bench bar in Tennessee

2017Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. 1996) (“[I]inferior courts are not free to disregard, on the basis that the statement is obiter dictum, the pronouncement of a superior court when it speaks directly on the matter before it, particularly when the superior court seeks to give guidance to the bench and bar.

2015The court observed, “[w]hen courts have implied a private right of action from a criminal statute, the statute invariably is intended to protect a particular class of people.” Id. (emphasis added) 3 The 2012 amendment to section 107 added the provision currently codified at sub-section 107(a)(3)(B). 9 before it, particularly when the superior court seeks to give guidance to the bench and bar.‖ Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. 1996); Monday v. Thomas, No. M2012–01357– COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 1852958 , at *3 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2014). ―[T]rial courts mu

1998In all these circumstances our ability to deny review with concurrence in results only precludes publication of the intermediate appellate court decision, Pairamore v. Pairamore, 547 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn. 1977); see also Rule 4.4, Rules of Tenn. Sup. Ct. This designation also alerts the bench and the bar that this -9- Court disagrees with some aspect of the intermediate appellate court decision.

1991While this type of disposition leaves the bench and bar guessing about the reasons for the Supreme Court’s dissatisfaction with the opinion, Pairamore v. Pairamore, 547 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Tenn.1977) (Henry, J., dissenting), it should be sufficient to dissuade others from relying on the opinion.

2020In State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), our supreme court emphasized that the burden is on the defendant to ensure that the conditions for properly preserving a question of law pursuant to Rule 37 have been met: This is an appropriate time for this Court to make explicit to the bench and bar exactly what the appellate courts will hereafter require as prerequisites to the consideration of the merits of a question of law certified pursuant to Tenn. R.

2020In State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), our supreme court emphasized that the burden is on the defendant to ensure that the conditions for properly preserving a question of law pursuant to Rule 37 have been met: This is an appropriate time for this Court to make explicit to the bench and bar exactly what the appellate courts will hereafter require as prerequisites to the consideration of the merits of a question of law certified pursuant to Tenn. R.

2013Between 1977 and 1997, reviewing courts conducted proportionality reviews without “a structured review process.” State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 363 (Tenn. 1997) (Reid, J., dissenting).

2013Between 1977 and 1997, reviewing courts conducted proportionality reviews without “a structured review process.” State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 363 (Tenn.1997) (Reid, J., dissenting).

2012See Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. 1993) (“[T]he published opinions of the intermediate appellate courts are opinions which have precedential value and may be relied upon by the bench and bar of this state as representing the present state of the law with the same confidence and reliability as the published opinions of [the Tennessee Supreme] Court, so long as either are not overruled or modified by subsequent decisions.”); Allen v. State, No. M2003-00905-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1745357 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2004) (noting that because the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permi

2002Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. 1993).

2026P. 56.04 (“The trial court shall state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion [for summary judgment], which shall be included in the order reflecting the court’s ruling.”); Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 313 (Tenn. 2014) (finding Rule 56.04 to be mandatory and explaining that “the litigants, the bench and bar, and the public expect [judges] to explain why a particular result is correct based on the applicable legal principles” (citation omitted)).

2026Moreover, “[i]n addition to expecting judges to be ‘fair, impartial, and engaged,’ the litigants, the bench and bar, and the public expect them to explain why a particular result is correct based on the applicable legal principles”; indeed, a trial court “[p]roviding reasons for a decision reinforces the legitimacy of the legal process which, in turn, promotes respect for the judicial system.” Id. at 312– 13 (citations omitted).

2003Failure to properly reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Preston will result in the dismissal of the appeal. -3- State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1996).

1998In State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and again in State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1996), the court held: This is an app ropriate time for this Court to make explicit to the bench and bar exa ctly what the appe llate courts will hereafter requ ire as prerequisites to the consideration of the merits of a question of law certified pursuant to Tenn. R.

2020Moreover, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “‘[p]ublic policy demands that the court should shorten, as far as possible, litigations, lest the estate should be more or less absorbed as a result of expensive court costs and other expenses of litigation.’” Jones, 187 S.W.2d at 791 (quoting Lillard v. Tolliver, 285 S.W. 576, 579 (Tenn. 1926)).

2019Rather, these questions are “answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” Id.

2019The floor established by the Due Process Clause simply “requires a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal,’ before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Id. at 904-05 (emphasis added).

2016We note that the United States Supreme Court instructed the bench and bar that while the analysis of a defendant‟s standing to challenge a search and the analysis of whether a defendant‟s personal Fourth Amendment rights have been violated are generally the same, “the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant‟s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978). -3- The trial court denied appellant‟s motion for new trial.

2015The court observed, “[w]hen courts have implied a private right of action from a criminal statute, the statute invariably is intended to protect a particular class of people.” Id. (emphasis added) 3 The 2012 amendment to section 107 added the provision currently codified at sub-section 107(a)(3)(B). 9 before it, particularly when the superior court seeks to give guidance to the bench and bar.‖ Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. 1996); Monday v. Thomas, No. M2012–01357– COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 1852958 , at *3 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2014). ―[T]rial courts mu

2015The court observed, “[w]hen courts have implied a private right of action from a criminal statute, the statute invariably is intended to protect a particular class of people.” Id. (emphasis added) 3 The 2012 amendment to section 107 added the provision currently codified at sub-section 107(a)(3)(B). 9 before it, particularly when the superior court seeks to give guidance to the bench and bar.‖ Holder v. Tennessee Judicial Selection Comm’n, 937 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. 1996); Monday v. Thomas, No. M2012–01357– COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 1852958 , at *3 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 2014). ―[T]rial courts mu

2002Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee is not necessarily committed to all views expressed in an opinion of an intermediate appellate court when discretionary review is denied, see Swift v. Kirby, 737 S.W.2d 271, 277 (Tenn. 1987), our supreme court has stated that the published opinions of the intermediate appellate courts are opinions which have precedential value and may be relied upon by the bench and bar of this state as representing the present state of the law with the same confidence and reliability as the published opinions of this Court, so long as [they] are not overruled or modifie

1998In State v. Robinson, 618 S.W.2d 754, 759 (Tenn. Crim.

1998Ct. App. 1988) which recognized that the issue was novel. 533 So. 2d at 846, n.4 . .... [T]his court [has] held that if a legal issue, although in existence, was not generally known to the bench and bar when a particular case went to trial, then it could not be said that the attorney in that trial was ineffective for failing to raise the issue. 24 Overbay, 806 S.W.2d at 214-15 (parallel citations omitted).

1998Ct. App. 1988) which recognized that the issue was novel. 533 So. 2d at 846, n.4 . .... [T]his court [has] held that if a legal issue, although in existence, was not generally known to the bench and bar when a particular case went to trial, then it could not be said that the attorney in that trial was ineffective for failing to raise the issue. 24 Overbay, 806 S.W.2d at 214-15 (parallel citations omitted).

1998See, e.g., Aetna, supra, at 820-821, 106 S.Ct., at 1584-1585 ; Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 , 47 S.Ct. 437 , 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 , 455; ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(l)(a)(1980).