bench bar in Louisiana

2014See State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.1981) (a trial court may rely on the contemporaneous statements of counsel on a plea waiver form because “[a]ny other holding by this Court would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”); cf. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983) (declining to adopt a rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants personally of the right to trial by jury); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308-09 (La.1978) (declining to adopt a rule barring waiver of jury trial except by defendant personally); St

2012Cf State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308 (La.l979)(valid waiver of jury trial made by counsel in open court in defendant’s presence); State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.l981)(trial court may rely on counsel’s representation she had explained defendant’s rights to him; any other rule “would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”).

2014See State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.1981) (a trial court may rely on the contemporaneous statements of counsel on a plea waiver form because “[a]ny other holding by this Court would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”); cf. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983) (declining to adopt a rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants personally of the right to trial by jury); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308-09 (La.1978) (declining to adopt a rule barring waiver of jury trial except by defendant personally); St

2012Cf State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308 (La.l979)(valid waiver of jury trial made by counsel in open court in defendant’s presence); State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.l981)(trial court may rely on counsel’s representation she had explained defendant’s rights to him; any other rule “would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”).

1990When construing La.C.C.P. art. 3245, we must be mindful of the following, which is stated in Maddens Cable Service, Inc. v. Gator Wireline Services, Ltd., 509 So.2d 21, 23 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1987): La.C.C.P. art. 5051 admonishes us that the articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure must “be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves.” The official revision comment for Article 5051 states that it “expresses the procedural philosophy of this Code and serves as a constant reminder to the bench

1989Unless the ground urged for the dismissal is free from doubt an appeal will be sustained. [Citations omitted.] In Maddens Cable Service, Inc. v. Gator Wireline Services, Ltd., 509 So.2d 21, 23 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), appears the following: La.C.C.P. art. 5051 admonishes us that the articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure must "be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves." The official revision comment for Article 5051 states that it "expresses the procedural philosophy of this Code and

1998Co., 140 La. 1027 , 74 So. 541 (1917), which was cited and relied upon by the Billiot court, many of the discussions of punitive damages in these earlier cases arose in dicta or out of a mistaken belief among members of the bench and bar that moral damages, damages repairing injuries to the mind or feelings, and damages insusceptible of assessment by direct testimony [were] punitive damages, when in reality they are compensatory damages, arising from the mandate of full reparation under Article 2315 and the grant of broad discretion to the jury in assessing damages under Article 1934.

1998Co., 140 La. 1027 , 74 So. 541 (1917), which was cited and relied upon by the Billiot court, many of the discussions of punitive damages in these earlier cases arose in dicta or out of a mistaken belief among members of the bench and bar that moral damages, damages repairing injuries to the mind or feelings, and damages insusceptible of assessment by direct testimony [were] punitive damages, when in reality they are compensatory damages, arising from the mandate of full reparation under Article 2315 and the grant of broad discretion to the jury in assessing damages under Article 1934.

2024Accordingly, in Pete, this court simply incorporated an element of objectivity–“a reasonable criterion”5–into a reviewing court’s determination of whether an award is abusively high or low based on what has been done through the decades in practice by attorneys in estimating the value of a case and by courts in assisting in the determination of whether an award shocks the conscience so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.6 Long ago, for guidance in evaluating the value of a case, the bench and bar looked to a quantum study that was first published in 1973 by the Loyola Law Review-Comment,

2024App. 1 Cir. 1985), 468 So.2d 1379, 1382 (citing Stuckey v. Hayden, (La.

2018See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 889 -90 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 (states may "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires;" federal "Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications," and leaves it to the legislature and the states to "impose more rigorous standards" for judicial disqualification); Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 (distinguishing the "constitutional floor" from the ceiling set "by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar").

2018See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 889 -90 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 (states may "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires;" federal "Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications," and leaves it to the legislature and the states to "impose more rigorous standards" for judicial disqualification); Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 (distinguishing the "constitutional floor" from the ceiling set "by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar").

2018See, e.g. , People v. Freeman , 47 Cal.4th 993 , 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 222 P.3d 177 , 178 (2010) (applying Caperton and finding an appearance of impropriety, as proscribed under California law, is not enough to warrant judicial disqualification under the federal standard: "while a showing of actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under the due process clause, neither is the mere appearance of bias sufficient.

2018See, e.g. , People v. Freeman , 47 Cal.4th 993 , 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 222 P.3d 177 , 178 (2010) (applying Caperton and finding an appearance of impropriety, as proscribed under California law, is not enough to warrant judicial disqualification under the federal standard: "while a showing of actual bias is not required for judicial disqualification under the due process clause, neither is the mere appearance of bias sufficient.

2014See State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.1981) (a trial court may rely on the contemporaneous statements of counsel on a plea waiver form because “[a]ny other holding by this Court would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”); cf. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983) (declining to adopt a rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants personally of the right to trial by jury); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308-09 (La.1978) (declining to adopt a rule barring waiver of jury trial except by defendant personally); St

2014See State v. Halsell, 403 So.2d 688, 692 (La.1981) (a trial court may rely on the contemporaneous statements of counsel on a plea waiver form because “[a]ny other holding by this Court would tend to undermine the relationship of trust that must necessarily exist between the bench and bar.”); cf. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475, 486 (La.1983) (declining to adopt a rule requiring trial judges to inform defendants personally of the right to trial by jury); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1308-09 (La.1978) (declining to adopt a rule barring waiver of jury trial except by defendant personally); St

1994See id. at 1042-50 , 74 So. at 546-49 (discussing Caspar v. Prosdame, 46 La.Ann. 36 , 14 So. 317 (1894); Rutherford v. Railroad Co., 41 La.Ann. 793 , 6 So. 644 (1889); McFee v. Railroad, 42 La.Ann. 790 , 7 So. 720 ; Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 26 (1835); McGary v. City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 , 4 La.Ann. 440 (1846); Black v. Carrollton, 10 La.Ann. 33 , 63 Am.Dec. 586 (1855); Varillat v. N.O. & C.R.

1971See dictum in Succession of Lombardo, 205 La. 261 , 17 So.2d 303 , and dictum in Livingston v. Dick, 1 La.Ann. 323 .

1971See dictum in Succession of Lombardo, 205 La. 261 , 17 So.2d 303 , and dictum in Livingston v. Dick, 1 La.Ann. 323 .

1971See dictum in Succession of Lombardo, 205 La. 261 , 17 So.2d 303 , and dictum in Livingston v. Dick, 1 La.Ann. 323 .

1971See dictum in Succession of Lombardo, 205 La. 261 , 17 So.2d 303 , and dictum in Livingston v. Dick, 1 La.Ann. 323 .