9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carl v. Children's Hospitalgreen1 sentence2011See id. at 162 (noting that to come within a “public policy exception” to the at-will employment doctrine, exception must be “firmly anchored either in the Constitution or in a statute or regulation which clearly reflects the ‘public policy’ being relied upon”). | 1 | 1 |
FW BOLGIANO & CO., INC. v. Browngreen2 sentences1996Bolgiano & Co. v. Brown, 333 A.2d 674, 675 (D.C. 1975) (summary judgment: same). [18] At the " ex parte " damages evidentiary hearing on the issue resolved by the grant of summary judgment, N & N offered legal bills and a cost accounting summary to support its claim for attorneys' fees and expenses. 1996Bolgiano & Co. v. Brown, 333 A.2d 674, 675 (D.C.1975) (summary judgment: same). . | 1 | 1 |
Nolan v. Nolangreen2 sentences1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness" of attorneys' fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. 1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. | 1 | 1 |
Williams Enterprises, Inc., and Strait Manufacturing and Welding, Inc. v. The Sherman R. Smoot Companygreen2 sentences1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness" of attorneys' fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. 1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. | 1 | 1 |
Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellangreen2 sentences1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness" of attorneys' fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. 1996D.C. at 416, 938 F.2d at 237 (bench trial: when contract provides for attorneys' fees, "trial judge, in view of his or her experience on the bench and at the bar, may be in a position, without more, to make a determination of reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees) (citation omitted); Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 490 (D.C.1990) (same); Central Fidelity Bank v. McLellan, 563 A.2d 358, 360 (D.C.1989) (default judgment: same); F.W. | 1 | 1 |
Trice v. Hewgleygreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Trice v. Hewgley, 53 Tenn.App. 259, 265 , 381 S.W.2d 589, 594-95 (1964); Annotation, Necessity of Introducing Evidence to Show Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees Where Promissory Note Provides for such Fees, 18 ALR3d § 4, at 740 (1968). 1989See, e.g., Trice v. Hewgley, 53 Tenn.App. 259, 265 , 381 S.W.2d 589, 594-95 (1964); Annotation, Necessity of Introducing Evidence to Show Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees Where Promissory Note Provides for such Fees, 18 ALR3d § 4, at 740 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985To demonstrate the extent to which the court’s decisions are now changing in the matter of introducing prior convictions on cross-examination, in the very recent decision in Reed v. United States, 485 A.2d 613, 617 (D.C.1984), this court makes this statement: [Cjross-examination of a defendant by impeachment of prior convictions must be undertaken in a manner to avoid suggesting guilt of pending charges as a result of prior convictions and to avoid suggesting bad character or worse about a defendant. 1985To demonstrate the extent to which the court's decisions are now changing in the matter of introducing prior convictions on cross-examination, in the very recent decision in Reed v. United States, 485 A.2d 613, 617 (D.C.1984), this court makes this statement: [C]ross-examination of a defendant by impeachment of prior convictions must be undertaken in a manner to avoid suggesting guilt of pending charges as a result of prior convictions and to avoid suggesting bad character or worse about a defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Southland Reship, Inc. v. S. Leslie Flegel, Individually and D/B/A Periodical Sales of Americagreen1 sentence1982Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, supra; Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Guardinogreen2 sentences1981Illustratively, in Basil, Inc. v. Guardino, D.C.App., 424 A.2d 70, 77 (1980) (KELLY, J.), we recognized: Furthermore, in determining whether an instate activity may serve as the basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff’s performance does not control: “It is [the defendant’s] activity in the state which must provide the basis for jurisdiction.” [Citations omitted; see also id., at 74 & n.6.] The majority’s disposition of this case dis-serves not merely the losing parties, whose due process rights are being violated, but also the bench and the bar with respect to future 1981Illustratively, in Basil, Inc. v. Guardino, D.C.App., 424 A.2d 70, 77 (1980) (KELLY, J.), we recognized: Furthermore, in determining whether an instate activity may serve as the basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff’s performance does not control: “It is [the defendant’s] activity in the state which must provide the basis for jurisdiction.” [Citations omitted; see also id., at 74 & n.6.] The majority’s disposition of this case dis-serves not merely the losing parties, whose due process rights are being violated, but also the bench and the bar with respect to future | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baptist v. United States
green
2 sentences1985That is to say, it seems unmistakably clear that the court’s en banc opinion in this case effectively overrules this court’s decision in Baptist, supra, and sets a new standard. 1985That is to say, it seems *474 unmistakably clear that the court's en banc opinion in this case effectively overrules this court's decision in Baptist, supra, and sets a new standard. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Arra Ray Messenger v. United States
green
1 sentence1980In an oft-quoted synopsis of the history of the Rules, the court in Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1956), said: Rule 3 clearly provides “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” When the rules were being formulated and preliminary drafts were circulated and debated by the bench and bar throughout the country, it was at first proposed that the action should abate unless personal jurisdiction by service of process was acquired within 60 days. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence1975NOTES [1] Both Congress and the United States Attorney recognize that disclosure may be required when nondisclosure would constitute a deprivation of due process. [2] We had earlier acknowledged the existence of such discretionary authority in Davis v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 157 (1974). [3] The Supreme Court will this term again consider the constitutionality of a statute which permits the imposition of capital punishment for certain criminal offenses. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Robinson v. United States
green
1 sentence1972Statement of KERN, Associate Judge, Concurred in by FICKLING, Associate Judge, in Support of His Vote to have the Court Rehear this Case In Banc The majority hold that no seizure within the meaning and protection of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case when a uniformed police officer placed his hand on the arm of a citizen at the corner of 13th and F Streets and ordered him to “hold it” for questioning because the officer believed there was “something wrong” about what that particular citizen was doing. 1 The holding is contrary to the plain language of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1972Statement of KERN, Associate Judge, Concurred in by FICKLING, Associate Judge, in Support of His Vote to have the Court Rehear this Case In Banc The majority hold that no seizure within the meaning and protection of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case when a uniformed police officer placed his hand on the arm of a citizen at the corner of 13th and F Streets and ordered him to “hold it” for questioning because the officer believed there was “something wrong” about what that particular citizen was doing. 1 The holding is contrary to the plain language of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S 1972Statement of KERN, Associate Judge, Concurred in by FICKLING, Associate Judge, in Support of His Vote to have the Court Rehear this Case In Banc The majority hold that no seizure within the meaning and protection of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case when a uniformed police officer placed his hand on the arm of a citizen at the corner of 13th and F Streets and ordered him to “hold it” for questioning because the officer believed there was “something wrong” about what that particular citizen was doing. 1 The holding is contrary to the plain language of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.