bench bar (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

bench bar in California

104 California opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2026 12 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (44)

CaseFollowedCited
Hogya v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–2022
2 sentences

2022The cause does not raise questions of first impression, nor does it appear to have “general importance to the bench and bar where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Hogya v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 129 .) The petition should therefore be denied.

1989“Notwithstanding [the well-recognized] limitations on the availability of prerogative writs, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court may be required to consider instances of a grave nature or of significant legal impact, or to review questions of first impression and general importance to the bench and bar where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ], fn. omitted.) In addition, the petition alleges that job search orders entered against the five petitioners ar

35
Anderson v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2022
2 sentences

2022In such cases, the statutory requirement of inadequacy of appellate remedy may have been relaxed in favor of immediate review of a question of statewide importance so that lower decisions in other cases will be uniform.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129 , fns. omitted (Hogya); accord, Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 (Anderson).) Additionally, while “[a] remedy is not inadequate merely because more time would be consumed by pursuing it through the ordinary course of law than would be required in the

2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional

33
In Re the Marriage of Smithgreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2013
2 sentences

2013(See Hogoboom & King, supra, ¶ 6:822, p. 6-302.5 [“Whereas child support awards facilitate a uniform purpose . . . spousal support necessarily serves varying 14 functions, depending on the parties and the underlying facts and circumstances.”]; In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480 [“Some members of the bench and bar have been critical of the Legislature, contending it has failed to specify the purpose of spousal support. . . .

2013(See Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2012) 1 6:822, p. 6-302.5 (rev. # 1, 2012) [“Whereas child support awards facilitate a uniform purpose . . . spousal support necessarily serves varying functions, depending on the parties and the underlying facts and circumstances.”]; In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 911 ] [“Some members of the bench and bar have been critical of the Legislature, contending it has failed to specify the purpose of spousal support. . . .

33
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.green
scotus · 2009 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2026
2 sentences

2026Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And the California Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this federal constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts.

2021Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for 31 judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And our Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts.

22
Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023
2 sentences

2023(City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 795, 803 .) Pertinent factors include whether (1) “the party seeking the writ lacks an adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain relief,” (2) “the petitioner will suffer harm or prejudice which cannot be corrected on appeal,” or (3) “the petition presents an issue of first impression that is of general interest to the bench and bar.” (United Health Centers of San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 63, 74 ; see also Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273–1274.) We f

2021(Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122 , 129–130; see also Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273–1274.) “[G]iven that the petition raised a question of first impression appropriate for resolution in a published opinion, we deliberately chose to issue an OSC [order to show cause] instead of an alternative writ, since the latter procedure would have permitted reversal of the challenged order with the undesirable result of potentially rendering the issue moot.” (Paul Blanco’s Good Car Company Auto Group v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86 , 99,

22
Litmon v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011(Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ] (Litmon).) Whether an SVP who is not under a current commitment is entitled to petition for conditional release as a result of extraordinary delay in SVP proceedings is an issue that is appropriate for writ review.

2011(Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ] (Litmon).) Whether an SVP who is not under a current commitment is entitled to petition for conditional release as a result of extraordinary delay in SVP proceedings is an issue that is appropriate for writ review.

22
People v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2009
2 sentences

2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional

2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional

22
People v. McGauthagreen
pa · 1969 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–2001
2 sentences

2001Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even ‘debatable trial tactics’ do not ‘constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.’ (People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 434 , 452 P.2d 650 ], affd. sub nom.

2001Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even ‘debatable trial tactics’ do not ‘constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.’ (People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 434 , 452 P.2d 650 ], affd. sub nom.

22
Oceanside Union School District v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1962 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–1998
2 sentences

1998(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 373 P.2d 439 ].) Discussion Informal Resolution It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (§ 2016 et seq.) (hereinafter Discovery Act) that civil discovery be essentially self-executing.

1998(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 373 P.2d 439 ].) Discussion Informal Resolution It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (§ 2016 et seq.) (hereinafter Discovery Act) that civil discovery be essentially self-executing.

22
Adams v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1959 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1984
2 sentences

1982(See Adams v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 867, 870 [ 345 P.2d 466 ].) The dictum has, however, survived almost a half century and has been accepted by the bench and bar.

1982(See Adams v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 867, 870 [ 345 P.2d 466 ].) The dictum has, however, survived almost a half century and has been accepted by the bench and bar.

22
In Re Hanleygreen
cal · 1975 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar.

1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar.

22
In Re Bloomgreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar.

1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar.

22
Estate of Loudgreen
calctapp · 1945 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1970
2 sentences

1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file.

1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file.

22
People v. Adamsongreen
cal · 1949 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1970
2 sentences

1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file.

1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file.

22
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.green
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2025The term ‘officer of the court,’ with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance.” (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 292 .) Additionally, California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, provides us broad discretion to issue sanctions.

2014The term 'officer of the court,' with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append 15 to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance." (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 292 .) DISPOSITION The motion to dismiss the cross-appeal is granted.

13
Rescue Army v. Municipal Courtgreen
cal · 1946 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1977–2022
2 sentences

2022(People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 ; Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 112-113 (Powers).) “ ‘The discretionary aspect of writ review comes into play primarily when the petitioner has another remedy by appeal and the issue is whether the alternative remedy is adequate.’ ” (Mena, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 153 ; accord, Powers, at p. 113; Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467.) Even where an appeal is available, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court [by way of writ review] may be required to consider instances of a grave

1977“If reviewing courts made themselves routinely available to intervene by writ whenever a litigant claimed a mistake had been made in a law-and-motion department, trials would be delayed, litigants would be vexed with multiple proceedings, and judgment appeals would be kept waiting.” (Burrus v. Municipal Court, 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 236 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 539 ].) Notwithstanding these limitations on the availability of prerogative writs, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court may be required to consider instances of a grave nature or of significant legal im

12
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1975 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2015
2 sentences

2015(Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 655 .) McMillin’s writ petition presents an issue of first impression, which is of interest to builders, home buyers, their attorneys, and others.

2011(Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 655 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 542 P.2d 977 ].) When the petitioner may immediately appeal, his remedy is considered adequate and writ relief is precluded, unless the petitioner “can show some special reason why it is rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ] (Hogya).) “Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal from a later judgment, various factors must be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the appellate

12
In Re Marriage of Pendleton & Firemangreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2012
2 sentences

2012However, we find Roberta’s comment reflects Justice Kennard’s dissenting opinion stating that the majority opinion in Pendleton failed to “articulate guidelines for the bench and bar explaining when, if ever, such waivers are enforceable.” (Pendleton, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 59 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) “The majority’s silence on these important questions does a disservice to the public, the bar, and the bench.” (Id. at p. 60 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As mentioned above, the Legislature responded to the Pendleton decision by creating new rules and guidelines.

2000The majority declares that it will not decide "whether all such agreements [premarital agreements waiving spousal support] are enforceable regardless of the circumstances of the parties at the time enforcement is sought" (maj. opn., ante, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 279-280, 5 P.3d at pp. 840-841) and that it will not decide "whether circumstances existing at the time enforcement of a waiver of spousal support is sought might make enforcement unjust" ( id. at p. 289, 5 P.3d at p. 848 , fn. omitted).

12
In Re Hawleygreen
cal · 1967 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–2001
2 sentences

2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse

2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse

12
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ].) *678 I Petitioner’s Right to a Report of Dr. Weil’s Examination Section 2032, subdivision (h) provides that “If a party submits to ... a physical or mental examination in compliance with a demand . . . , that party has the option of making a written demand that the party at whose instance the examination was made deliver to the demanding party (1) a copy of a detailed written report setting out the history, examinations, findings, including the results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the

1998Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ].) *678 I Petitioner’s Right to a Report of Dr. Weil’s Examination Section 2032, subdivision (h) provides that “If a party submits to ... a physical or mental examination in compliance with a demand . . . , that party has the option of making a written demand that the party at whose instance the examination was made deliver to the demanding party (1) a copy of a detailed written report setting out the history, examinations, findings, including the results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the

12
Kleveland V.Siegel & Wolensky LLPgreen
calctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025(See Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 559 [“ ‘It is critical to both the bench and the bar that we be able to rely on the honesty of counsel.

11
Powers v. City of Richmondgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
People v. Stronggreen
cal · 2022 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Bernhard v. Harrah's Clubgreen
cal · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
PH II, INC. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Wallace v. McCubbingreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Lockyer v. Andradegreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Ewing v. Californiagreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Baeza v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
People v. Dillongreen
cal · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Groupgreen
cal · 2002 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11
Woods v. Younggreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11
Dye v. Battlesgreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
11
Prichard v. Southern Pacific Co.green
calctapp · 1935 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
11
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Maine v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Serrano v. Priestgreen
cal · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
11
Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performancegreen
cal · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
People v. Bradygreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (36)

CaseCitedYears
Bracy v. Gramley green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2026Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And the California Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this federal constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts.

2021Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for 31 judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And our Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts.

32006–2026
Leiserson v. City of San Diego green
calctapp · 1988
2 sentences

2018This court must consider all the pertinent circumstances and make an assessment of any gains that have resulted from this particular case. [¶] An appellate opinion clarifying the law is an insufficient basis for a fee award under section 1021.5. 'It would be *861 patently absurd for entitlement to attorney's fees under section 1021.5 to be predicated upon our fortuitous decision to use Leiserson's appeal as a tool to communicate with the bench and bar certain legal guidelines ....' ( Leiserson v. City of San Diego (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725 , 737, 249 Cal.Rptr. 28 .) [¶] Furthermore, [the Laffe

2018This court must consider all the pertinent circumstances and make an assessment of any gains that have resulted from this particular case. [¶] An appellate opinion clarifying the law is an insufficient basis for a fee award under section 1021.5. 'It would be *861 patently absurd for entitlement to attorney's fees under section 1021.5 to be predicated upon our fortuitous decision to use Leiserson's appeal as a tool to communicate with the bench and bar certain legal guidelines ....' ( Leiserson v. City of San Diego (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725 , 737, 249 Cal.Rptr. 28 .) [¶] Furthermore, [the Laffe

32018–2018
Philpott v. Superior Court green
cal · 1934
2 sentences

2014As the Supreme Court explained in Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512 [ 36 P.2d 635 ], “Considerable confusion now exists among the bench and bar as to the proper classification of ... [a quantum meruit] cause of action, due to the fact that the courts of law administering this relief apply equitable principles and to the further fact that certain expressions found in court opinions and textbooks, on first impression, might seem to classify it as an action in equity.

2014As the Supreme Court explained in Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512 [ 36 P.2d 635 ], “Considerable confusion now exists among the bench and bar as to the proper classification of ... [a quantum meruit] cause of action, due to the fact that the courts of law administering this relief apply equitable principles and to the further fact that certain expressions found in court opinions and textbooks, on first impression, might seem to classify it as an action in equity.

22014–2014
McGautha v. California green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse

2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse

21972–2001
Bidna v. Rosen green
calctapp · 1993
2 sentences

1996However, given the deeply personal nature of the issues ... and despite best efforts of the Legislature, the bench and the bar, it is not surprising there is still considerable bitterness between spouses whose marriage is being dissolved.... [¶] In this atmosphere, the judge hearing the domestic relations calendar must regularly issue orders which do not and most often cannot satisfy either party...." ( Id. at pp. 1121-1122.) After reviewing these precedent cases, the court in Bidna v. Rosen, supra, 19 Cal. App.4th 27 , concluded that "[t]he cases are ... heading in one direction, though they

1996However, given the deeply personal nature of the issues . . . and despite best efforts of the Legislature, the bench and the bar, it is not surprising there is still considerable bitterness between spouses whose marriage is being dissolved. ... [] In this atmosphere, the judge hearing the domestic relations calendar must regularly issue orders which do not and most often cannot satisfy either party. . . .” (Id. at pp. 1121-1122.) After reviewing these precedent cases, the court in Bidna v. Rosen, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , concluded that “[t]he cases are . . . heading in one direction, though

21996–1996
People v. Welch green
cal · 1993
2 sentences

1994It would be unfair to effectively bar any review of defendant’s claims where the rule requiring their preservation in the trial court was adopted in the context of [this] appeal.” (Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228, 238 , fn. omitted.) Prospective application of the Welch rule also gave the bench and bar an opportunity to learn about the change in the law before it took effect in other cases.

1994It would be unfair to effectively bar any review of defendant's claims where the rule requiring their preservation in the trial court was adopted in the context of [this] appeal." ( Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228, 238 , fn. omitted.) Prospective application of the Welch rule also gave the bench and bar an opportunity to learn about the change in the law before it took effect in other cases.

21994–1994
United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento green
ca2 · 1975
2 sentences

1979In distinguishing a line of civil cases underscoring the court's equal responsibility to avoid conflict in situations endangering confidentiality and threatening to undermine the integrity of the bench and bar, that court concluded that the crucial presence of Sixth Amendment rights mandated the defendant's election to be represented by counsel of choice concurrent with a knowing waiver of any claim of prejudice based upon conflicting interests, including the right of the former clients-witnesses to invoke the claim of privilege during cross-examination. ( United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, su

1979In distinguishing a line of civil cases underscoring the court's equal responsibility to avoid conflict in situations endangering confidentiality and threatening to undermine the integrity of the bench and bar, that court concluded that the crucial presence of Sixth Amendment rights mandated the defendant's election to be represented by counsel of choice concurrent with a knowing waiver of any claim of prejudice based upon conflicting interests, including the right of the former clients-witnesses to invoke the claim of privilege during cross-examination. ( United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, su

21979–1979
Knight v. Kaiser Co. green
cal · 1957
2 sentences

1959First, is the majority impliedly approving or, on the other hand, “disapproving the former eases,” as advocated by the dissenting Justices in Knight v. Kaiser Co., supra, 48 Cal.2d 778 , 785?

1959As indicated in my dissent in Reynolds v. Willson, supra, ante, pp. 94, 106 [ 331 P.2d 48 ], I believe that section 339 of the Restatement of Torts, properly construed, is entirely consistent with "the former cases." (See Knight v. Kaiser Co., supra, 48 Cal.2d 778 ; Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 8 Cal.2d 741 ; Wilford v. Little, supra, 144 Cal. App.2d 477 .) On the other hand, I do not believe that the majority opinion in the Reynolds case or the main opinion here can be reconciled with those decisions.

21959–1959
People v. Taylor green
calctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2025(See fn. 10, ante [noting that these two potentially disparate terms appear in the statutory text]; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 770 [observing that “[t]he text of [the statute] itself ‘arguably allows for [this] distinction to be 21 Bibi also claims for the first time in her reply that her interpretation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is the only one that is “consistent with the other provisions of section 1170[ and] promotes the legislative goal[ ] of equality in sentencing . . . .” Bibi has forfeited these belated arguments as well. ( Taylor, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 64

12025–2025
H. D. Arnaiz Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin green
calctapp · 2002
12024–2024
Amie v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1979
12024–2024
City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2003
12023–2023
United Health Centers of the San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2014
12023–2023
People v. Gentile red
cal · 2020
12022–2022
People v. Lewis green
cal · 2021
12022–2022
People v. Mena green
cal · 2012
12022–2022
The People v. Super. Ct. green
calctapp · 2013
12022–2022
People v. Chun red
cal · 2009
12022–2022
People v. Loper green
cal · 2015
12022–2022
In Re Jessica K. green
calctapp · 2000
12021–2021
Orange County Social Services Agency v. Gloria D. green
calctapp · 1998
12021–2021
Farmer v. City of Inglewood green
calctapp · 1982
12016–2016
Cho v. Chang green
calctapp · 2013
12016–2016
In Re Marriage of Johnson green
calctapp · 1982
12015–2015
Norviel v. Norviel green
calctapp · 2002
12015–2015
Solem v. Helm red
scotus · 1983
12014–2014
People v. Burgos green
calctapp · 2004
12014–2014
In re Coley green
cal · 2012
12014–2014
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez green
scotus · 2006
12013–2013
People v. Marsden green
cal · 1970
12013–2013
Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. green
calctapp · 1994
12010–2010
Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. green
calctapp · 2006
12006–2006
People v. Horn green
cal · 1974
11996–1996
Commonwealth v. Chambers green
pa · 1991
11992–1992
In Re Estate of Hume green
cal · 1918
11992–1992
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. green
cal · 1975
11990–1990

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (6) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1717 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12965 (5) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 182 (5) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (5) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1780 (4) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 487 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 232 (1876–2026) MI 145 (1920–2024) CA 104 (1866–2026) MS 99 (1954–2025) GA 93 (1905–2025) PA 91 (1830–2026) FL 83 (1912–2019) TN 73 (1903–2026) AL 65 (1868–2026) IL 56 (1879–2025) SC 52 (1914–2026) IA 41 (1915–2026) ID 40 (1979–2022) KS 40 (1871–2024) IN 39 (1872–2020) WI 38 (1881–2026) KY 38 (1876–2026) OK 37 (1897–2025) OR 34 (1955–2025) OH 34 (1907–2026) AR 29 (1929–2023) NJ 29 (1954–2021) WV 28 (1960–2022) MD 26 (1895–2019) NY 25 (1888–2022) LA 24 (1946–2024) MO 24 (1890–2018) SD 21 (1910–2022) NC 19 (1898–2020) WA 19 (1962–2025) UT 18 (1930–2020) MT 17 (1920–2022) CT 15 (1939–2026) NV 15 (1943–2021) VA 14 (1907–2026) MN 13 (1890–2010) AZ 13 (1935–2020) WY 12 (1975–2021) DC 9 (1972–2011) AK 8 (1964–2015) NE 8 (1898–2025) ME 7 (1972–2024) CO 7 (1915–2005) NM 7 (1937–2011) RI 7 (1986–2016) ND 5 (1911–1998) VT 3 (1875–1996) PR 3 (1955–1963) MA 3 (1823–1991) NH 2 (1985–1998) DE 2 (1936–1997) HI 2 (1902–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check