93 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1905–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Owens v. Stategreen2 sentences2024So, yet again, we remind the bench and bar that long post-conviction delays “put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,” and we “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (811 SE2d 420) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted.). 3 Because this case requires our assessment of whether an instructional error was harmless, see Divi 2024So, yet again, we remind the bench and bar that long post-conviction delays “put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,” and we “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 3 Because this case requires our assessment of whether an instructional error was harmless, see | 18 | 18 |
Owens v. Stategreen2 sentences2024So, yet again, we remind the bench and bar that long post-conviction delays “put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,” and we “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (811 SE2d 420) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted.). 3 Because this case requires our assessment of whether an instructional error was harmless, see Divi 2024So, yet again, we remind the bench and bar that long post-conviction delays “put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,” and we “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 3 Because this case requires our assessment of whether an instructional error was harmless, see | 15 | 18 |
In Re Shelfergreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., In the Matter of Shelfer, 278 Ga. 55, 56 ( 597 SE2d 365 ) (2004) (After considering several mitigating factors, including “the absence of a prior disciplinary record during [the attorney’s] three and a half decades of practice,” the Court imposed a two-year suspension for an attorney who stole over $100,000 from his client over two years). 2014See, e.g., In the Matter of Shelfer, 278 Ga. 55, 56 ( 597 SE2d 365 ) (2004) (After considering several mitigating factors, including “the absence of a prior disciplinary record during [the attorney’s] three and a half decades of practice,” the Court imposed a two-year suspension for an attorney who stole over $100,000 from his client over two years). | 2 | 2 |
Alizota v. Stanfieldgreen2 sentences2013Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga. subject matter jurisdiction, “the General Assembly may desire to provide the bench and bar with additional guidance on the appropriate limits and application of each court’s concurrent [and exclusive] jurisdiction.” Alizota, supra, 319 Ga. App. at 259 (Boggs, J., concurring specially). 5 645, 649 (2) ( 533 SE2d 695 ) (2000) (holding that “where neither party seeking custody is a parent as defined by Georgia law, a determination of custody is to be made according to the best interest of the child even where there exists an agreement by which a parent of the child has 2013Given the utmost importance of cases involving the interests of our children and the apparent increase in litigation over subject matter jurisdiction, “the General Assembly may desire to provide the bench and bar with additional guidance on the appropriate limits and application of each court’s concurrent [and exclusive] jurisdiction.” Alizota, supra, 319 Ga. App. at 259 (Boggs, J., concurring specially). | 2 | 2 |
Hightower v. Stategreen2 sentences1993After the hearing mandated by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 (B), the trial court made the following determination on the record: “[T]he court has to make findings; number one, a similar transaction is being introduced for the proper, specific purpose, which the court so finds; that the defendant on trial was the person who committed the similar transaction and that there is sufficient connection or similarity between the similar transactions and the offense charged so that proof of the similar event tends to prove the latter, and the court makes a finding on each of those.” Although no enum 1993After the hearing mandated by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 (B), the trial court made the following determination on the record: “[T]he court has to make findings; number one, a similar transaction is being introduced for the proper, specific purpose, which the court so finds; that the defendant on trial was the person who committed the similar transaction and that there is sufficient connection or similarity between the similar transactions and the offense charged so that proof of the similar event tends to prove the latter, and the court makes a finding on each of those.” Although no enum | 2 | 2 |
In re Koehlergreen2 sentences2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat 2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Dogangreen2 sentences2025The Special Master found in mitigation that Nwosu acted without a selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b), explaining that because Nwosu “was working on a flat fee, . . . the result [of his client’s case] would not have benefited [Nwosu] directly.” The Special Master also found that Nwosu provided strong evidence of his good character and reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g), as the testimony at the evidentiary hearing from the then- Chief Judge of the Cobb Judicial Circuit “paint[ed] [Nwosu] as an attorney trusted and respected by both the bench and the bar, and valued by his clients,” and 2025The Special Master found in mitigation that Nwosu acted without a selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b), explaining that because Nwosu “was working on a flat fee, . . . the result [of his client’s case] would not have benefited [Nwosu] directly.” The Special Master also found that Nwosu provided strong evidence of his good character and reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g), as the testimony at the evidentiary hearing from the then- Chief Judge of the Cobb Judicial Circuit “paint[ed] [Nwosu] as an attorney trusted and respected by both the bench and the bar, and valued by his clients,” and | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Jones v. State, 316 Ga. 481, 486 (2) (888 SE2d 91) (2023). 2 Police responded to the call and entered Nelson’s home through the balcony door. 2024See Jones v. State, 316 Ga. 481, 486 (2) (888 SE2d 91) (2023). 2 Police responded to the call and entered Nelson’s home through the balcony door. | 1 | 1 |
MITCHELL v. the STATE.green2 sentences2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Stategreen2 sentences2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 | 1 | 1 |
Peacock Construction Co. v. Chambersgreen2 sentences2020Co. v. Chambers, 223 Ga. 515, 518 ( 156 SE2d 348 ) (1967) (resolving conflicting decisions “to clear the air of confusion in the minds of both the bench and bar”). 2020Co. v. Chambers, 223 Ga. 515, 518 ( 156 SE2d 348 ) (1967) (resolving conflicting decisions “to clear the air of confusion in the minds of both the bench and bar”). | 1 | 1 |
Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, Llp v. Francisco \Frank\" Lopez"green1 sentence2020See also Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 SW3d 494, 506-508 (Tex. 2015) (Guzman, J., concurring) (explaining that defining the parameters of an ethics rule requiring attorneys to fully inform clients about the potential consequences of arbitration before entering into an agreement mandating arbitration of legal malpractice claims is “more aptly suited to [the bar] rulemaking process, which invites the input of the bench and bar,” and that “[g]uidance is essential, but rather than articulating best-practices standards by judicial fiat, the rulemaking process provides a bet | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Eavesgreen2 sentences2019Judge Peterson's statement in Franklin I , related only to application of the statute of limitation to separate causes of action created by "any discrete adverse employment action." 337 Ga. App. at 297 (2), 787 S.E.2d 265 . 2019Judge Peterson's statement in Franklin I , related only to application of the statute of limitation to separate causes of action created by "any discrete adverse employment action." 337 Ga. App. at 297 (2), 787 S.E.2d 265 . | 1 | 1 |
Edge v. Edgegreen1 sentence2017This means that the proper appellate procedure to employ 4 290 Ga. 551, 662 (1) ( 722 SE2d 729 ) (2012). 6 depends upon the issue involved in the appeal, even if the order or judgment being challenged on appeal was of the type listed in OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) and was entered in a child custody case.5 Turning to this case, Husband has not directly challenged on appeal the court’s substantive ruling refusing to change custody. | 1 | 1 |
Norred v. Teavergreen2 sentences2016And thus the majority is in fact overruling these decisions, not merely clarifying them. 2 “The bench and bar are entitled to rely on long-standing case law,” Norred v. Teaver, 320 Ga. App. 508, 515 ( 740 SE2d 251 ) (2013) (Andrews, P. J., concurring), and so it is here. 2016And thus the majority is in fact overruling these decisions, not merely clarifying them. 2 “The bench and bar are entitled to rely on long-standing case law,” Norred v. Teaver, 320 Ga. App. 508, 515 ( 740 SE2d 251 ) (2013) (Andrews, P. J., concurring), and so it is here. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Matichgreen2 sentences2016See Anderson v. Matich, 186 Ga. App. 84, 86 ( 366 SE2d 300 ) (1988) (summary judgment not authorized solely because party opposing motion did not appear at the summary judgment hearing). 2016See Anderson v. Matich, 186 Ga. App. 84, 86 ( 366 SE2d 300 ) (1988) (summary judgment not authorized solely because party opposing motion did not appear at the summary judgment hearing). | 1 | 1 |
| McFalls v. Onsagergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boddie v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Armstrong v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harper v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beck v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Slatongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Radioshack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing II, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blake v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brodes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bailey v. Edmundsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Banks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terrell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shadix v. Carroll Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hardwick v. Georgia Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cochran v. McCollumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Germanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pitts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodriguez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
FRETT v. STATE FARM EMPLOYEE WORKERS' COMPENSATIONgreen2 sentences2022But cf., e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 309 Ga. 44, 60 (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (pointing out, in the course of overruling an 85-year-old precedent, the opposite phenomenon and noting that we had “never cited [the states that “the basis for the creation of an out-of-time appeal is unwieldy, contradictory, and unsound, as it creates two paths to relief, contradicts statute, and does not lead to finality in judgment.” And even GACDL concedes that “[t]he out-of-time appeal is a jerry-rigged remedy, illegitimate but practical,” and that “[t]here can be little doubt at this 2022But cf., e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 309 Ga. 44, 60 (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (pointing out, in the course of overruling an 85-year-old precedent, the opposite phenomenon and noting that we had “never cited [the states that “the basis for the creation of an out-of-time appeal is unwieldy, contradictory, and unsound, as it creates two paths to relief, contradicts statute, and does not lead to finality in judgment.” And even GACDL concedes that “[t]he out-of-time appeal is a jerry-rigged remedy, illegitimate but practical,” and that “[t]here can be little doubt at this | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC
green
2 sentences2018Turning to the language at issue, Rule 25.1 requires that a recusal motion be both filed and presented to the trial judge; because filing and presentation are set forth in the conjunctive, compliance with both is required, see Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC , 299 Ga. 891 (1), 792 S.E.2d 680 (2016), and, logically, they must mean different things. 2018Turning to the language at issue, Rule 25.1 requires that a recusal motion be both filed and presented to the trial judge; because filing and presentation are set forth in the conjunctive, compliance with both is required, see Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC , 299 Ga. 891 (1), 792 S.E.2d 680 (2016), and, logically, they must mean different things. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Hall v. Hopper
green
2 sentences2006More recently, however, this Court recognized the repeal of the full bench rule and gave notice thereof to the bench and bar in Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625 (3) ( 216 SE2d 839 ) (1975). 2006More recently, however, this Court recognized the repeal of the full bench rule and gave notice thereof to the bench and bar in Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625 (3) ( 216 SE2d 839 ) (1975). | 2 | 1975–2006 |
Stephens v. State
green
2 sentences1993Accord Loggins v. State, 260 Ga. 1 (2) ( 388 SE2d 675 ) (1990); Hamilton v. State, 260 Ga. 3 (2) (b) (ii) ( 389 SE2d 225 ) (1990); Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789 (3) ( 400 SE2d 329 ) (1991); Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (6) ( 405 SE2d 483 ) (1991); Edwards v. State, 261 Ga. 509, 510-511 ( 406 SE2d 79 ) (1991) (Benham and Smith, JJ., dissenting); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (2) ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991); Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798 (1) ( 410 SE2d 423 ) (1991); Kemp v. State, 261 Ga. 804 (2) ( 411 SE2d 711 ) (1992); Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73 (2) ( 414 SE2d 470 ) (1992); Ward v. State, 2 1993Accord Loggins v. State, 260 Ga. 1 (2) ( 388 SE2d 675 ) (1990); Hamilton v. State, 260 Ga. 3 (2) (b) (ii) ( 389 SE2d 225 ) (1990); Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789 (3) ( 400 SE2d 329 ) (1991); Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (6) ( 405 SE2d 483 ) (1991); Edwards v. State, 261 Ga. 509, 510-511 ( 406 SE2d 79 ) (1991) (Benham and Smith, JJ., dissenting); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (2) ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991); Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798 (1) ( 410 SE2d 423 ) (1991); Kemp v. State, 261 Ga. 804 (2) ( 411 SE2d 711 ) (1992); Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73 (2) ( 414 SE2d 470 ) (1992); Ward v. State, 2 | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Coppage v. Mellon Bank
green
2 sentences1985Therefore, after such jury trial, direct appeal is possible from the resulting entry of judgment. “[F]or the benefit of the bench and bar we reiterate the pertinent statements contained in Coppage v. Mellon Bank, 142 Ga. App. 12 (2) ( 234 SE2d 824 ) [(1977)] (disapproved on other procedural grounds, Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., supra). ‘The defendant shall be required to pay into the registry of the court all past due amounts “admitted” due and all amounts of “unaccelerated” payments which become due after the issuance of the summons.’ Thus, the defendant is not required to pay into the registr 1985Therefore, after such jury trial, direct appeal is possible from the resulting entry of judgment. “[F]or the benefit of the bench and bar we reiterate the pertinent statements contained in Coppage v. Mellon Bank, 142 Ga. App. 12 (2) ( 234 SE2d 824 ) [(1977)] (disapproved on other procedural grounds, Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., supra). ‘The defendant shall be required to pay into the registry of the court all past due amounts “admitted” due and all amounts of “unaccelerated” payments which become due after the issuance of the summons.’ Thus, the defendant is not required to pay into the registr | 2 | 1979–1985 |
In re Shankle
neutral
2 sentences2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 (764 SE2d 549) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of 12 making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 (727 SE2d 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriate where 2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re Minsk
green
2 sentences2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat 2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Manning-Wallace
green
2 sentences2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 (764 SE2d 549) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of 12 making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 (727 SE2d 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriate where 2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat | 1 | 2025–2025 |
in the Matter of Clark Jones-Lewis
green
2 sentences2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 (764 SE2d 549) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of 12 making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 (727 SE2d 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriate where 2025See also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 ( 778 SE2d 218 ) (2015) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 ( 764 SE2d 549 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 ( 765 SE2d 361 ) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 ( 727 SE2d 12 502) (2012) (disbarment appropriat | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023The cases he cites to that end are inapposite. 6 Indeed, we 5 We note for the bench and bar that “[t]he General Assembly recently has amended the Evidence Code . . . to extend to criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993), and its progeny. 2023The cases he cites to that end are inapposite. 6 Indeed, we 5 We note for the bench and bar that “[t]he General Assembly recently has amended the Evidence Code . . . to extend to criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993), and its progeny. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jarvis v. Jarvis
green
2 sentences2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 2022As a result, this claim of error is moot.11 9 See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (4) ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (reminding the bench and bar that “we do not condone … inordinate delay[s] in … motion for new trial proceeding[s],” as such “delays put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial[ ]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 See State v. Huffman, 351 Ga. App. 853 , 854 ( 833 SE2d 552 ) (2019) (reviewing due process argument regarding notice of probation revocation petition); Mitchell v. State, 343 Ga. App. 116, 117 ( 8 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hammond v. Hammond
green
1 sentence2017This means that the proper appellate procedure to employ 4 290 Ga. 551, 662 (1) ( 722 SE2d 729 ) (2012). 6 depends upon the issue involved in the appeal, even if the order or judgment being challenged on appeal was of the type listed in OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) and was entered in a child custody case.5 Turning to this case, Husband has not directly challenged on appeal the court’s substantive ruling refusing to change custody. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Benefield v. Tominich
green
2 sentences2017Unlike a concurrence in the judgment only or a special concurrence without a statement of agreement with all that is said — which, according to our Rule 33 (a), renders a decision physical precedent only — a concurrence dubitante is a full concurrence, albeit one with reservations.” Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605 , 611 n.28 ( 708 SE2d 563 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring dubitante). for ascertaining whether a criminal defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was both knowing and voluntary.2 Our case law notes that where a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the 2017Unlike a concurrence in the judgment only or a special concurrence without a statement of agreement with all that is said — which, according to our Rule 33 (a), renders a decision physical precedent only — a concurrence dubitante is a full concurrence, albeit one with reservations.” Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605 , 611 n.28 ( 708 SE2d 563 ) (2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring dubitante). for ascertaining whether a criminal defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was both knowing and voluntary.2 Our case law notes that where a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Stills v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2013Stills v. Johnson, 272 Ga. subject matter jurisdiction, “the General Assembly may desire to provide the bench and bar with additional guidance on the appropriate limits and application of each court’s concurrent [and exclusive] jurisdiction.” Alizota, supra, 319 Ga. App. at 259 (Boggs, J., concurring specially). 5 645, 649 (2) ( 533 SE2d 695 ) (2000) (holding that “where neither party seeking custody is a parent as defined by Georgia law, a determination of custody is to be made according to the best interest of the child even where there exists an agreement by which a parent of the child has | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Adams v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Merrow v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Strozier v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Bailey v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Edgar v. Shave green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Chubbuck v. Lake green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Patterson v. Patterson green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Drake v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Rutledge v. Northbank Liquor Store, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Edmonson v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Malcolm v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Byrd v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Kerlin v. State neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Gilstrap v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Gillis v. Goodgame green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Maxwell v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Ward v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Daniel v. Daniel green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Hamilton v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Edwards v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.