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38 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1876–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matheny v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010Johnstone, writing for this Court in Matheny v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Ky.2001): For guidance to the bench and bar, we set forth the preferred procedure a trial court should follow when accepting a guilty plea that is made pursuant to a plea agreement. 2004Matheny v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 756, 759 (2001) (quoting Misher, 576 S.W.2d at 241) ("For guidance to the bench and bar, we set forth the preferred procedure a trial court should follow when accepting a guilty plea that is made pursuant to a plea agreement .... 'The sentencing court should merely accept the plea, note the recommendation or agreement concerning sentence, and set a day certain for sentencing. | 2 | 2 |
Misher v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010As stated by the Court of Appeals in Misher v. Commonwealth, [ 576 S.W.2d 238 (Ky.App.1978) ], “The sentencing court should merely accept the plea, note the recommendation or agreement concerning sentence, and set a day certain for sentencing. 2004No sentencing at all should be carried out until KRS 532.050 has been complied with.’ "); Misher v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 576 S.W.2d 238, 241 (1978) ("The sentencing function of our courts on pleas of guilty is carried out by the judge. | 1 | 3 |
Harp v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky. 2008). 2025Id. at 818 . | 1 | 2 |
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincentgreen2 sentences2007See Kentucky State Bar Ass’n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ky.1976) ("It is beyond cavil that an attorney who is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, or who is convicted of an intentional and serious misdemeanor, or who is convicted of a felony, is guilty of such conduct as is calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute. 1978In Kentucky Bar Association v. Vincent, Ky., 537 S.W.2d 171 (1976), this court held that the conviction of an attorney for the wrongful use of a client’s money in and of itself constituted unethical and unprofessional conduct calculated to bring the bench and bar into disrepute. | 1 | 2 |
Wright v. Ecolab, Inc.green1 sentence2026Wright v. Ecolab, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Ky. 2015). -7- contains just one reference to the written record. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025In fact, this Court has in the past equated the firearm enhancement with other statutory enhancements that elevate the classification of an offense, even at the charging level.” 7 438 S.W.3d 333 -34 (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 23-24 (Ky. 2012)). | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024Such careful preservation should eliminate uncertainty, which would inure to the benefit of everyone involved.” Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Ky. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hardestygreen1 sentence2022See also Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Hardesty, 775 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1989) (holding “it [is] appropriate for the Bar Association to proceed against the individual in his capacity as a lawyer, as provided for in SCR Rule 3, regardless of the action taken by the [JCC].”). 4 Hardesty, 775 S.W.2d at 87. 5 Id. 6 Id. 8 nothing more than a public censure by the JCC for his alleged misconduct,7 though the KBA sought a one-year suspension.8 In the second case, Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Wilson, this Court adopted the Board of Governor’s recommendation that former judge Billy Wilson be suspended from the practice of law f | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2007This has come to be referred to in the vernacular as the `magic question ."' Montgomery v. Commonwealth , 819 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1991). !d. at 718. a particular juror is disqualified by bias or prejudice, from whatever source . . . .' ' Thus, we cautioned the bench and bar of the Commonwealth that a truly biased juror could not, by virtue of the purportedly magic question, be magically rehabilitated.$ We again strongly caution the bench and bar of the Commonwealth to remove the term "magic question" from their lexicon. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kindnessgreen2 sentences2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon 2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power."); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country."); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes."); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to `nol pros' belon 2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon | 1 | 1 |
Pryor v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power."); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country."); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes."); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to `nol pros' belon 2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon 2004Until it does so, however, local prosecutors retain the common law nolle prosequi power.”); State v. Jackson, 420 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ("In the absence of statute, the common law continues to be in force in most of the states of this country.”); Pryor v. Thomas, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (1962) ("it has long been accepted by the bench and bar that the common law prevails unless changed by our constitution or statutes.”); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa.Super. 99 , 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1977) ("The authorities are virtually unanimous that the historical power to 'nol pros' belon | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accountsgreen2 sentences2001Indeed, we affirmed the basic proposition that the Court has authority over admission to and discipline of members of the bar in Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682, 683-84 (1980), when we stated, “There can be no doubt that this constitutional amendment completely removed the subject from any legislative authority and rendered obsolete and ineffective statutes pertaining to it.” Furthermore, Appellant points out that this Court has declared unconstitutional the General Assembly’s attempts to legislate aspects of legal practice, procedure, admission or discipline. 1 Howeve 2001Indeed, we affirmed the basic proposition that the Court has authority over admission to and discipline of members of the bar in Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682, 683-84 (1980), when we stated, "There can be no doubt that this constitutional amendment completely removed the subject from any legislative authority and rendered obsolete and ineffective statutes pertaining to it." Furthermore, Appellant points out that this Court has declared unconstitutional the General Assembly's attempts to legislate aspects of legal practice, procedure, admission or discipline. [1] Howe | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Rankingreen1 sentence1998After oral argument, by a majority vote, the Board of Governors found the Respondent herein not guilty of Count I, guilty of Count II, and recommended a six-month suspension, probated for two years under the following conditions: (1) that the Respondent abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages; (2) that the Respondent continue attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings; (3) that the Respondent submit to supervision by an attorney as approved by the Executive Director of the Kentucky Bar Association, the terms of said supervision to be equivalent to those set out in Kentucky Bar As | 1 | 1 |
In Re Raggiogreen2 sentences1980“Nor does free speech give a lawyer the right to openly denigrate the court in the eyes of the public.” In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 371 , 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971). 1980“Nor does free speech give a lawyer the right to openly denigrate the court in the eyes of the public.” In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 371 , 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Frerichsgreen2 sentences1980“Our system of justice rests upon the mutual regard of the bench and bar.” Matter of Frerichs, supra at 766. “[I]n the case of a lawyer an abuse of the right of free speech may be some index of his character or fitness to be a lawyer.” In re Lacey, S.D., 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1979) quoting In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191 , 75 N.W.2d 644 , 57 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1956). 1980“Our system of justice rests upon the mutual regard of the bench and bar.” Matter of Frerichs, supra at 766. “[I]n the case of a lawyer an abuse of the right of free speech may be some index of his character or fitness to be a lawyer.” In re Lacey, S.D., 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1979) quoting In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191 , 75 N.W.2d 644 , 57 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1956). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Discipline of Laceygreen2 sentences1980“Our system of justice rests upon the mutual regard of the bench and bar.” Matter of Frerichs, supra at 766. “[I]n the case of a lawyer an abuse of the right of free speech may be some index of his character or fitness to be a lawyer.” In re Lacey, S.D., 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1979) quoting In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191 , 75 N.W.2d 644 , 57 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1956). 1980“Our system of justice rests upon the mutual regard of the bench and bar.” Matter of Frerichs, supra at 766. “[I]n the case of a lawyer an abuse of the right of free speech may be some index of his character or fitness to be a lawyer.” In re Lacey, S.D., 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1979) quoting In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191 , 75 N.W.2d 644 , 57 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1956). | 1 | 1 |
| Gulf Interstate Gas Company v. Garvingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Claycomb
green
2 sentences2022The members of the class, however, briefed the statute of limitations issue and “request[ed] guidance for the bench and bar regarding the applicability of the saving statute and/or equitable tolling principles for MRP claims filed with the Cabinet that should now proceed to court.” On November 15, 2018, this Court issued its opinion in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), in which we held that the MRPA was unconstitutional. 2020The members of the class, however, briefed the statute of limitations issue and “request[ed] guidance for the bench and bar regarding the applicability of the 4 saving statute and/or equitable tolling principles for MRP claims filed with the Cabinet that should now proceed to court.” On November 15, 2018, this Court issued its opinion in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), in which we held that the MRPA was unconstitutional. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller
green
2 sentences2010If the court determines within its discretion that an expert is needed, it should give the plaintiff a reasonable amount of time to identify an expert as outlined by this Court in Baptist Healthcare, supra. However, if the need for an expert is never disputed and if it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to argue that an expert is not needed, (and most particularly if the plaintiff requests an extension for the express purpose of securing more time to identify his experts), there is no reason for a trial court first to enter a separate ruling informing the plaintiff that his ease requires 2010If the court determines within its discretion that an expert is needed, it should give the plaintiff a reasonable amount of time to identify an expert as outlined by this Court in Baptist Healthcare, supra. Id. at 672-73. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Conley v. Hall
green
2 sentences1967Cf. Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S. W.2d 575 (1965). 1967Cf. Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 575 (1965). | 2 | 1967–1967 |
Stephen Marchese v. Allison Aebersold
green
1 sentence2025The Court added the following “for further guidance of the bench and bar [to] address the merits of the evidentiary issue presented.” Id. at 446 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2025Judge Bertelsman, -27- former federal judge of the Eastern District of Kentucky, helpfully and practically, explained this process.10 Bench and bar are well-advised to study it. 10 Judge Bertelsman said the following in a “restatement of the law reflected by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S. Ct. 1089 , 67 L. 2025Judge Bertelsman, -27- former federal judge of the Eastern District of Kentucky, helpfully and practically, explained this process.10 Bench and bar are well-advised to study it. 10 Judge Bertelsman said the following in a “restatement of the law reflected by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 101 S. Ct. 1089 , 67 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Colyer v. Coyote Ridge Farm, LLC
green
1 sentence2025Colyer cautions “the bench and bar in Kentucky to not cite Dukes or Baker as authority for the erroneous proposition that easements appurtenant can never be extinguished by acts of the parties.” Colyer, 565 S.W.3d at 663 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mayo v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024We can certainly say that it would have been “[b]etter practice . . . for any discussion regarding an objection (including the grounds for the objection, any response thereto, and the trial court’s ruling) to have occurred at the bench outside the hearing of the jury.” Mayo v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 41 , 52 n.13 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Butts v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2012Going forward, this Court emphasizes to the bench and bar that while such an independent instruction is not required, Butts, 953 S.W.2d at 946 , it is available upon request if supported by the evidence, Sherroan, 142 S.W.3d at 23 . 2012The bench and bar is admonished only to be careful and that any “instruction on reasonable doubt as to the degree of the offense ... be given correctly.” Butts, 953 S.W.2d at 946 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bracy v. Gramley
green
2 sentences2012Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 , 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (citations omitted). 2012Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 , 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sherroan v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2012Going forward, this Court emphasizes to the bench and bar that while such an independent instruction is not required, Butts, 953 S.W.2d at 946 , it is available upon request if supported by the evidence, Sherroan, 142 S.W.3d at 23 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lawson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2003First, although KRS 520.095(l)(b)(2) also embraces “serious physical injury or death to ... any ... property," see Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 571 , 576 n. 9 (2002) (describing KRS 520.095(l)(b)(2) as a "curious phrasing” and observing that commentators have found it “largely incoherent in light of the KRS 500.080(15) definition of 'serious physical injury.’ "), the indictment in this case alleged only that Appellant’s act of fleeing and eluding had "created a substantial danger of death or serious injury to other [sic] person.” (Emphasis added). 2003First, although KRS 520.095(1)(b)(2) also embraces "serious physical injury or death to... any... property," see Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 571 , 576 n. 9 (2002) (describing KRS 520.095(1)(b)(2) as a "curious phrasing" and observing that commentators have found it "largely incoherent in light of the KRS 500.080(15) definition of `serious physical injury.'"), the indictment in this case alleged only that Appellant's act of fleeing and eluding had "created a substantial danger of death or serious injury to other [sic] person. " (Emphasis added). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Nix v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1986The Concurring Opinion in this case urges us "to overrule Nix v. Jordan, Ky., 532 S.W.2d 762 (1975)," which rejected extending the rule of apportioning of liability to a defendant's claim over against a third party defendant, for good and sufficient reasons. 1986The Concurring Opinion in this case urges us “to overrule Nix v. Jordan, Ky., 532 S.W.2d 762 (1975),” which rejected extending the rule of apportioning of liability to a defendant’s claim over against a third party defendant, for good and sufficient reasons. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In Re Gorsuch green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Gilbert v. Union College green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Orr v. Coleman green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Smith v. Campbell green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Mooser v. Mason green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Nider v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Commonwealth v. Duvall green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Runyon v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Runyon v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Commonwealth v. Kelley green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Roland v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Dunavant v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Commonwealth v. Holliday neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Commonwealth v. Weddle green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Spalding v. Alexander neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Schnabel v. Waggener neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Wood v. Jackson ex dem. Genet neutral | 1 | 1876–1876 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.