bench bar in Connecticut

2017In State v. Urbanowski, 163 Conn. App. 377 , 384–85, 136 A.3d 236 , cert. granted, 321 Conn. 905 , 138 A.3d 280 (2016), this court held that, where a defendant had not sought to correct an illegal sentence by filing a Practice Book § 43-22 motion in the trial court, it is inappropriate to raise an illegal sentence claim for the first time on direct appeal.

2009This statutory emphasis upon the defendant further demonstrates the function of the jury in their evaluation of the self-defense claim.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) We acknowledge that the original development of this proposition in Quintana may well have been misleading to the bench and bar, as this court quoted State v. Corchado, 188 Conn. 653, 663 , 453 A.2d 427 (1982), for the general proposition of what the defendant “reasonably believes under the circumstances,” and then added the bracketed language “[as to whether a safe retreat was available and whether he knew of it].” (Internal quotati

2009This statutory emphasis upon the defendant further demonstrates the function of the jury in their evaluation of the self-defense claim.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) We acknowledge that the original development of this proposition in Quintana may well have been misleading to the bench and bar, as this court quoted State v. Corchado, 188 Conn. 653, 663 , 453 A.2d 427 (1982), for the general proposition of what the defendant “reasonably believes under the circumstances,” and then added the bracketed language “[as to whether a safe retreat was available and whether he knew of it].” (Internal quotati

2008I The majority posits four reasons why this court is not constrained in its ability to overrule or modify a rule of evidence despite the fact that the judges of the Superior Court have codified that rule into the code: (1) "Although it is clear [from the stated purpose of the code under § 1.2(a)] that the judges of the Superior Court intended the law of evidence to grow and develop in the future through `interpretation of the [c]ode' and through `judicial rule making,' the meaning of these two terms ... is unclear"; (2) the history of the code only "reflects that [it] was intended to provide t

2008I The majority posits four reasons why this court is not constrained in its ability to overrule or modify a rule of evidence despite the fact that the judges of the Superior Court have codified that rule into the code: (1) "Although it is clear [from the stated purpose of the code under § 1.2(a)] that the judges of the Superior Court intended the law of evidence to grow and develop in the future through `interpretation of the [c]ode' and through `judicial rule making,' the meaning of these two terms ... is unclear"; (2) the history of the code only "reflects that [it] was intended to provide t

2008While Salamon was pending before this court, we heard argument in State v. Sanseverino, supra, 287 Conn. 608 , and released the decisions in the two cases concurrently, with Salamon as the lead case, and with the intention that the two cases would provide guidance to the bench and bar, as application of the framework adopted had yielded different results.

2008While Salamon was pending before this court, we heard argument in State v. Sanseverino, supra, 287 Conn. at 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 , and released the decisions in the two cases concurrently, with Salamon as the lead case, and with the intention that the two cases would provide guidance to the bench and bar, as application of the framework adopted had yielded different results.

2008Like Shakespeare's Puck, I can only apologize to the audience and suggest that it also pretend that this has all been a bad dream. [35] NOTES [1] General Statutes § 53a-92 provides in relevant part: "(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and ... (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually...." [2] We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclu

2008Like Shakespeare's Puck, I can only apologize to the audience and suggest that it also pretend that this has all been a bad dream. [35] NOTES [1] General Statutes § 53a-92 provides in relevant part: "(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and ... (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually...." [2] We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclu

2003Id., 684 .

1999See, e.g., Matter of Horwitz , 180 Ariz. 20 , 881 P.2d 352 , 356 (1994) (en banc); People v. Fahselt , 807 P.2d 586 , 587-88 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones , 759 S.W.2d 61 , 63 (Ky. 1988).

1999See, e.g., Matter of Horwitz , 180 Ariz. 20 , 881 P.2d 352 , 356 (1994) (en banc); People v. Fahselt , 807 P.2d 586 , 587-88 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones , 759 S.W.2d 61 , 63 (Ky. 1988).

1998It is beyond cavil that an attorney . . . who is convicted of a felony, is guilty of such conduct as is calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute." Kentucky State Bar Assn. v. Vincent , 537 S.W.2d 171 , 173 (Ky. 1976).

1998It is beyond cavil that an attorney . . . who is convicted of a felony, is guilty of such conduct as is calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute." Kentucky State Bar Assn. v. Vincent , 537 S.W.2d 171 , 173 (Ky. 1976).

1996Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms , 222 Conn. 361 , 371 .

1996These forms were compiled for the convenience of the bench and bar and their language is not mandatory." Connecticut Savings Bank v. Hanoman Realty Corp., 168 Conn. 554 , 557 , 362 A.2d 827 (1975); accord, Killingly v. Wells, 18 Conn. App. 508 , 512 , 558 A.2d 1039 (1989).

1996These forms were compiled for the convenience of the bench and bar and their language is not mandatory." Connecticut Savings Bank v. Hanoman Realty Corp., 168 Conn. 554 , 557 , 362 A.2d 827 (1975); accord, Killingly v. Wells, 18 Conn. App. 508 , 512 , 558 A.2d 1039 (1989).

1992The practice of law and the performance of a trial judge’s duties both are sufficiently difficult without the additional burden of uncertainty as to which rules will be strictly enforced and which rules will be liberally interpreted . . . .” Birmingham v. Kielczewski, 17 Conn. App. 219, 225 , 551 A.2d 1260 (1988) (O’Connell, J., dissenting).

1992The practice of law and the performance of a trial judge’s duties both are sufficiently difficult without the additional burden of uncertainty as to which rules will be strictly enforced and which rules will be liberally interpreted . . . .” Birmingham v. Kielczewski, 17 Conn. App. 219, 225 , 551 A.2d 1260 (1988) (O’Connell, J., dissenting).

1979In State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518 , an appeal from a murder conviction, the court commented on this practice (p. 534) as follows: “The court, under a recent statute and at large expense to the state, employed stenographers to take the testimony in full, and directed that full copies of the testimony taken each day be delivered to the counsel for the accused on the morning of the day succeeding, which was complied with.” The court reporter must be a skillful stenographer.

1939It is true that in Goldberg v. Callender Brothers, Inc., 95 Conn. 69, 71 , 110 Atl. 457 , it is stated broadly that correction of errors committed by a trial court in summary process actions can be obtained only by writs of error, but that was said in an attempted appeal from the decision of a City Court and we based our decision upon the ancient provision now found in § 5974 of the General Statutes, that no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment rendered in such an action.

1939It is true that in Goldberg v. Callender Brothers, Inc., 95 Conn. 69, 71 , 110 Atl. 457 , it is stated broadly that correction of errors committed by a trial court in summary process actions can be obtained only by writs of error, but that was said in an attempted appeal from the decision of a City Court and we based our decision upon the ancient provision now found in § 5974 of the General Statutes, that no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment rendered in such an action.