bench bar in Indiana

1974Under such circumstances and the conflict of evidence, the law pertaining thereto as herein announced, it is not within the province of this court to substitute its finding and judgment for that of the trial court “In the case of Fuller v. Fuller (1913), 52 Ind. App. 488 , 100 N. E. 869 , the court said: “ ‘As the evidence in this case consists largely of oral testimony, we are governed by the well-settled rule which forbids a court on appeal to weigh conflicting evidence. .We can consider only the evidence favorable to the finding, and if there is some evidence tending to support it in every

1974Under such circumstances and the conflict of evidence, the law pertaining thereto as herein announced, it is not within the province of this court to substitute its finding and judgment for that of the trial court “In the case of Fuller v. Fuller (1913), 52 Ind. App. 488 , 100 N. E. 869 , the court said: “ ‘As the evidence in this case consists largely of oral testimony, we are governed by the well-settled rule which forbids a court on appeal to weigh conflicting evidence. .We can consider only the evidence favorable to the finding, and if there is some evidence tending to support it in every

2019First, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that these Lee prejudice inquiries require "a 'case-by-case examination' of the 'totality of the evidence.' " Id. at 1966 (quoting Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362 , 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ).

2019First, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that these Lee prejudice inquiries require “a ‘case-by-case examination’ of the ‘totality of the evidence.’” Id. at 1966 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).

2019In Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court held as follows when discussing a similar situation: Where status as a felon is an element of the crime charged and the defendant stipulates to his status as a felon, admission into evidence of the full record of a defendant’s prior felony conviction is an abuse of discretion under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403.

2007To this extent, one might deduce that as stated in Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), “Our supreme court does not decide important questions of law in footnotes.” Be that as it may, the Ewing court appropriately observed that such footnote comments as are indicative of an intent to benefit the bench and bar are deserving of “respect from an intermediate court and require[ ] special consideration.” 358 N.E.2d at 206 .

2007To this extent, one might deduce that as stated in Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), "Our supreme court does not decide important questions of law in footnotes." Be that as it may, the Ewing court appropriately observed that such footnote comments as are indicative of an intent to benefit the bench and bar are deserving of "respect from an intermediate court and require[] special consideration." 358 N.E.2d at 206 .

2006See Mishler v. County of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149, 151-52 (Ind.1989) (recognizing that Indiana courts use "jurisdiction over the particular case” to describe a venue issue); City of Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind. 143 (1884) (one of the earliest Indiana cases using the phrase "jurisdiction over the particular case” and equating it with subject matter jurisdiction); Indiana State Bd. of Health Facility Adm'rs v. Werner, 841 N.E.2d 1196, 1204-05 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (analyzing procedural AOPA issue as "jurisdiction over the particular case” issue); In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d 777, 778-80 (Ind.Ct.App. 19

1996Consensus is clear, however, that the rule requires specificity, Id., and “as long as the trial court is apprised of the specific material on which the parties rely either in support of or in opposition to the motion then the designation requirement has been met.” Mid State Bank v. 84 Lumber Co. (1994) Ind.App., 629 N.E.2d 909, 913 .

1995Of particular relevance to our ingqui-ry here are Dawbert's statements that "scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes," and that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 .

1995Of particular relevance to our ingqui-ry here are Dawbert's statements that "scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes," and that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 .

1989Id.

1982In Re Marriage of Gray (1981), Ind. App., 422 N.E.2d 696, 703 ; Belcher v. Buesking (1978), Ind. App., 371 N.E.2d 417, 420 . [11] A lesser standard would undermine the confidence of the public in the bench and the bar.

1982In Re Marriage of Gray (1981), Ind. App., 422 N.E.2d 696, 703 ; Belcher v. Buesking (1978), Ind. App., 371 N.E.2d 417, 420 . [11] A lesser standard would undermine the confidence of the public in the bench and the bar.

1982Vincent Hospital & Health Center, Inc., (1981) Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 1328 , to the extent it holds a T.R. 60(B) motion filed within sixty (60) days of a default judgment is not treated as a T.R. 59 motion if it invokes the equity powers of the trial court.

1982Vincent Hospital & Health Center, Inc., (1981) Ind. App., 426 N.E.2d 1328 , to the extent it holds a T.R. 60(B) motion filed within sixty (60) days of a default judgment is not treated as a T.R. 59 motion if it invokes the equity powers of the trial court.

1981Furthermore, in developing the federal rules, consideration was given to requiring a time limit for service of process. 6 An often quoted synopsis of the history of the federal rules comes from Messenger v. United States, (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 328 , 329: “Rule 3 clearly provides ‘A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.’ When the rules were being formulated and preliminary drafts were circulated and debated by the bench and bar throughout the country, it was at first proposed that the action should abate unless personal jurisdiction by service of process was acquired

1980Co-op Ass’n. (1979), Ind., 395 N.E.2d 257 ; Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield (1973), 155 Ind.App. 422 , 293 N.E.2d 210 .

1980Co-op Ass’n. (1979), Ind., 395 N.E.2d 257 ; Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield (1973), 155 Ind.App. 422 , 293 N.E.2d 210 .

1980Co-op Ass’n. (1979), Ind., 395 N.E.2d 257 ; Rembold Motors, Inc. v. Bonfield (1973), 155 Ind.App. 422 , 293 N.E.2d 210 .

1980Flewallen, supra, 267 Ind. at 97 , 368 N.E.2d at 243 . [4] We are cognizant of the Supreme Court's recent condemnation of unjustifiable extensions of the Patterson rule by the bench and the bar.

1980Flewallen, supra, 267 Ind. at 97 , 368 N.E.2d at 243 . [4] We are cognizant of the Supreme Court's recent condemnation of unjustifiable extensions of the Patterson rule by the bench and the bar.

1980See, Stone v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 672, 678 , 377 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 ; Samuels v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 676, 679 , 372 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 .

1980See, Stone v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 672, 678 , 377 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 ; Samuels v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 676, 679 , 372 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 .

1975Note.—Reported at 823 N.E.2d 192 .