bench bar in Ohio

2002Inappropriately in my view, it deemed this “reenactment” to be an encroachment by the General Assembly into the judicial sphere, violating the principle of separation of powers. {¶ 66} However, the majority expressly assured the bench and bar that it would “entertain a public action only ‘in the rare and extraordinary case’ where the challenged statute operates, ‘directly and broadly, to divest the courts of judicial power.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 504 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 .

2002Inappropriately in my view, it deemed this “reenactment” to be an encroachment by the General Assembly into the judicial sphere, violating the principle of separation of powers. {¶ 66} However, the majority expressly assured the bench and bar that it would “entertain a public action only ‘in the rare and extraordinary case’ where the challenged statute operates, ‘directly and broadly, to divest the courts of judicial power.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 504 , 715 N.E.2d 1062 .

1995I would adopt the “frequency-proximity” test adopted in the case of Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156 .

1995I would adopt the “frequency-proximity” test adopted in the case of Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156 .

1981BLACK, P.J., and DOAN, J., concur. 1 In Household Finance Corp. v. Altenberg (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 190 , 193 [ 34 O.O.2d 348 ], it is stated that: "The term, `clear and convincing,' has a well defined meaning with the bench and bar.

1981BLACK, P.J., and DOAN, J., concur. 1 In Household Finance Corp. v. Altenberg (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 190 , 193 [ 34 O.O.2d 348 ], it is stated that: "The term, `clear and convincing,' has a well defined meaning with the bench and bar.

1907Counc.) 28 Mich. 228 , and adds: “This distinction as to the'powers delegated to municipal corporations was clearly recognized and commented upon by this court in the case of Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375.” I need not follow his elaboration of this distinction, which has become quite familiar to the bench and bar of this state, the distinction between governmental powers and the proprietary and business powers of a municipality.

1907As to third persons who seek to enforce pecuniary liabilities against towns, arising upon contract, such towns are merely private corporations or individuals, and in this respect, they are not affected by the purely municipal public and political features that appertain to their corporate existence in virtue of, and in reference to which alone, they are subject to the absolute control of legislation.” Judge Crew cites to the same effect the case of People v. Detroit, 28 Mich., 228 , and adds: “This distinction as to the powers delegated to municipal corporations was clearly recognized and comm

2020To that end, the General Assembly should amend R.C. 2721.12(A) to provide a temporal requirement to clarify this issue for the bench and bar—whether that requirement is at the inception of the constitutional challenge, within a reasonable time afterward, or some other standard. _________________ KLATT, J., dissenting. {¶ 44} Because I would follow the rationale expressed in Cicco v. Stockmaster, 89 Ohio St. 3d 95, 99 , 728 N.E.2d 1066 (2000), I respectfully dissent.

2020To that end, the General Assembly should amend R.C. 2721.12(A) to provide a temporal requirement to clarify this issue for the bench and bar—whether that requirement is at the inception of the constitutional challenge, within a reasonable time afterward, or some other standard. _________________ KLATT, J., dissenting. {¶ 44} Because I would follow the rationale expressed in Cicco v. Stockmaster, 89 Ohio St. 3d 95, 99 , 728 N.E.2d 1066 (2000), I respectfully dissent.

2018It decided the case before it and it introduced a mischief into the land law of Ohio which will plague the bench and bar for years.” Clark v. Smith, 89 Ohio Law.

2018It decided the case before it and it introduced a mischief into the land law of Ohio which will plague the bench and bar for years.” Clark v. Smith, 89 Ohio Law Abs. 229, 243 , 184 N.E.2d 695 (C.P.1962).

2018For example, in In re Disqualification of Corrigan , 110 Ohio St.3d 1217 , 2005-Ohio-7153 , 850 N.E.2d 720 , the chief justice disqualified an entire bench from hearing a case in which the plaintiff was a county commissioner who had a leadership role in local party politics.

2018For example, in In re Disqualification of Corrigan , 110 Ohio St.3d 1217 , 2005-Ohio-7153 , 850 N.E.2d 720 , the chief justice disqualified an entire bench from hearing a case in which the plaintiff was a county commissioner who had a leadership role in local party politics.

2013Co. (1939), 215 Ind. 305, 309-310 , 19 N.E.2d 547, 548-549 . * * * We therefore caution the bench and bar against resorting to this rule too readily and without a sufficient awareness of its pitfalls.

2013Co. (1939), 215 Ind. 305, 309-310 , 19 N.E.2d 547, 548-549 . * * * We therefore caution the bench and bar against resorting to this rule too readily and without a sufficient awareness of its pitfalls.

2013Id. {¶ 25} Construing Davis in view of the facts then before the Supreme Court, we conclude that Davis supports the premise that, if spoliation is discovered after an action between the same parties has concluded, res judicata does not bar a subsequent claim against an alleged spoliation tortfeasor.

2011See State v. Hardesty, Pickaway App. No. 07CA2, 2007-Ohio-3889, at ¶14 ; State v. Richardson, Pickaway App. No. 05CA29, 2006-Ohio-386, at ¶16 .

2008Mary’s School (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 563 , 697 N.E.2d 198 , which has been cited in connection with cases involving violations of administrative regulations. {¶ 13} The bench and bar should reasonably expect a decision on this issue, and no legitimate reason exists not to decide this case.

2008Mary’s School (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 563 , 697 N.E.2d 198 , which has been cited in connection with cases involving violations of administrative regulations. {¶ 13} The bench and bar should reasonably expect a decision on this issue, and no legitimate reason exists not to decide this case.

2008O’Donnell, J., dissenting. {¶ 9} I continue to adhere to my earlier dissent as I anticipate uncertainty among the members of the bench and bar as to the application of a structural-error analysis, as opposed to a plain-error analysis, following the court’s decision today. {¶ 10} If I understand the majority, the error here is structural because it “permeate[d] the trial from beginning to end.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, at ¶ 17 .

2008O’Donnell, J., dissenting. {¶ 9} I continue to adhere to my earlier dissent as I anticipate uncertainty among the members of the bench and bar as to the application of a structural-error analysis, as opposed to a plain-error analysis, following the court’s decision today. {¶ 10} If I understand the majority, the error here is structural because it “permeate[d] the trial from beginning to end.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, at ¶ 17 .

2008O’Donnell, J., dissenting. {¶ 9} I continue to adhere to my earlier dissent as I anticipate uncertainty among the members of the bench and bar as to the application of a structural-error analysis, as opposed to a plain-error analysis, following the court’s decision today. {¶ 10} If I understand the majority, the error here is structural because it “permeate[d] the trial from beginning to end.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, at ¶ 17 .

2008O’Donnell, J., dissenting. {¶ 9} I continue to adhere to my earlier dissent as I anticipate uncertainty among the members of the bench and bar as to the application of a structural-error analysis, as opposed to a plain-error analysis, following the court’s decision today. {¶ 10} If I understand the majority, the error here is structural because it “permeate[d] the trial from beginning to end.” State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-1624 , 885 N.E.2d 917, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2004-Ohio-297 , 802 N.E.2d 643, at ¶ 17 .

2004Nevertheless, we have provided some guidance to the bench and bar over the years. {¶ 11} In Posin , which did not involve criminal liability, we stated that “the act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 278, 74 O.O.2d 427 , 344 N.E.2d 334 , citing Tarlecka v. Morgan (1932), 125 Ohio St. 319 , 181 N.E. 450 .

2004Nevertheless, we have provided some guidance to the bench and bar over the years. {¶ 11} In Posin , which did not involve criminal liability, we stated that “the act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 278, 74 O.O.2d 427 , 344 N.E.2d 334 , citing Tarlecka v. Morgan (1932), 125 Ohio St. 319 , 181 N.E. 450 .

2004Nevertheless, we have provided some guidance to the bench and bar over the years. {¶ 11} In Posin , which did not involve criminal liability, we stated that “the act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 278, 74 O.O.2d 427 , 344 N.E.2d 334 , citing Tarlecka v. Morgan (1932), 125 Ohio St. 319 , 181 N.E. 450 .

2004Nevertheless, we have provided some guidance to the bench and bar over the years. {¶ 11} In Posin , which did not involve criminal liability, we stated that “the act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 278, 74 O.O.2d 427 , 344 N.E.2d 334 , citing Tarlecka v. Morgan (1932), 125 Ohio St. 319 , 181 N.E. 450 .

2004Nevertheless, we have provided some guidance to the bench and bar over the years. {¶ 11} In Posin , which did not involve criminal liability, we stated that “the act of an agent is the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Id., 45 Ohio St.3d at 278, 74 O.O.2d 427 , 344 N.E.2d 334 , citing Tarlecka v. Morgan (1932), 125 Ohio St. 319 , 181 N.E. 450 .

1990The plurality’s reliance on Wood v. Shepard (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 86 , 526 N.E. 2d 1089 , is totally misplaced as seen in Hill v. Allstate Ins.

1990The plurality’s reliance on Wood v. Shepard (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 86 , 526 N.E. 2d 1089 , is totally misplaced as seen in Hill v. Allstate Ins.

1989The primary reason for my concurrence in the majority opinion is the citation to Graham v. Hansen (1982), 128 Cal. App. 3d 965 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 , which gives further clarification by stating that, in determining when the statute of limitations is triggered, “ ‘[t]he test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation.’ ” Graham, supra, at 972 , 180 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (quoting McGee v. Weinberg [1979], 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803 , 159 Cal. Rptr.

1989The primary reason for my concurrence in the majority opinion is the citation to Graham v. Hansen (1982), 128 Cal. App. 3d 965 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 , which gives further clarification by stating that, in determining when the statute of limitations is triggered, “ ‘[t]he test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation.’ ” Graham, supra, at 972 , 180 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (quoting McGee v. Weinberg [1979], 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803 , 159 Cal. Rptr.

1989The primary reason for my concurrence in the majority opinion is the citation to Graham v. Hansen (1982), 128 Cal. App. 3d 965 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 , which gives further clarification by stating that, in determining when the statute of limitations is triggered, “ ‘[t]he test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation.’ ” Graham, supra, at 972 , 180 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (quoting McGee v. Weinberg [1979], 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803 , 159 Cal. Rptr.

1989The primary reason for my concurrence in the majority opinion is the citation to Graham v. Hansen (1982), 128 Cal. App. 3d 965 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 604 , which gives further clarification by stating that, in determining when the statute of limitations is triggered, “ ‘[t]he test is whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation.’ ” Graham, supra, at 972 , 180 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (quoting McGee v. Weinberg [1979], 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803 , 159 Cal. Rptr.

1988Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 U.S. 468 , 470: ‘What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.’ With respect to a power company the standard is not merely reasonable prudence but is ‘the highest degree of care.’ Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347 [ 25 O.O. 467 ], paragraph two of the syllabus.” (Emphasis added.) While the majority opinion reinforces this court’s adoption of the “highest degree of care” standard for power companies, it is my

1988As a result, I concur separately and also reiterate the statement made in the last sentence of Kohli , urging utilities to “warn their consumers of the potential dangers of neutral-to-earth voltage.” Id. at 15 , 18 OBR at 12, 479 N.E. 2d at 843 .

1988Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 U.S. 468 , 470: ‘What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.’ With respect to a power company the standard is not merely reasonable prudence but is ‘the highest degree of care.’ Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347 [ 25 O.O. 467 ], paragraph two of the syllabus.” (Emphasis added.) While the majority opinion reinforces this court’s adoption of the “highest degree of care” standard for power companies, it is my

1988Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 U.S. 468 , 470: ‘What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.’ With respect to a power company the standard is not merely reasonable prudence but is ‘the highest degree of care.’ Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347 [ 25 O.O. 467 ], paragraph two of the syllabus.” (Emphasis added.) While the majority opinion reinforces this court’s adoption of the “highest degree of care” standard for power companies, it is my