15 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1943–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vromangreen2 sentences2016Thus, the dissent embraces the most liberal form of the blue pencil doctrine, id. at 682, a use of judicial resources that is unwarranted and blurs the line between the bench and the bar. 11 As explained by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, "[vv]e are firmly convinced that parties are not entitled to make an agreement, as these litigants have tried to do, that they will be bound by whatever contract the courts may make for them at some time in the future." Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1973). 2016Thus, the dissent embraces the most liberal form of the blue pencil doctrine, id. at 682, a use of judicial resources that is unwarranted and blurs the line between the bench and the bar. 11 As explained by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, "[w] e are firmly convinced that parties are not entitled to make an agreement, as these litigants have tried to do, that they will be bound by whatever contract the courts may make for them at some time in the future." Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1973). | 5 | 5 |
Weakland v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Underlying each of these factors is the “supervisory function of the appellate court in maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial.” Id. at 701 , 615 P.2d at 254 (quoting in part Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366 , 374 P.2d 525 (1962)) (emphasis added). 1992Underlying each of these factors is the “supervisory function of the appellate court in maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial.” Id. at 701 , 615 P.2d at 254 (quoting in part Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366 , 374 P.2d 525 (1962)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Churchill County v. State Engineergreen2 sentences2021State Eng'r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 242, 277 P.3d 449, 456 (2012). 2Incidentally, no party has ever discussed whether it matters to this analysis that Sciarratta was injured on a motorcycle, which is not a "passenger car." Because we hold that the statute does not apply, we assume without deciding that the difference between a motorcycle and a passenger car is immaterial here. 2021State Eng'r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 242 , 277 P.3d 449, 456 (2012). 2Incidentally, no party has ever discussed whether it matters to this analysis that Sciarratta was injured on a motorcycle, which is not a "passenger car." Because we hold that the statute does not apply, we assume without deciding that the difference between a motorcycle and a passenger car is immaterial here. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Nevada State Engr. Ruling No. 5823green2 sentences2021State Eng'r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 242, 277 P.3d 449, 456 (2012). 2Incidentally, no party has ever discussed whether it matters to this analysis that Sciarratta was injured on a motorcycle, which is not a "passenger car." Because we hold that the statute does not apply, we assume without deciding that the difference between a motorcycle and a passenger car is immaterial here. 2021State Eng'r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 242 , 277 P.3d 449, 456 (2012). 2Incidentally, no party has ever discussed whether it matters to this analysis that Sciarratta was injured on a motorcycle, which is not a "passenger car." Because we hold that the statute does not apply, we assume without deciding that the difference between a motorcycle and a passenger car is immaterial here. | 1 | 1 |
Perkins v. Komarnyckyjgreen2 sentences2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, 2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, | 1 | 1 |
DeJesus v. Flickgreen2 sentences2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, 2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, | 1 | 1 |
Canterino v. the Mirage Casino-Hotelgreen2 sentences2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, 2002Further, the uncertainty over the split decisions of the court on the issue led me to conclude that the bench and bar of the state should know where all of the justices stand on it as soon as possible. [6] See Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [1] 172 Ariz. 115 , 834 P.2d 1260 (1992). [2] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [3] Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). [1] 116 Nev. 812 , 7 P.3d 459 (2000). [2] Canterino v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 415, 422 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [3] See DeJesus, | 1 | 1 |
Withrow v. Larkingreen1 sentence1999But the floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a “fair trial in a fair tribunal,” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975), before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. | 1 | 1 |
Schad v. Arizonagreen1 sentence1998Pursuant to NRS 200.030, the commission of a felony and premeditation are merely alternative means of establishing the single *1364 mens rea element of first degree murder, rather than constituting independent elements of the crime. 3 See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637 (1991) (noting that under Arizona law, “premeditation and the commission of a felony are not independent elements of the crime [of first degree murder], but rather are mere means of satisfying a single mens rea element”). | 1 | 1 |
Fahy v. Connecticutgreen1 sentence1992Likewise, the United States Supreme Court stated it preferred a harmless error rule which was based on “whether there [was] a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared1 sentence1992Likewise, the United States Supreme Court stated it preferred a harmless error rule which was based on “whether there [was] a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garner v. State
green
2 sentences1992Underlying each of these factors is the “supervisory function of the appellate court in maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial.” Id. at 701 , 615 P.2d at 254 (quoting in part Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366 , 374 P.2d 525 (1962)) (emphasis added). 1992Underlying each of these factors is the “supervisory function of the appellate court in maintaining the standards of the trial bench and bar, to the end that all defendants will be accorded a fair trial.” Id. at 701 , 615 P.2d at 254 (quoting in part Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366 , 374 P.2d 525 (1962)) (emphasis added). | 2 | 1980–1992 |
Zant v. Stephens
green
2 sentences1993The first stage I would call the "Death-Eligibility Stage"; the second stage I would call the "Death-Imposition Stage." In the death-eligibility stage the jury "narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and ... [thereby] justi[fies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 , 103 S.Ct. at 2742 . 1993The first stage I would call the "Death-Eligibility Stage"; the second stage I would call the "Death-Imposition Stage." In the death-eligibility stage the jury "narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and ... [thereby] justi[fies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 , 103 S.Ct. at 2742 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sweeney v. Sweeney
green
2 sentences1948However, counsel for appellant purports to feel that the bench and bar of this state will read our original opinion as overruling Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431 , 179 P. 638 , as effecting a change in the law of this state, as negativing the advice given by attorneys “to thousands of litigants that in the light of Sweeney v. Sweeney, a decree fixing the amount of alimony is a permanent decree, unless the court expressly retained *124 jurisdiction by the terms of its decree (but that) under the decision in the instant case it is believed that that is no longer the law (and that) it can be anti 1948However, counsel for appellant purports to feel that the bench and bar of this state will read our original opinion as overruling Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431 , 179 P. 638 , as effecting a change in the law of this state, as negativing the advice given by attorneys “to thousands of litigants that in the light of Sweeney v. Sweeney, a decree fixing the amount of alimony is a permanent decree, unless the court expressly retained *124 jurisdiction by the terms of its decree (but that) under the decision in the instant case it is believed that that is no longer the law (and that) it can be anti | 1 | 1948–1948 |
California State Telegraph Co. v. Patterson
neutral
1 sentence1943Co. v. Patterson, 1 Nev. 150 , attention is directed to pages 155, 156 and 159 of the opinion. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.