bench bar in Texas

2019The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly recommended that members of the bench and bar avoid using the term “accidental.” Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim.

2019As noted in Williams, “[t]here is no law and defense of accident in the present penal code, and the bench and bar would be well advised to avoid the term ‘accident’ in connection with offenses defined by the present penal code.” 630 S.W.2d at 644 .

2023This Court has been improvising for the entire twenty-year-plus “legislative interregnum” since Atkins was decided, with a view to “provide the bench and bar with” what the Court hoped would be only “temporary guidelines in addressing Atkins JEAN – 12 claims.” Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5 .

2017Without a unified procedure, intellectual disability determinations may vary from county to county, court to court, and case to case.”); Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4-5 (deciding that this Court had to act “during this legislative interregnum” to provide guidelines to the bench and bar); Allen, 462 S.W.3d at 67 (Newell, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly left the door open for the legislature to act” regarding the procedures for determining mental retardation.).

2023Co. v. Bilotto, 928 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996) (en banc) (“Although we are aware that the Texas Pattern Jury Charges are not ‘law’, they are heavily relied upon by both the bench and bar.”), aff’d by, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998).

2020Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 928 S.W.2d 197, 199, 200 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996), aff’d, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998) (noting that, while the Texas Pattern Jury Charges “are not ‘law’, they are heavily relied upon by both the bench and bar” and are “a widely accepted source throughout the legal community”).

2025Such a delineation would be “helpful to the bench and bar,” but is not required by the 32 rules, if the “motion clearly sets forth its grounds and otherwise meets Rule 166a’s requirements.” Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004).

2023See Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004) (“[U]sing headings to clearly delineate the basis for summary judgment . . . would be helpful to the bench and bar, but [Rule 166a] does not require it.”).

2018Presuming for argument’s sake that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements retain their relevance as judicial dicta because they constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.40 These judicial dicta bind this court.41 36 Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109 n. 26 (emphasis in original). 37 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 38 See id. at 107 . 39 See id. at 106–10. 40 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106–10; Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255,

2018Even presuming that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.38 These judicial dicta bind this court.39 Thus, Salinas requires this court to apply the legal standard in that case to all facial, separation-of-powers challenges to court-cost statutes.40 In criminal appeals, this 35 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 36 See id. at 107 . 37 See id. at 106–10. 38 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d

2017We also acknowledge that a claim of “accident” is not the same as a claim of “no voluntary conduct.” Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Tex. Crim.

2003Publish. 1. "'There is no law and defense of accident in the present penal code, and the bench and bar would be well advised to avoid the term "accident" in connection with offenses defined by the present penal code.' Thus, for purposes of [Penal Code] section 6.01(a), an 'accident' is not the same as, and should not be treated as the equivalent of, the absence of any voluntary act." Rogers v. State , 105 S.W.3d 630, 637-39 (Tex. Cr.

2003LEE ANN DAUPHINOT JUSTICE PUBLISH DELIVERED: June 19, 2003 FOOTNOTES 1: See Zarate v. State , 908 S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (discussing cases analyzing whether references to current events constitute proper jury argument and concluding that “any comparison to current events must be evaluated in the context of the times”).

2003LEE ANN DAUPHINOT JUSTICE PUBLISH DELIVERED: June 19, 2003 FOOTNOTES 1: See Zarate v. State , 908 S.W.2d 544, 547-48 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (discussing cases analyzing whether references to current events constitute proper jury argument and concluding that “any comparison to current events must be evaluated in the context of the times”).

1990As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1982): There is no law and defense of accident in the present penal code, and the bench and bar would be well advised to avoid the term “accident” in connection with offenses defined by the present penal code. • The function of the former defense of accident is performed now by the requirement of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 6.01(a), that, “A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct....” Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d 644, 649-650 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

1983The function of the former defense of accident is performed now by the requirement of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 6.01(a), that, ‘A person commits an *382 offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct .... ’ Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d 644, 649-650 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

2015App. 2006); while trial counsel's "performance is to be judged by the totality of the representation," Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2006); while trial counsel's "performance is to be judged by the totality of the representation," Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim.

2015Respectfully submitted, Lisa Mullen ___________________________ /s/ Lisa Mullen Attorney at Law 3149 Lackland Road, Suite 102 Fort Worth, Texas 76116 (817) 332-8900 State Bar No. 03254375 [email protected] 16 Certificate of Service I hereby certify that a true copy of this document was served on September 8, 2015, by mail delivery upon Assistant District Attorney Charles Mallin, Appellate Section, Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, 401 West Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76104 , and by mail delivery upon the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O.

2015Respectfully submitted, Lisa Mullen ___________________________ /s/ Lisa Mullen Attorney at Law 3149 Lackland Road, Suite 102 Fort Worth, Texas 76116 (817) 332-8900 State Bar No. 03254375 [email protected] 16 Certificate of Service I hereby certify that a true copy of this document was served on September 3, 2015, by mail delivery upon Assistant District Attorney Charles Mallin, Appellate Section, Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, 401 West Belknap, Fort Worth, Texas 76104 , and by mail delivery upon the Office of the State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O.

2013More than thirty years ago, however, Judge Clinton observed that “the unique character of ‘possessor/ offenses has always plagued and confounded the bench and bar, for it defies analysis by the general methodology of viewing the major components of offenses as ‘conduct’ distinct from ‘intent.’ ” Gorman v. State, 634 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (Clinton, J., concurring). *299 “Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (a)(39) (West Supp.2012).

1987Once again we confront "the unique character of `possessory' offenses [that] has always plagued and confounded the bench and bar." Gorman v. State, 634 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).

2011Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ("[A] trial court's inherent power includes broad discretion over the conduct of its proceedings."). [31] See, e.g., Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (holding that "the exclusion of a defendant's evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense"). [32] E.g., Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. at 1797 (holding that most questions concerning judge's qualifications to hear case are "answered b

2011Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ("[A] trial court's inherent power includes broad discretion over the conduct of its proceedings."). [31] See, e.g., Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (holding that "the exclusion of a defendant's evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense"). [32] E.g., Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. at 1797 (holding that most questions concerning judge's qualifications to hear case are "answered b

2011See Zarco v. State , 210 S.W.3d 816, 831 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2011See Zarco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 816, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2023Co. v. Bilotto, 928 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996) (en banc) (“Although we are aware that the Texas Pattern Jury Charges are not ‘law’, they are heavily relied upon by both the bench and bar.”), aff’d by, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998).

2020Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 928 S.W.2d 197, 199, 200 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996), aff’d, 985 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1998) (noting that, while the Texas Pattern Jury Charges “are not ‘law’, they are heavily relied upon by both the bench and bar” and are “a widely accepted source throughout the legal community”).

2005C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 326-27 (Tex.1994); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.1985). .Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 555 (noting that forcing litigants "to determine precisely when each element of a plaintiff's damage award was incurred would impose an onerous burden on both the trial bench and bar”). .

2005C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315, 326-27 (Tex.1994); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.1985). .Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 555 (noting that forcing litigants "to determine precisely when each element of a plaintiff's damage award was incurred would impose an onerous burden on both the trial bench and bar”). .

2020See Ex parte Carter, 849 S.W.2d 410 , 411 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, pet. ref’d) (“Failure to docket habeas corpus proceedings separately is a common mistake of the bench and bar and the court clerks of this State.”).

2015“Failure to docket habeas corpus proceedings separately is a common mistake of the bench and bar and the court clerks of this State.” Ex parte Carter, 849 S.W.2d 410 , 412 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, pet. ref’d.).

2018Presuming for argument’s sake that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements retain their relevance as judicial dicta because they constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.40 These judicial dicta bind this court.41 36 Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109 n. 26 (emphasis in original). 37 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 38 See id. at 107 . 39 See id. at 106–10. 40 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106–10; Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255,

2018Even presuming that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.38 These judicial dicta bind this court.39 Thus, Salinas requires this court to apply the legal standard in that case to all facial, separation-of-powers challenges to court-cost statutes.40 In criminal appeals, this 35 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 36 See id. at 107 . 37 See id. at 106–10. 38 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d

1990The majority’s statement in Danziger on the very point in issue here and its rare pronouncement upon its “n.r.e.” of Petroscience Corp. were “deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar upon a point of statutory construction.” Thomas, 168 S.W.2d at 685 .

1990The majority's statement in Danziger on the very point in issue here and its rare pronouncement upon its "n.r.e." of Petroscience Corp. were "deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and bar upon a point of statutory construction." Thomas, 168 S.W.2d at 685 .

2018Presuming for argument’s sake that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements retain their relevance as judicial dicta because they constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.40 These judicial dicta bind this court.41 36 Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109 n. 26 (emphasis in original). 37 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 38 See id. at 107 . 39 See id. at 106–10. 40 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106–10; Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255,

2018Presuming for argument’s sake that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements retain their relevance as judicial dicta because they constitute deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration and for future guidance of the bench and bar.40 These judicial dicta bind this court.41 36 Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109 n. 26 (emphasis in original). 37 See id. at 109–10, nn. 26 & 36. 38 See id. at 107 . 39 See id. at 106–10. 40 See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106–10; Murray v. State, 261 S.W.3d 255,

2016See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2016See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2014Indeed, the bench and bar may find it helpful to refer to some of these out-of-state cases when addressing novel double-jeopardy scenarios, though of course they are not required to do so. . 634 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). .

2014Indeed, the bench and bar may find it helpful to refer to some of these out-of-state cases when addressing novel double-jeopardy scenarios, though of course they are not required to do so. 21 634 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Crim.

2011We will no longer look to the facts of the case to permit an ‘implied’ affirmative finding....” 693 S.W.2d at 396 . *925 Judge Clinton seconded the majority in his concurring and dissenting opinion, noting that the court’s decision seeking to pull the bench and bar out of the “quagmire” of implied or inferred findings was overdue.

2011Id. at 397 (Clinton, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Lafluer v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91, 92 (Tex. Crim.