bench bar in Minnesota

1991We also remind the bench and bar that we have not addressed or decided whether Minn.Stat. § 634.26 (Supp.1989), providing for the admission of statistical probability evidence relating to DNA test results, has the effect of legislatively creating an exception for DNA evidence to the limitations of State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.1987), on the use of statistical probability evidence in criminal trials.

1985In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968).

1985In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968).

1985We nevertheless address this issue under the principle that it “will settle a rule of practice affecting all litigants,” and is a rule of “apparent importance to the litigants and to the bench and bar as a whole.” Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 259 , 156 N.W.2d 254, 260 (1968) (quoting Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 271 Minn. 79, 84 , 185 N.W.2d 48 , 46 (1965)).

1979Respondent sought an order from the district court declaring that the restriction in the 1949 deed would cease to be valid and operative as of April 23, 1979, under the provisions of Minn.St. 500.20, subd. 2. 7 The district court found that the question whether the restriction in the 1949 deed was subject to Minn.St. 500.20, subd. 2, was not “right for judicial determination.” We believe that the question as to whether the controversy is ripe for determination is answered by our recent decision in Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association, 271 N.W.2d 445 (Minn.1978).

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1976For the reasons stated above, the application for extraordinary relief in this case was denied. 1 Minn. St. 629.50 was superseded by Rules 5 and 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 State v. Kluck, 299 Minn. 161 , 217 N. W. 2d 202 (1974); State v. Clark, 277 Minn. 502 , 151 N. W. 2d 253 (1967); State v. Zirbes, 274 Minn. 288 , 143 N. W. 2d 212 (1966); State ex rel.

1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun

1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun

1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun

1975NOTES [1] The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn.St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971. [1] I would not retreat from our considered dictum in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354 , 184 N.W.2d 599 (1971), but this is not, in my view, the extraordinary kind of case that we there contemplated as constitutionally overriding the applicable statute. [1] State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242 , 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). [2] Minn.Const. art. 1, § 4, provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amoun

1971The bench and bar will observe the extent to which we have responded to the landmark opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc. 31 N. J. 44, 155 A. 2d 90 , 82 A. L.

1952Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120 , 5 N. W. (2d) 397 , 142 A. L.

1952Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120 , 5 N. W. (2d) 397 , 142 A. L.

1942But there are some to which particular attention should be called: Beneke v. Beneke, 119 Minn. 441 , 138 N. W. 689 , Ann.

1942But there are some to which particular attention should be called: Beneke v. Beneke, 119 Minn. 441 , 138 N. W. 689 , Ann.

1896And, whether my theories are sound or unsound, the members of this court who leave the bench and bar of this state to hunt for the law between this case and the Blomquist Case on the one hand and the Lindvall Case on the other hand, ought not to be hypercritical as to my theories. 60 Minn., at page 434 , 62 N. W., at page 822 . 60 Minn. at page 433 , 62 N. W. at page 822 .

1896And, whether my theories are sound or unsound, the members of this court who leave the bench and bar of this state to hunt for the law between this case and the Blomquist Case on the one hand and the Lindvall Case on the other hand, ought not to be hypercritical as to my theories. 60 Minn., at page 434 , 62 N. W., at page 822 . 60 Minn. at page 433 , 62 N. W. at page 822 .

1890We think this will be found true in every instance, from the earliest decisions on the subject down to the latest utterance of the supreme court of the United States in Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 , (10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557,) in which that court took occasion to set at rest some misapprehensions as to the scope of their previous decision in Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 , (3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586.) We think it would be a surprise to the bench and the bar of the country if it should be held that process or summons in ordinary' civil actions might be served on resident defendants, present and capabl

1890We think this will be found true in every instance, from the earliest decisions on the subject down to the latest utterance of the supreme court of the United States in Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 , (10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557,) in which that court took occasion to set at rest some misapprehensions as to the scope of their previous decision in Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 , (3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586.) We think it would be a surprise to the bench and the bar of the country if it should be held that process or summons in ordinary' civil actions might be served on resident defendants, present and capabl