bench bar in Utah

18 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates LLCgreen utahctapp · 2016 · cited in 3 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020 2 sentences 2020By contrast, judicial dicta is characterized by “statement[s] deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar,” or those “expression[s] of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon by the court.” Ortega, 2016 UT App 131 , ¶ 14 n.4 (quotation simplified). ¶52 The court in Greyhound I was presented with an entirely different question than the one that confronts us here. 2020And we think the statement is best classified as obiter dicta, rather than judicial dicta: it was made by way of “illustration, analogy, or suggestion,” and was not “deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar.” See Ortega, 2016 UT App 131 , ¶ 14 n.4 (quotation simplified).	1	3
Ex Parte Harrisongreen texapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016An example of judicial dicta is a statement "deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar upon a point of statutory construction not theretofore considered by the Supreme Court." Ex parte Harrison, 741 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.Ct.App.1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).	1	1
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peeblesgreen utah · 2002 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016See 2002 UT 48 , T21, 48 P.3d 968 . 2016See 2002 UT 48 , T21, 48 P.3d 968 .	1	1
Myers v. Stategreen utah · 2004 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ¶ 9 , 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain error raised for first time in reply brief). [2] I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31 , 94 P.3d 211 , considered this question and rejected it on the merits. 2004See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ¶ 9 , 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain error raised for first time in reply brief). [2] I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31 , 94 P.3d 211 , considered this question and rejected it on the merits.	1	1
Coleman Ex Rel. Schefski v. Stevensgreen utah · 2000 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ¶ 9 , 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain error raised for first time in reply brief). [2] I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31 , 94 P.3d 211 , considered this question and rejected it on the merits. 2004See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ¶ 9 , 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain error raised for first time in reply brief). [2] I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31 , 94 P.3d 211 , considered this question and rejected it on the merits.	1	1
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992Similarly, the abortion quote, if Bowen's, was an explanation of the charges against Brown and Russell and is protected by the fair report privilege. [15] Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702-03 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1990). [16] Id. 497 U.S. at 13 , 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03 , at 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). [17] 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.1952). [18] Id. at 23 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Standard Examiner, 83 Utah 31 , 27 P.2d 1, 15 (1933)). [19] Although the fair comment privilege does not apply to the facts of this case, we make 1992Similarly, the abortion quote, if Bowen's, was an explanation of the charges against Brown and Russell and is protected by the fair report privilege. [15] Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702-03 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1990). [16] Id. 497 U.S. at 13 , 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03 , at 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). [17] 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.1952). [18] Id. at 23 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Standard Examiner, 83 Utah 31 , 27 P.2d 1, 15 (1933)). [19] Although the fair comment privilege does not apply to the facts of this case, we make	1	1
Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub. Co.green utah · 1933 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992Similarly, the abortion quote, if Bowen's, was an explanation of the charges against Brown and Russell and is protected by the fair report privilege. [15] Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702-03 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1990). [16] Id. 497 U.S. at 13 , 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03 , at 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). [17] 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.1952). [18] Id. at 23 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Standard Examiner, 83 Utah 31 , 27 P.2d 1, 15 (1933)). [19] Although the fair comment privilege does not apply to the facts of this case, we make 1992Similarly, the abortion quote, if Bowen's, was an explanation of the charges against Brown and Russell and is protected by the fair report privilege. [15] Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702-03 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1990). [16] Id. 497 U.S. at 13 , 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03 , at 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). [17] 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.1952). [18] Id. at 23 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Standard Examiner, 83 Utah 31 , 27 P.2d 1, 15 (1933)). [19] Although the fair comment privilege does not apply to the facts of this case, we make	1	1
Wade v. Jobegreen utah · 1991 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992See Utah R.App.P. 30(a); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah 1991). 1992See Utah R.App.P. 30(a); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah 1991).	1	1
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 1991See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

Case	Cited	Years
Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. neutral utah · 1906 2 sentences 2020In Sanipoli this court noted the existence of a “practice” tracing back to “territorial days” of our courts “transferring cases and proceedings . . . for the mere convenience of the bench and bar.” Id. at 868–69. 2020Sanipoli held that an original provision of article VIII of the Utah Constitution precluded this practice—in the section 2 requirement that “[a]ll civil and criminal business arising in any county must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be taken, in such cases as provided by law.” See id. at 867–69 (quoting UTAH CONST. art.	1	2020–2020
Dickman Family Properties, Inc. v. White green utahctapp · 2013 2 sentences 2017Cf Dickman Family Props., Inc. v. White, 2013 UT App 116, ¶¶ 12-13 , 302 P.3d 833 (concluding that the appellants had not preserved an argument for appeal where they had been “unambiguously alerted” during a bench hearing regarding the court’s “conception” about the point of law they disputed but failed to bring their argument “to the court’s attention” at that time or in their subsequent objection to the court’s proposed order). 2017Cf Dickman Family Props., Inc. v. White, 2013 UT App 116, ¶¶ 12-13 , 302 P.3d 833 (concluding that the appellants had not preserved an argument for appeal where they had been “unambiguously alerted” during a bench hearing regarding the court’s “conception” about the point of law they disputed but failed to bring their argument “to the court’s attention” at that time or in their subsequent objection to the court’s proposed order).	1	2017–2017
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. green utah · 1992 2 sentences 2007For example, in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992), we sought to provide guidance to the bench and bar by offering observations concerning the distinction between public and private figures. 2007Id. at 908 n. 20.	1	2007–2007
State v. Leyva green utah · 1997 2 sentences 1998The majority does not connect its holding today to State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997), the binding Utah law. 1998The majority does not connect its holding today to State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997), the binding Utah law.	1	1998–1998
Union Pacific Railroad v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission green utah · 1992 2 sentences 1993Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), a post Morton opinion, the Utah Supreme Court applies the broader analysis. 1993Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), a post Morton opinion, the Utah Supreme Court applies the broader analysis.	1	1993–1993
Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Union Service Corp. green ca10 · 1952 1 sentence 1992Similarly, the abortion quote, if Bowen's, was an explanation of the charges against Brown and Russell and is protected by the fair report privilege. [15] Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13 , 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2702-03 , 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1990). [16] Id. 497 U.S. at 13 , 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03 , at 14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). [17] 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.1952). [18] Id. at 23 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Standard Examiner, 83 Utah 31 , 27 P.2d 1, 15 (1933)). [19] Although the fair comment privilege does not apply to the facts of this case, we make	1	1992–1992
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. green cal · 1988 2 sentences 1992Both the cases Justice Durham cites and many others she does not cite state in rather conclusory terms, mirrored in Justice Durham’s opinion, that for a violation of public policy to be actionable, that policy must be “substantial” or “fundamental.” For analytic purposes, I find that the following statement of the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 (1988), gives some texture to the elusive concept of “substantiality”: Even where, as here, a statutory touchstone has been asserted, we must still inquire whether the discha 1992Both the cases Justice Durham cites and many others she does not cite state in rather conclusory terms, mirrored in Justice Durham’s opinion, that for a violation of public policy to be actionable, that policy must be “substantial” or “fundamental.” For analytic purposes, I find that the following statement of the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 (1988), gives some texture to the elusive concept of “substantiality”: Even where, as here, a statutory touchstone has been asserted, we must still inquire whether the discha	1	1992–1992
Stone v. Powell green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 1991See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 1991See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).	1	1991–1991
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc. green nj · 1959 2 sentences 1980It was our hope that after Meistrich the bench and bar would focus upon the true issues, but unhappily some cling to the terminology of assumption of risk and continue to be misled by it even while purporting to think of it as merely a covertible equivalent of negligence or contributory negligence. * * * * * * In Meistrich we said the terminology of assumption of the risk should not be used when it is projected in its secondary sense, i.e., that of contributory negligence ( 31 N.J., at p. 55 , 155 A.2d at p. 96 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1208 ). 1980It was our hope that after Meistrich the bench and bar would focus upon the true issues, but unhappily some cling to the terminology of assumption of risk and continue to be misled by it even while purporting to think of it as merely a covertible equivalent of negligence or contributory negligence. * * * * * * In Meistrich we said the terminology of assumption of the risk should not be used when it is projected in its secondary sense, i.e., that of contributory negligence ( 31 N.J., at p. 55 , 155 A.2d at p. 96 , 82 A.L.R.2d 1208 ).	1	1980–1980
Oficina del Comisionado de Seguros de Puerto Rico v. Integrand Assurance Co. neutral prsupreme · 2008 1 sentence 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925).	1	1970–1970
Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. green utah · 1956 2 sentences 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925). 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925).	1	1970–1970
Jackson v. Harries green utah · 1925 2 sentences 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925). 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925).	1	1970–1970
Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. neutral · 1918 1 sentence 1970(All emphasis added.) . 4 Utah 2d 255 , 292 P.2d 849 (1956). . 52 Utah 338 , 173 P. 900 (1918). . 65 Utah 282 , 236 P. 234 (1925).	1	1970–1970
Sampsell v. Holt green utah · 1949 2 sentences 1958In all probability that section is generally understood by the bench and bar of this state as being applicable to divorce suits. * * * ” In the Holt case, supra [ 115 Utah 73 , 202 P.2d 553 ], this court after tracing income pletely the legislative history of Sections 30-3-5 and 30-3-10, observed: “ * * * Apparently it was the intent of the Legislature to provide some rules for the custody of minor children during the times when the parents were separated by agreement, or by refusal of one to cohabit with the other, but before any judicial decree of divorce had been made. 1958In all probability that section is generally understood by the bench and bar of this state as being applicable to divorce suits. * * " In the Holt case, supra [ 115 Utah 73 , 202 P.2d 553 ], this court after tracing incompletely the legislative history of Sections 30-3-5 and 30-3-10, observed: " * * Apparently it was the intent of the Legislature to provide some rules for the custody of minor children during the times when the parents were separated by agreement, or by refusal of one to cohabit with the other, but before any judicial decree of divorce had been made.	1	1958–1958
Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson green utah · 1947 1 sentence 1948In the case of Gray Realty Co. v. Robinson, 111 Utah 521 , 184 P. 237 , the majority of this court did not think so.	1	1948–1948
State v. Webb green nd · 1917 2 sentences 1930State v. Webb, 36 N. D. 235 , 162 N. W. 358 ; State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W. 1930State v. Webb, 36 N. D. 235 , 162 N. W. 358 ; State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W.	1	1930–1930
State v. Goldstrohm neutral · 1919 1 sentence 1930State v. Webb, 36 N. D. 235 , 162 N. W. 358 ; State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W.	1	1930–1930

Where else courts name it

TX 232 (1876–2026) MI 145 (1920–2024) CA 104 (1866–2026) MS 99 (1954–2025) GA 93 (1905–2025) PA 91 (1830–2026) FL 83 (1912–2019) TN 73 (1903–2026) AL 65 (1868–2026) IL 56 (1879–2025) SC 52 (1914–2026) IA 41 (1915–2026) ID 40 (1979–2022) KS 40 (1871–2024) IN 39 (1872–2020) WI 38 (1881–2026) KY 38 (1876–2026) OK 37 (1897–2025) OR 34 (1955–2025) OH 34 (1907–2026) AR 29 (1929–2023) NJ 29 (1954–2021) WV 28 (1960–2022) MD 26 (1895–2019) NY 25 (1888–2022) LA 24 (1946–2024) MO 24 (1890–2018) SD 21 (1910–2022) NC 19 (1898–2020) WA 19 (1962–2025) UT 18 (1930–2020) MT 17 (1920–2022) CT 15 (1939–2026) NV 15 (1943–2021) VA 14 (1907–2026) MN 13 (1890–2010) AZ 13 (1935–2020) WY 12 (1975–2021) DC 9 (1972–2011) AK 8 (1964–2015) NE 8 (1898–2025) ME 7 (1972–2024) CO 7 (1915–2005) NM 7 (1937–2011) RI 7 (1986–2016) ND 5 (1911–1998) VT 3 (1875–1996) PR 3 (1955–1963) MA 3 (1823–1991) NH 2 (1985–1998) DE 2 (1936–1997) HI 2 (1902–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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