 912 (2021) (declining to “require trial courts to give a special instruction in every case in which the police fail to record custodial interrogations” b

2026See, e.g., id., 198 n.14 (discussing trial court’s discretion to instruct jury with respect to scientific facts that contradict “common misperceptions” about eyewit- ness identification in emphasizing court’s discretion, “in appropriate circumstances, and when the defendant requests it, [to instruct] the jury on the meaning of the statistical rarity of a [DNA] match”); see also, e.g., State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn. 255 , 299–300, 257 A.3d 912 (2021) (declining to “require trial courts to give a special instruction in every case in which the police fail to record custodial interrogations” b

2024Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 22 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Diaz v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705 , 718–19, 259 A.3d 617 (2021) (declining to decide whether defendant’s claim was prosecutorial impropriety claim or unpreserved eviden- tiary claim because challenged remark was not improper); State v. Wilson, 111 Conn. App. 614 , 631 and n.8, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008) (declining to decide whether defen- dant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was waived because prosecutor’s remark was not improper), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 917 , 966 A.2d 234 (2009).

2024Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 22 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Diaz v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705 , 718–19, 259 A.3d 617 (2021) (declining to decide whether defendant’s claim was prosecutorial impropriety claim or unpreserved eviden- tiary claim because challenged remark was not improper); State v. Wilson, 111 Conn. App. 614 , 631 and n.8, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008) (declining to decide whether defen- dant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was waived because prosecutor’s remark was not improper), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 917 , 966 A.2d 234 (2009).

2024Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 22 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Diaz v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705 , 718–19, 259 A.3d 617 (2021) (declining to decide whether defendant’s claim was prosecutorial impropriety claim or unpreserved eviden- tiary claim because challenged remark was not improper); State v. Wilson, 111 Conn. App. 614 , 631 and n.8, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008) (declining to decide whether defen- dant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was waived because prosecutor’s remark was not improper), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 917 , 966 A.2d 234 (2009).

2024Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 22 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Diaz v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705 , 718–19, 259 A.3d 617 (2021) (declining to decide whether defendant’s claim was prosecutorial impropriety claim or unpreserved eviden- tiary claim because challenged remark was not improper); State v. Wilson, 111 Conn. App. 614 , 631 and n.8, 960 A.2d 1056 (2008) (declining to decide whether defen- dant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was waived because prosecutor’s remark was not improper), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 917 , 966 A.2d 234 (2009).

2023See Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 25 , 602 A.2d 1 (1992) (court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint where amendment sought to separate theories of liability that improperly had been pleaded in same count); Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn. App. 286, 295 , 925 A.2d 441 (2007) (court abused its discretion in denying motion to amend where proposed amendment did not set forth new theories of liability and preparation of defense would not have required significant additional time and resources), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905 , 942 A.2d 414 (2008). 25 The plaintiff al

2023See Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 25 , 602 A.2d 1 (1992) (court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint where amendment sought to separate theories of liability that improperly had been pleaded in same count); Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn. App. 286, 295 , 925 A.2d 441 (2007) (court abused its discretion in denying motion to amend where proposed amendment did not set forth new theories of liability and preparation of defense would not have required significant additional time and resources), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905 , 942 A.2d 414 (2008). 25 The plaintiff al

2023See Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 25 , 602 A.2d 1 (1992) (court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint where amendment sought to separate theories of liability that improperly had been pleaded in same count); Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn. App. 286, 295 , 925 A.2d 441 (2007) (court abused its discretion in denying motion to amend where proposed amendment did not set forth new theories of liability and preparation of defense would not have required significant additional time and resources), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905 , 942 A.2d 414 (2008). 25 The plaintiff al

2023See Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 25 , 602 A.2d 1 (1992) (court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint where amendment sought to separate theories of liability that improperly had been pleaded in same count); Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn. App. 286, 295 , 925 A.2d 441 (2007) (court abused its discretion in denying motion to amend where proposed amendment did not set forth new theories of liability and preparation of defense would not have required significant additional time and resources), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905 , 942 A.2d 414 (2008). 25 The plaintiff al

2022Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 , 730 A.2d 51 (1999); see also Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 713 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (because ‘‘the privilege has the effect of with- holding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 , 730 A.2d 51 (1999); see also Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 713 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (because ‘‘the privilege has the effect of with- holding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022The privilege applies, however, only when necessary to achieve its purpose; it is not a blanket privilege.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kosuda-Bigazzi, 335 Conn. 327, 342 , 250 A.3d 617 (2020). ‘‘Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege should be made only when the reason for disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of essential communications.’’ Metropolitan Life Ins.

2020It cited cases in which an in cold blood argument was found to be proper, including Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 496 , 813 N.E.2d 820 (2004), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that a statement that the victims were murdered in cold blood was not improper where the evidence permitted an inference that the murders were unprovoked, senseless, and brutal.

2020It cited cases in which an in cold blood argument was found to be proper, including Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 496 , 813 N.E.2d 820 (2004), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that a statement that the victims were murdered in cold blood was not improper where the evidence permitted an inference that the murders were unprovoked, senseless, and brutal.

2018Consequently, [in State v. Boscarino , 204 Conn. 714 , 722-24, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), our Supreme Court] identified several factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether a severance may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial.

2018Consequently, [in State v. Boscarino , 204 Conn. 714 , 722-24, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), our Supreme Court] identified several factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether a severance may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial.

2016Con- struction Co., 88 Conn. App. 787 , 871 A.2d 1067 , cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907 , 876 A.2d 1199 (2005).

2016Con- struction Co., 88 Conn. App. 787 , 871 A.2d 1067 , cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907 , 876 A.2d 1199 (2005).

2016Con- struction Co., 88 Conn. App. 787 , 871 A.2d 1067 , cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907 , 876 A.2d 1199 (2005).

2016Con- struction Co., 88 Conn. App. 787 , 871 A.2d 1067 , cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907 , 876 A.2d 1199 (2005).

2015The scope of counsel’s obligation to investigate must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and we do not intend to suggest a blanket rule for all occasions. 12 The petitioner argues that failure to cross-examine about a reward can never be ‘‘sound trial strategy’’ pursuant to the holding in Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099 , 1110–14 (9th Cir. 2006).

2012Moreover, we conclude that the blanket presumption in favor of joinder that developed in King's wake; see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 289 Conn. 437, 451 , 958 A.2d 713 (2008); State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608, 628 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 437 , 953 A.2d 45 (2008), superseded in part after reconsideration by State v. Sanseverino, 291 Conn. 574 , 969 A.2d 710 (2009); State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 521 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L.

2012Moreover, we conclude that the blanket presumption in favor of joinder that developed in King's wake; see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 289 Conn. 437, 451 , 958 A.2d 713 (2008); State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608, 628 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 437 , 953 A.2d 45 (2008), superseded in part after reconsideration by State v. Sanseverino, 291 Conn. 574 , 969 A.2d 710 (2009); State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 521 , 915 A.2d 822 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888 , 128 S. Ct. 248 , 169 L.