104 California opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hogya v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022The cause does not raise questions of first impression, nor does it appear to have “general importance to the bench and bar where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Hogya v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 129 .) The petition should therefore be denied. 1989“Notwithstanding [the well-recognized] limitations on the availability of prerogative writs, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court may be required to consider instances of a grave nature or of significant legal impact, or to review questions of first impression and general importance to the bench and bar where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ], fn. omitted.) In addition, the petition alleges that job search orders entered against the five petitioners ar | 3 | 5 |
Anderson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022In such cases, the statutory requirement of inadequacy of appellate remedy may have been relaxed in favor of immediate review of a question of statewide importance so that lower decisions in other cases will be uniform.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129 , fns. omitted (Hogya); accord, Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 (Anderson).) Additionally, while “[a] remedy is not inadequate merely because more time would be consumed by pursuing it through the ordinary course of law than would be required in the 2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional | 3 | 3 |
In Re the Marriage of Smithgreen2 sentences2013(See Hogoboom & King, supra, ¶ 6:822, p. 6-302.5 [“Whereas child support awards facilitate a uniform purpose . . . spousal support necessarily serves varying 14 functions, depending on the parties and the underlying facts and circumstances.”]; In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480 [“Some members of the bench and bar have been critical of the Legislature, contending it has failed to specify the purpose of spousal support. . . . 2013(See Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2012) 1 6:822, p. 6-302.5 (rev. # 1, 2012) [“Whereas child support awards facilitate a uniform purpose . . . spousal support necessarily serves varying functions, depending on the parties and the underlying facts and circumstances.”]; In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 911 ] [“Some members of the bench and bar have been critical of the Legislature, contending it has failed to specify the purpose of spousal support. . . . | 3 | 3 |
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.green2 sentences2026Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And the California Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this federal constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts. 2021Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for 31 judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And our Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts. | 2 | 2 |
Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 795, 803 .) Pertinent factors include whether (1) “the party seeking the writ lacks an adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain relief,” (2) “the petitioner will suffer harm or prejudice which cannot be corrected on appeal,” or (3) “the petition presents an issue of first impression that is of general interest to the bench and bar.” (United Health Centers of San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 63, 74 ; see also Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273–1274.) We f 2021(Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122 , 129–130; see also Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 , 1273–1274.) “[G]iven that the petition raised a question of first impression appropriate for resolution in a published opinion, we deliberately chose to issue an OSC [order to show cause] instead of an alternative writ, since the latter procedure would have permitted reversal of the challenged order with the undesirable result of potentially rendering the issue moot.” (Paul Blanco’s Good Car Company Auto Group v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86 , 99, | 2 | 2 |
Litmon v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ] (Litmon).) Whether an SVP who is not under a current commitment is entitled to petition for conditional release as a result of extraordinary delay in SVP proceedings is an issue that is appropriate for writ review. 2011(Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ] (Litmon).) Whether an SVP who is not under a current commitment is entitled to petition for conditional release as a result of extraordinary delay in SVP proceedings is an issue that is appropriate for writ review. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional 2009(See Litmon v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 ]; People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 ]; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 405 ]; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 818 ] [“ ‘generally extraordinary writs are determined more speedily than appeals’ ”].) Writ review also resolves the issue before needless time and effort is expended on the pending probation violation proceedings and potential dispositional | 2 | 2 |
People v. McGauthagreen2 sentences2001Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even ‘debatable trial tactics’ do not ‘constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.’ (People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 434 , 452 P.2d 650 ], affd. sub nom. 2001Yet as we reminded the bench and bar not long ago, even ‘debatable trial tactics’ do not ‘constitute a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.’ (People v. McGautha (1969) 70 Cal.2d 770, 784 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 434 , 452 P.2d 650 ], affd. sub nom. | 2 | 2 |
Oceanside Union School District v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 373 P.2d 439 ].) Discussion Informal Resolution It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (§ 2016 et seq.) (hereinafter Discovery Act) that civil discovery be essentially self-executing. 1998(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 373 P.2d 439 ].) Discussion Informal Resolution It is a central precept to the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (§ 2016 et seq.) (hereinafter Discovery Act) that civil discovery be essentially self-executing. | 2 | 2 |
Adams v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982(See Adams v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 867, 870 [ 345 P.2d 466 ].) The dictum has, however, survived almost a half century and has been accepted by the bench and bar. 1982(See Adams v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 867, 870 [ 345 P.2d 466 ].) The dictum has, however, survived almost a half century and has been accepted by the bench and bar. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Hanleygreen2 sentences1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar. 1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Bloomgreen2 sentences1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar. 1981(See In re Bloom (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175, 179 [ 137 Cal. Rptr. 168 , 561 P.2d 258 ]; In re Hanley (1975) 13 Cal.3d 448, 454 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 530 P.2d 1381 ].) [4] Documents filed in this proceeding indicate that since the filing of the record in this case petitioner has continued to make progress in rehabilitating both his personal life and professional career, and has received strong recommendations from members of both the bench and bar. | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Loudgreen2 sentences1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file. 1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file. 1970As pointed out by Mr. Witkin in his work on Evidence, “Sometimes ‘common knowledge’ is merely that of the particular professional group which administers the judicial processes, i.e., the bench and bar.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Judicial Notice, § 175, subd. (6), p. 162; cf. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 333 [16] [ 210 P.2d 13 ]; Estate of Loud, 70 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [ 161 P.2d 49 ].) Innumerable pleadings were filed by the parties to the action, as reflected by the voluminous court file. | 2 | 2 |
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.green2 sentences2025The term ‘officer of the court,’ with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance.” (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 292 .) Additionally, California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, provides us broad discretion to issue sanctions. 2014The term 'officer of the court,' with all the assumptions of honor and integrity that append 15 to it, must not be allowed to lose its significance." (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 292 .) DISPOSITION The motion to dismiss the cross-appeal is granted. | 1 | 3 |
Rescue Army v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2022(People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 ; Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 112-113 (Powers).) “ ‘The discretionary aspect of writ review comes into play primarily when the petitioner has another remedy by appeal and the issue is whether the alternative remedy is adequate.’ ” (Mena, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 153 ; accord, Powers, at p. 113; Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467.) Even where an appeal is available, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court [by way of writ review] may be required to consider instances of a grave 1977“If reviewing courts made themselves routinely available to intervene by writ whenever a litigant claimed a mistake had been made in a law-and-motion department, trials would be delayed, litigants would be vexed with multiple proceedings, and judgment appeals would be kept waiting.” (Burrus v. Municipal Court, 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 236 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 539 ].) Notwithstanding these limitations on the availability of prerogative writs, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the intervention of an appellate court may be required to consider instances of a grave nature or of significant legal im | 1 | 2 |
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 655 .) McMillin’s writ petition presents an issue of first impression, which is of interest to builders, home buyers, their attorneys, and others. 2011(Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 655 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 542 P.2d 977 ].) When the petitioner may immediately appeal, his remedy is considered adequate and writ relief is precluded, unless the petitioner “can show some special reason why it is rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case.” (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ] (Hogya).) “Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal from a later judgment, various factors must be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the appellate | 1 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Pendleton & Firemangreen2 sentences2012However, we find Roberta’s comment reflects Justice Kennard’s dissenting opinion stating that the majority opinion in Pendleton failed to “articulate guidelines for the bench and bar explaining when, if ever, such waivers are enforceable.” (Pendleton, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 59 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) “The majority’s silence on these important questions does a disservice to the public, the bar, and the bench.” (Id. at p. 60 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As mentioned above, the Legislature responded to the Pendleton decision by creating new rules and guidelines. 2000The majority declares that it will not decide "whether all such agreements [premarital agreements waiving spousal support] are enforceable regardless of the circumstances of the parties at the time enforcement is sought" (maj. opn., ante, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 279-280, 5 P.3d at pp. 840-841) and that it will not decide "whether circumstances existing at the time enforcement of a waiver of spousal support is sought might make enforcement unjust" ( id. at p. 289, 5 P.3d at p. 848 , fn. omitted). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Hawleygreen2 sentences2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse 2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse | 1 | 2 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ].) *678 I Petitioner’s Right to a Report of Dr. Weil’s Examination Section 2032, subdivision (h) provides that “If a party submits to ... a physical or mental examination in compliance with a demand . . . , that party has the option of making a written demand that the party at whose instance the examination was made deliver to the demanding party (1) a copy of a detailed written report setting out the history, examinations, findings, including the results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the 1998Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 ].) *678 I Petitioner’s Right to a Report of Dr. Weil’s Examination Section 2032, subdivision (h) provides that “If a party submits to ... a physical or mental examination in compliance with a demand . . . , that party has the option of making a written demand that the party at whose instance the examination was made deliver to the demanding party (1) a copy of a detailed written report setting out the history, examinations, findings, including the results of all tests made, diagnoses, prognoses, and conclusions of the | 1 | 2 |
Kleveland V.Siegel & Wolensky LLPgreen1 sentence2025(See Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 559 [“ ‘It is critical to both the bench and the bar that we be able to rely on the honesty of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
| Powers v. City of Richmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bernhard v. Harrah's Clubgreen | 1 | 1 |
| PH II, INC. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wallace v. McCubbingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockyer v. Andradegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ewing v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baeza v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dillongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Groupgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woods v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dye v. Battlesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prichard v. Southern Pacific Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maine v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Serrano v. Priestgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bradygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bracy v. Gramley
green
2 sentences2026Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And the California Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this federal constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts. 2021Massey Coal Co., Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 (Caperton).) The United States Supreme Court has characterized these due process grounds for 31 judicial disqualification as a “constitutional floor” that supplements “the ceiling set ‘by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.’ ” (Caperton, at p. 889, quoting Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904 .) And our Supreme Court has emphasized that cases meeting this constitutional standard will be “extraordinary” ones that involve “extreme” or “exceptional” facts. | 3 | 2006–2026 |
Leiserson v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences2018This court must consider all the pertinent circumstances and make an assessment of any gains that have resulted from this particular case. [¶] An appellate opinion clarifying the law is an insufficient basis for a fee award under section 1021.5. 'It would be *861 patently absurd for entitlement to attorney's fees under section 1021.5 to be predicated upon our fortuitous decision to use Leiserson's appeal as a tool to communicate with the bench and bar certain legal guidelines ....' ( Leiserson v. City of San Diego (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725 , 737, 249 Cal.Rptr. 28 .) [¶] Furthermore, [the Laffe 2018This court must consider all the pertinent circumstances and make an assessment of any gains that have resulted from this particular case. [¶] An appellate opinion clarifying the law is an insufficient basis for a fee award under section 1021.5. 'It would be *861 patently absurd for entitlement to attorney's fees under section 1021.5 to be predicated upon our fortuitous decision to use Leiserson's appeal as a tool to communicate with the bench and bar certain legal guidelines ....' ( Leiserson v. City of San Diego (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 725 , 737, 249 Cal.Rptr. 28 .) [¶] Furthermore, [the Laffe | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Philpott v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014As the Supreme Court explained in Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512 [ 36 P.2d 635 ], “Considerable confusion now exists among the bench and bar as to the proper classification of ... [a quantum meruit] cause of action, due to the fact that the courts of law administering this relief apply equitable principles and to the further fact that certain expressions found in court opinions and textbooks, on first impression, might seem to classify it as an action in equity. 2014As the Supreme Court explained in Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512 [ 36 P.2d 635 ], “Considerable confusion now exists among the bench and bar as to the proper classification of ... [a quantum meruit] cause of action, due to the fact that the courts of law administering this relief apply equitable principles and to the further fact that certain expressions found in court opinions and textbooks, on first impression, might seem to classify it as an action in equity. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
McGautha v. California
green
2 sentences2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse 2001McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 711 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 ].) When, as here, ‘there is no showing that counsel did not research the facts or the law, or that he was ignorant of a crucial defense’ (In re Hawley (1967) ... 67 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 433 P.2d 919 ]), and counsel makes a tactical choice to withhold certain evidence for a later stage of trial, sound policy reasons persuade us to defer to counsel’s judgment in the matter.” (People v. Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 572-574, fns. omitted.) We agree and conclude the record does not demonstrate that counse | 2 | 1972–2001 |
Bidna v. Rosen
green
2 sentences1996However, given the deeply personal nature of the issues ... and despite best efforts of the Legislature, the bench and the bar, it is not surprising there is still considerable bitterness between spouses whose marriage is being dissolved.... [¶] In this atmosphere, the judge hearing the domestic relations calendar must regularly issue orders which do not and most often cannot satisfy either party...." ( Id. at pp. 1121-1122.) After reviewing these precedent cases, the court in Bidna v. Rosen, supra, 19 Cal. App.4th 27 , concluded that "[t]he cases are ... heading in one direction, though they 1996However, given the deeply personal nature of the issues . . . and despite best efforts of the Legislature, the bench and the bar, it is not surprising there is still considerable bitterness between spouses whose marriage is being dissolved. ... [] In this atmosphere, the judge hearing the domestic relations calendar must regularly issue orders which do not and most often cannot satisfy either party. . . .” (Id. at pp. 1121-1122.) After reviewing these precedent cases, the court in Bidna v. Rosen, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , concluded that “[t]he cases are . . . heading in one direction, though | 2 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Welch
green
2 sentences1994It would be unfair to effectively bar any review of defendant’s claims where the rule requiring their preservation in the trial court was adopted in the context of [this] appeal.” (Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228, 238 , fn. omitted.) Prospective application of the Welch rule also gave the bench and bar an opportunity to learn about the change in the law before it took effect in other cases. 1994It would be unfair to effectively bar any review of defendant's claims where the rule requiring their preservation in the trial court was adopted in the context of [this] appeal." ( Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th 228, 238 , fn. omitted.) Prospective application of the Welch rule also gave the bench and bar an opportunity to learn about the change in the law before it took effect in other cases. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento
green
2 sentences1979In distinguishing a line of civil cases underscoring the court's equal responsibility to avoid conflict in situations endangering confidentiality and threatening to undermine the integrity of the bench and bar, that court concluded that the crucial presence of Sixth Amendment rights mandated the defendant's election to be represented by counsel of choice concurrent with a knowing waiver of any claim of prejudice based upon conflicting interests, including the right of the former clients-witnesses to invoke the claim of privilege during cross-examination. ( United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, su 1979In distinguishing a line of civil cases underscoring the court's equal responsibility to avoid conflict in situations endangering confidentiality and threatening to undermine the integrity of the bench and bar, that court concluded that the crucial presence of Sixth Amendment rights mandated the defendant's election to be represented by counsel of choice concurrent with a knowing waiver of any claim of prejudice based upon conflicting interests, including the right of the former clients-witnesses to invoke the claim of privilege during cross-examination. ( United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, su | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Knight v. Kaiser Co.
green
2 sentences1959First, is the majority impliedly approving or, on the other hand, “disapproving the former eases,” as advocated by the dissenting Justices in Knight v. Kaiser Co., supra, 48 Cal.2d 778 , 785? 1959As indicated in my dissent in Reynolds v. Willson, supra, ante, pp. 94, 106 [ 331 P.2d 48 ], I believe that section 339 of the Restatement of Torts, properly construed, is entirely consistent with "the former cases." (See Knight v. Kaiser Co., supra, 48 Cal.2d 778 ; Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 8 Cal.2d 741 ; Wilford v. Little, supra, 144 Cal. App.2d 477 .) On the other hand, I do not believe that the majority opinion in the Reynolds case or the main opinion here can be reconciled with those decisions. | 2 | 1959–1959 |
People v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2025(See fn. 10, ante [noting that these two potentially disparate terms appear in the statutory text]; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 770 [observing that “[t]he text of [the statute] itself ‘arguably allows for [this] distinction to be 21 Bibi also claims for the first time in her reply that her interpretation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is the only one that is “consistent with the other provisions of section 1170[ and] promotes the legislative goal[ ] of equality in sentencing . . . .” Bibi has forfeited these belated arguments as well. ( Taylor, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 64 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| H. D. Arnaiz Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Amie v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| United Health Centers of the San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Gentile red | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Mena green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| The People v. Super. Ct. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Chun red | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Loper green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Jessica K. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Orange County Social Services Agency v. Gloria D. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Farmer v. City of Inglewood green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Cho v. Chang green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re Marriage of Johnson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Norviel v. Norviel green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Solem v. Helm red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Burgos green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Coley green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Marsden green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Horn green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Chambers green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Estate of Hume green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.