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91 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1830–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
National Recovery Systems v. Perlmangreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Grim v. Betz, 372 Pa.Superior Ct. 614, 623, 539 A.2d 1365, 1369 (1988) (Beck, J., concurring) (calling for the reform of the rules relating to the appealability of orders); National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. 546, 551, 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987) (“both the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order----”). 1989See, e.g., Grim v. Betz, 372 Pa.Superior Ct. 614, 623, 539 A.2d 1365, 1369 (1988) (Beck, J., concurring) (calling for the reform of the rules relating to the appealability of orders); National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. 546, 551, 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987) (“both the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order ... ”). | 4 | 4 |
Pugar v. Grecogreen2 sentences1988As was recently stated in National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Super. 546 , 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987): [B]oth the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order given in Pugar v. Greco: "one which usually ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case," 483 Pa. 68, 73 , 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978), at least as to one party to the suit. 1988As was recently stated in National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Super. 546 , 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987): [B]oth the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order given in Pugar v. Greco: "one which usually ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case," 483 Pa. 68, 73 , 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978), at least as to one party to the suit. | 3 | 3 |
Lamp v. Heymangreen2 sentences2021Id. (“Our purpose is to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.”). [ ] Farinacci [ ] aided the bench and bar by further defining the contours of the Lamp rule. 2021Id. (“Our purpose is to avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.”). [] Farinacci [] aided the bench and bar by further defining the contours of the Lamp rule. | 2 | 2 |
Robinson Township v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (Pa. 2013); Markham v. Wolfe, 136 A.3d 134 , 147 n.2 (Pa. 2016) (Dougherty, J., concurring) (“justiciability questions (including political question limitations, standing, ripeness, and mootness) are threshold matters generally to be resolved before proceeding to the merits.”). 2016See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 , 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (2013); Markham v. Wolf, 635 Pa. 288 , 136 A.3d 134 , 147 n. 2 (2016) (Dougherty, J., concurring) (“justiciability questions (including political question limitations, standing, ripeness, and mootness) are threshold matters generally to be resolved before proceeding to the merits.”). | 2 | 2 |
Grim v. Betzgreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Grim v. Betz, 372 Pa.Superior Ct. 614, 623, 539 A.2d 1365, 1369 (1988) (Beck, J., concurring) (calling for the reform of the rules relating to the appealability of orders); National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. 546, 551, 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987) (“both the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order----”). 1989See, e.g., Grim v. Betz, 372 Pa.Superior Ct. 614, 623, 539 A.2d 1365, 1369 (1988) (Beck, J., concurring) (calling for the reform of the rules relating to the appealability of orders); National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. 546, 551, 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987) (“both the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order ... ”). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Batts, Q., Aplt.red2 sentences2022Accordingly, in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II),1 this Court established a set of legal criteria to guide the bench and bar. 2022If so, then the appellant’s challenge implicates the legality of his sentence.17 Conversely, if the challenge is not to the existence of certain authority but to the exercise of that authority, then the challenge 15 The four categories of legality challenges described above are not necessarily exhaustive; they are descriptive and intended as guideposts for the bench and bar in assessing whether a challenge sounds in legality or in discretionary aspects. 16 See also Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 434-35 (Pa. 2017) (reviewing distinct kinds of legality challenges and concluding that “a cla | 1 | 2 |
Phillips v. Cricket Lightersgreen2 sentences2014Cf. Phillips, supra. The Azzarello Court premised its broad holding on the assumption that the term “unreasonably dangerous” is misleading to jurors because it “tends to suggest considerations which are usually identified with the law of negligence.” 391 A.2d at 1025. 2010See Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644, 665 , 841 A.2d 1000, 1012 (2003) (Saylor, J., concurring). | 1 | 2 |
Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc.red2 sentences2014Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547 , 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978) (observing that principles articulated in the Restatement of Torts that have value in providing guidance to the bench and bar are not necessarily appropriate for use in a jury charge: “Thus the mere fact that we have approved Section 402A, and even if we agree that the phrase ‘unreasonably dangerous’ serves a useful purpose in predicting liability in this area, it does not follow that this language should be used in framing the issues for the jury’s consideration.”); see also Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (“An instruction that accurately quotes or 2014Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547 , 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978) (observing that principles articulated in the Restatement of Torts that have value in providing guidance to the bench and bar are not necessarily appropriate for use in a jury charge: “Thus the mere fact that we have approved Section 402A, and even if we agree that the phrase ‘unreasonably dangerous’ serves a useful purpose in predicting liability in this area, it does not follow that this language should be used in framing the issues for the jury’s consideration.”); see also Rogers, 772 P.2d at 931 (“An instruction that accurately quotes or | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Lordgreen2 sentences2010Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998). 2010Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
cluster 667153green2 sentences2002Respecting notice provisions, the Comment stated an intent “to aid the bench and bar in complying with Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3rd Cir.1994).” Explanatory Comment — 1996 to Rule 2958.3. 1998See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 , 1271 (3rd Cir.1994) (stating “procedural rules which included [due process] protections could largely avoid the problems the parties to this case face and, at the same time, preserve the legitimate aspects of a creditor’s remedy that has shown its commercial utility from colonial times to the present”); Pa.R.C.P. 2950, Explanatory Comment-1996 (II) (“The provisions for notice are intended to aid the bench and bar in complying with Jordan.”). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Dixongreen1 sentence2026See Dixon, 907 A.2d at 472-73 ; accord Commonwealth v. Phillips, 344 A.3d 360 , 367 n.11 (Pa. 2025) (declining to dismiss appeal as moot despite suspected expiration of sentence during appeal because, inter - 17 - J-A18018-25 alia, deciding issue raised “will be useful and instructive to the bench and bar in future cases”). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industrygreen1 sentence2025Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 162 A.3d 384, 392 (Pa. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Vicari v. Spiegelgreen1 sentence2024See generally Vicari v. Spiegel, 989 A.2d 1277, 1290 (Pa. 2010) (Saylor, J., concurring) (explaining that, although the overlooking of waiver “to dispose of [a] salient interpretive legal question on the merits can be justified as a salutary measure undertaken to provide guidance to the bench and bar,” such holdings “should be applied prospectively only, and only to parties that have preserved the issue”). | 1 | 1 |
| Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. McAninleygreen | 1 | 1 |
Fort Bend County v. Davisgreen1 sentence2021See Melograne, 812 A.2d at 1167 ; Riedel, 739 A.2d at 124 ; Delaware River Port Auth., 182 A.2d at 686 ; see also Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 , 1848 n.4 (2019) (“Courts, including this Court, . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”) (quotation marks omitted, alterations in original). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Bryant v. Hendrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Adoption of G.T.M.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Freemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Warren v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Burchardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stilp v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Bongiornogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Gonzalezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rogers v. Meridian Park Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bugosh v. I.U. North America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodgers v. Yellow Cab Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Policegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jeffrey v. Farmers New Century Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Torresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Larsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McGillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. LaCavagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Christoff Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Crawleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wolfegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2026This Court in Spencer recognized that, “[d]eadlocked juries are a matter of concern to both the bench and the bar.” [Spencer,] 275 A.2d at 304 . 2025Moreover, this Court in Spencer recognized that, “[d]eadlocked juries are a matter of concern to both the bench and the bar.” [Spencer,] 275 A.2d at 304 . | 5 | 2008–2026 |
McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia
green
2 sentences2021As noted supra, the Farinacci Court clarified that: (1) plaintiffs carry an evidentiary burden of proving -9- J-A25016-20 that they made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of actions was served on defendants, McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759 . 2021As noted supra, the Farinacci Court clarified that: (1) plaintiffs carry an evidentiary burden of proving that they made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of actions was served on defendants, McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759 . | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority
green
2 sentences2021As noted supra, the Farinacci Court clarified that: (1) plaintiffs carry an evidentiary burden of proving -9- J-A25016-20 that they made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of actions was served on defendants, McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759 . 2021As noted supra, the Farinacci Court clarified that: (1) plaintiffs carry an evidentiary burden of proving that they made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of actions was served on defendants, McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759 . | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Markham v. Wolf
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (Pa. 2013); Markham v. Wolfe, 136 A.3d 134 , 147 n.2 (Pa. 2016) (Dougherty, J., concurring) (“justiciability questions (including political question limitations, standing, ripeness, and mootness) are threshold matters generally to be resolved before proceeding to the merits.”). 2016See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 , 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (2013); Markham v. Wolf, 635 Pa. 288 , 136 A.3d 134 , 147 n. 2 (2016) (Dougherty, J., concurring) (“justiciability questions (including political question limitations, standing, ripeness, and mootness) are threshold matters generally to be resolved before proceeding to the merits.”). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Waters
green
2 sentences1987Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 231 ; (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied). 1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 . | 2 | 1978–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Sherard
green
2 sentences1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 . 1978Because of the desirability of the objectives sought to be obtained by enforcement of this requirement and the unequivocal notice to the bench and the bar that strict compliance would be expected as to motions filed after our Blair decision, there is no longer a justification for a continuation of an exception of the application . . . .” Id., Id., 477 Pa. at 435-36 , 384 A.2d at 237 . | 2 | 1978–1987 |
Kerper v. Hoch
neutral
2 sentences1938While the result reached by this line of cases is good, for the reasons given by Mr. Justice Kennedy in Kerper v. Hoch, supra (which case, incidentally, Mr. Justice Sharswood, in Bindley’s Appeal, 69 Pa. 295, 299 , says was “considered by many of the foremost men of the bench and the bar, at the time, to have been rather an act of judicial legislation than of construction”), the reasoning which distinguishes the two lines of Cases would seem to be rather tenuous. 1872In illustration of this general remark, it will be sufficient to refer to the decision in Kerper v. Hoch, 1 Watts 9 , considered by many of the foremost men of the bench and the bar, at the time, to have been rather an act of judicial legislation than of construction, and to the cases of Trevor v. Ellenberger’s Ex’rs., 2 Penna. | 2 | 1872–1938 |
Penn v. Hamilton
neutral
2 sentences1938As Mr. Chief Justice Gibson remarked in Penn v. Hamilton, supra (p. 58) : “It was of little moment as to consequences, whether the lien had its root in a judgment, or was but dependent on one for its continuance, as the mischief from an indefinite duration, of it would be the same ... 1872Rep. 94, and Penn v. Hamilton, 2 Watts 53 , in which the provisions of the Act of April 4th 1798, 3 Sm. | 2 | 1872–1938 |
Miller v. Billington
green
1 sentence2026Thus, this section merely seeks to provide the bench and bar with a clearer understanding through a consolidation of our precedent. [J-56-2024] - 21 at all, or to do it through its own officers, if in its legislative judgment it is no longer expedient to do so.” Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kapcsos, A. v. Benshoff, M.
green
1 sentence2025As this Court has observed, “partition actions are not very common and, thus, . . . the bench and bar may be unfamiliar with their procedural peculiarities.” Id. at 144 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jones v. Mississippi
green
1 sentence2022If so, then the appellant’s challenge implicates the legality of his sentence.17 Conversely, if the challenge is not to the existence of certain authority but to the exercise of that authority, then the challenge 15 The four categories of legality challenges described above are not necessarily exhaustive; they are descriptive and intended as guideposts for the bench and bar in assessing whether a challenge sounds in legality or in discretionary aspects. 16 See also Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 434-35 (Pa. 2017) (reviewing distinct kinds of legality challenges and concluding that “a cla | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Foster
green
1 sentence2022As Chief Justice Baer cogently has explained, “because a sentencing court loses its authority to exercise discretion when a mandatory minimum sentence applies, the question of the propriety of applying a mandatory minimum sentencing provision implicates legality.” Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 , 663–64 (Pa. 2016) (Baer, J., concurring) (referencing Foster, 17 A.3d 332 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Wolfe, M.
green
1 sentence2022As Chief Justice Baer cogently has explained, “because a sentencing court loses its authority to exercise discretion when a mandatory minimum sentence applies, the question of the propriety of applying a mandatory minimum sentencing provision implicates legality.” Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 , 663–64 (Pa. 2016) (Baer, J., concurring) (referencing Foster, 17 A.3d 332 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Riedel v. HUMAN REL. COM'N OF READING
green
1 sentence2021See Melograne, 812 A.2d at 1167 ; Riedel, 739 A.2d at 124 ; Delaware River Port Auth., 182 A.2d at 686 ; see also Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 , 1848 n.4 (2019) (“Courts, including this Court, . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”) (quotation marks omitted, alterations in original). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
green
1 sentence2021See Melograne, 812 A.2d at 1167 ; Riedel, 739 A.2d at 124 ; Delaware River Port Auth., 182 A.2d at 686 ; see also Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843 , 1848 n.4 (2019) (“Courts, including this Court, . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”) (quotation marks omitted, alterations in original). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Moore
green
1 sentence2021Nonetheless, in Moore, Justice Saylor astutely observed that our cases concerning state of mind evidence have been inconsistent, id. at 1070 , which undoubtedly has caused some confusion for the bench and bar in this complex area of evidentiary law. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Bracy v. Gramley green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Withrow v. Larkin green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Union Switch & Signal Division American Standard Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio and MacHine Workers of America, Local 610 green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In the Interest of D.L.F. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re: Est. of: Schumacher, R., Sr. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Commonwealth v. Thompson green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Zablocki, M. v. Beining, J. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Marion green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ireland v. Mitchell green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Grant green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Orocio green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Commonwealth v. Garcia green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| E.D. v. M.P. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Campbell v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Commonwealth v. Banks green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Hilton v. Guyot green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Spencer v. Kemna green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Commonwealth Ex. Rel. James Dadario v. Goldberg green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Chester green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Morris green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Kimball green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Lantzy green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.