bench bar in South Carolina

2006For an exhaustive analytical discussion of the history and merits of comparative negligence, we refer the bench and bar to the opinion of Chief *265 Judge Sanders in Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162 , 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct.App.1984).

2006For an exhaustive analytical discussion of the history and merits of comparative negligence, we refer the bench and bar to the opinion of Chief *265 Judge Sanders in Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162 , 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct.App.1984).

1954This court is committed to complete adherence to the doctrine expressed by Mr. Justice Woods in the case of Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S. C. 236, 75 S. E. 533 , 541: ‘There can be no doubt on the bench or at the bar, that, in an action by an employee against his employer to recover damages for personal injury, both reason and authority forbid bringing into the evidence or argument *77 the fact that defendant is protected by employer’s liability insurance.

1933That reason is stated in the case of Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S. C., 236, 75 S. E., 533 , and is approved in the case of Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C., 129, 166 S. E., 101, 104 , in this language: “There can be no doubt on the bench or at the bar, that, in an action by an employee against his em *414 ployer to recover damages for personal injury, both reason and authority forbid bringing into the evidence or argument the fact that defendant is protected by .employer’s liability insurance.

1962In the case of Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C. 129, 166 S. E. 101 , this Court, with reference to bringing before the jury the fact that a defendant is protected by liability insurance, said: “* * * This court is committed to complete adherence to the doctrine expressed by Mr. Justice Woods in the case of Horsford v. Carolina Glass Company, 92 S. C. 236, 75 S. *425 E. 533, 541: ‘There can be no doubt on the bench or at the bar, that, in an action by an employee against his employer to recover damages for personal injury, both reason and authority forbid bringing into the evidence or argument the f

1933That reason is stated in the case of Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S. C., 236, 75 S. E., 533 , and is approved in the case of Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C., 129, 166 S. E., 101, 104 , in this language: “There can be no doubt on the bench or at the bar, that, in an action by an employee against his em *414 ployer to recover damages for personal injury, both reason and authority forbid bringing into the evidence or argument the fact that defendant is protected by .employer’s liability insurance.

1997In Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243 , 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991), the supreme court referred the bench and bar to Langley for "an exhaustive analytical discussion of the history and merits of comparative negligence.” 5 .

1997In Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243 , 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991), the supreme court referred the bench and bar to Langley for "an exhaustive analytical discussion of the history and merits of comparative negligence.” 5 .

2026In support of his argument, Respondent cites In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 346 S.C. 177 , 552 S.E.2d 10 (2001) (addressing, for the benefit of the bench and the bar in connection with a separate, confidential disciplinary matter, the contours of appropriate conduct by attorneys in depositions and emphasizing the broad discretion afforded to trial judges to determine what constitutes improper discovery tactics).

2026In support of his argument, Respondent cites In re Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 346 S.C. 177 , 552 S.E.2d 10 (2001) (addressing, for the benefit of the bench and the bar in connection with a separate, confidential disciplinary matter, the contours of appropriate conduct by attorneys in depositions and emphasizing the broad discretion afforded to trial judges to determine what constitutes improper discovery tactics).

2019Nonetheless, we address the merits for the benefit of the bench and bar. **382 Merits "The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb *197 a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.' " Burke , 421 S.C. at 558 , 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Commander , 396 S.C. at 262 -63 , 721 S.E.2d at 417 ).

2019Nonetheless, we address the merits for the benefit of the bench and bar. **382 Merits "The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb *197 a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.' " Burke , 421 S.C. at 558 , 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Commander , 396 S.C. at 262 -63 , 721 S.E.2d at 417 ).

2019"Determining whether prejudice exists 'depends on the circumstances[,]' and 'the materiality and prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case.' " Id. (quoting Taylor , 333 S.C. at 172 , 508 S.E.2d at 876 ).

2019"Determining whether prejudice exists 'depends on the circumstances[,]' and 'the materiality and prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case.' " Id. (quoting Taylor , 333 S.C. at 172 , 508 S.E.2d at 876 ).

2019In State v. Oates, 421 S.C. 1, 18-19 , 803 S.E.2d 911, 920-21 (2017), our supreme court addressed the confusion among the bench and bar regarding what standard the trial court should apply to a directed verdict motion when self-defense has been asserted: In State v. Dickey, [ 394 S.C. at 499 , 716 S.E.2d at 101 ], our supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground of self-defense.

2019In State v. Oates, 421 S.C. 1, 18-19 , 803 S.E.2d 911, 920-21 (2017), our supreme court addressed the confusion among the bench and bar regarding what standard the trial court should apply to a directed verdict motion when self-defense has been asserted: In State v. Dickey, [ 394 S.C. at 499 , 716 S.E.2d at 101 ], our supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground of self-defense.

2019Nonetheless, we address the merits for the benefit of the bench and bar. **382 Merits "The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb *197 a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.' " Burke , 421 S.C. at 558 , 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Commander , 396 S.C. at 262 -63 , 721 S.E.2d at 417 ).

2019Nonetheless, we address the merits for the benefit of the bench and bar. **382 Merits "The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb *197 a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a 'manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.' " Burke , 421 S.C. at 558 , 808 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting Commander , 396 S.C. at 262 -63 , 721 S.E.2d at 417 ).

2018Id . at 498-99, 623 S.E.2d at 387 .

2014We anticipate that this confusion could be avoided by ceasing reference to "proof aliunde of the corpus delicti " and similar terms, and instead echoing the language in Opper , in that the State must “introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . .

2014We anticipate that this confusion could be avoided by ceasing reference to "proof aliunde of the corpus delicti " and similar terms, and instead echoing the language in Opper , in that the State must “introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S.Ct. 158 . .

2014For the benefit of the bench and bar, we note that requiring mediation for DSS removal actions contradicts Rule 3(b)(8), ADR, which exempts family court cases initiated by DSS from mandatory mediation. . 343 S.C. 129 , 134-35, 538 S.E.2d 285 , 287-88 (Ct.App.2000). .

2014For the benefit of the bench and bar, we note that requiring mediation for DSS removal actions contradicts Rule 3(b)(8), ADR, which exempts family court cases initiated by DSS from mandatory mediation. . 343 S.C. 129 , 134-35, 538 S.E.2d 285 , 287-88 (Ct.App.2000). .

2014This Court recently addressed to the bench and bar our concern over the admission of gruesome photographs in State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618 , 703 S.E.2d 226 (2010), where we observed: Although we affirm the admission of the photographs, we take this opportunity to address an area of growing concern to this Court.

2014This Court recently addressed to the bench and bar our concern over the admission of gruesome photographs in State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618 , 703 S.E.2d 226 (2010), where we observed: Although we affirm the admission of the photographs, we take this opportunity to address an area of growing concern to this Court.

2013In doing so, we reminded the bench and bar that “[wjhether an issue of public importance exists necessitates a cautious balancing of the competing interests presented.” ATC, 380 S.C. at 198 , 669 S.E.2d at 341 .

2013In doing so, we reminded the bench and bar that “[wjhether an issue of public importance exists necessitates a cautious balancing of the competing interests presented.” ATC, 380 S.C. at 198 , 669 S.E.2d at 341 .

2010We address two matters for the benefit of the bench and bar: the apparent trend at the appellate level to find an abuse of discretion when an equitable division award in a long-term *172 marriage deviates from an equal division, and our view that the manner of accounting for a spouse’s “special equity” in marital property should follow the approach approved in Toler v. Toler, 292 S.C. 374 , 356 S.E.2d 429 (Ct.App.1987).

2010We address two matters for the benefit of the bench and bar: the apparent trend at the appellate level to find an abuse of discretion when an equitable division award in a long-term *172 marriage deviates from an equal division, and our view that the manner of accounting for a spouse’s “special equity” in marital property should follow the approach approved in Toler v. Toler, 292 S.C. 374 , 356 S.E.2d 429 (Ct.App.1987).

2007See Plath, 281 S.C. at 15 , 313 S.E.2d at 627 (“It should not be necessary in the near future ... to remind the bench and bar of the strict focus to be maintained in the course of a capital sentencing trial.”); and Smart, 278 S.C. at 526 , 299 S.E.2d at 692-93 (“While this Court approves zealous representation ... it is important in capital cases to maintain strict focus upon the particular characteristics of the specific crime and the unique attributes of the defendant.”).

2003State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20 , 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000) (applying Rule 608, SCRE).

2003State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20 , 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000) (applying Rule 608, SCRE).

1998In State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282 , 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994), the South Carolina Supreme Court edified the bench and bar in regard to the bifurcation of immunity, i.e., (1) use immunity and (2) transactional immunity.

1998In State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282 , 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994), the South Carolina Supreme Court edified the bench and bar in regard to the bifurcation of immunity, i.e., (1) use immunity and (2) transactional immunity.