simple rule in Pennsylvania

29 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1853–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Commonwealth v. Wallsgreen pa · 2007 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026 2 sentences 2026Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007). 2017Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007).	2	2
Raab v. Keystone Insurancegreen pasuperct · 1979 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 2 sentences 1996We believe the simple rule expressed in Raab [v. Keystone Insurance Co., 271 Pa.Super. 185 , 412 A.2d 638 (1979)] is inadequate to determine the true character of a claim. 1996We believe the simple rule expressed in Raab [v. Keystone Insurance Co., 271 Pa.Super. 185 , 412 A.2d 638 (1979)] is inadequate to determine the true character of a claim.	1	2
Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine, & Inland Insurancegreen pacommwct · 1993 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996See Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine, and Inland Insurance Co., 154 Pa.Commw. 366, 623 A.2d 933 (1993) (noting the existence of confusion in the area)---We believe the simple rule expressed in Raab [v. Keystone Insurance Co., 271 Pa.Super. 185 , 412 A.2d 638 (1979) ] is inadequate to determine the true character of a claim.	1	1
In Re Montgomery Hulon Harrell, Debtor, Montgomery Hulon Harrell v. Caryl Ann (Kaldenberg) Harrell Sharpgreen ca11 · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 1 sentence 1990In In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir.1985), the Eleventh Circuit rejected Calhoun and stated: The statutory language [of § 523(a)(5) ] suggests a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support.	1	1
Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Dohertygreen pacommwct · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989However, we have held that a simple inquiry, “May I call my lawyer?” when asked to submit to a test, was merely a question and “that a refusal cannot be implied from a mere question.” Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Doherty, 88 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482, 485 , 490 A.2d 481, 482 (1985). 1989However, we have held that a simple inquiry, “May I call my lawyer?” when asked to submit to a test, was merely a question and “that a refusal cannot be implied from a mere question.” Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Doherty, 88 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482, 485 , 490 A.2d 481, 482 (1985).	1	1
Commonwealth v. Boernergreen pasuperct · 1980 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an	1	1
Commonwealth v. Samplegreen pa · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an	1	1
Abramovich v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Boardgreen pa · 1980 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982 1 sentence 1982Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., supra; see also Abramovich v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, supra; Bole v. Nationwide Insurance Co., supra. Appellant is entitled to have his claim heard by a panel of arbitrators that is not biased against one litigant and favorable to another, which is not to say that the arbitrator here was biased, for we need not make such determination in deciding the case.	1	1
Commonwealth v. Tomegreen pa · 1979 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980 2 sentences 1980Compare Commonwealth v. Tome, 484 Pa. 261 , 271 & 274, 398 A.2d 1369 , 1375 & 1376 with id. at 275 , 398 A.2d at 1377 . 1980Compare Commonwealth v. Tome, 484 Pa. 261 , 271 & 274, 398 A.2d 1369 , 1375 & 1376 with id. at 275 , 398 A.2d at 1377 .	1	1
McGowan v. Marylandgreen scotus · 1961 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979	1	1
Brown v. Frenchgreen mass · 1878 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1937–1937	1	1
D'Ooge v. Leedsgreen mass · 1900 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1927–1927	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (35)

Case	Cited	Years
Aircraft Braking Systems Corporation v. Local 856, International Union green ca6 · 1996 1 sentence 2018Cf. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, International Union, 97 F.3d 155 , 159 & 161-62 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing collateral estoppel in the context of arbitration proceedings and noting that the federal circuit court of appeals “have held uniformly that arbitrators are bound by prior federal court decisions under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.”).	1	2018–2018
Commonwealth v. Mendez green pasuperct · 2013 1 sentence 2016Mendez, supra, at 260 .	1	2016–2016
Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board green pa · 1999 2 sentences 2014Myers argues further that our Supreme Court’s decision in Shovel Transfer v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 559 Pa. 56 , 739 A.2d 133 (1999), is applicable to this case. 2014Myers argues further that our Supreme Court’s decision in Shovel Transfer v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 559 Pa. 56 , 739 A.2d 133 (1999), is applicable to this case.	1	2014–2014
Worm v. American Cyanamid Company green ca4 · 1993 1 sentence 1997The primary means for determining the line between a pre-empted claim and a permissible claim, is “whether one could reasonably foresee that the manufacturer, in seeking to avoid liability for the error, would choose to alter the product or the label.” Worm II, 5 F.3d at 747-48 .	1	1997–1997
COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. Hoover green pacommwct · 1992 2 sentences 1993In the companion case to Sorg, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 70, 606 A.2d 1264 , appeal denied, 531 Pa. 656 , 613 A.2d 561 (1992), a dissenting Judge Palladino exhibited remarkable prescience when she wrote: [T]o pursue the analysis the court proposes would have the effect of transforming a simple rule by the legislature into a procedural morass and thereby provide escape routes for drivers who are highway menaces. 1993In the companion case to Sorg, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 70, 606 A.2d 1264 , appeal denied, 531 Pa. 656 , 613 A.2d 561 (1992), a dissenting Judge Palladino exhibited remarkable prescience when she wrote: [T]o pursue the analysis the court proposes would have the effect of transforming a simple rule by the legislature into a procedural morass and thereby provide escape routes for drivers who are highway menaces.	1	1993–1993
Mitchell v. Pittsburgh green pasuperct · 1975 2 sentences 1990Judge Price in Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh, 233 Pa. Super. 119 , 335 A.2d 403 (1975), found the decisions so confusing that he proposed a simple rule that an appeal by any party will be an appeal by all parties as to all issues. 1990Judge Price in Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh, 233 Pa. Super. 119 , 335 A.2d 403 (1975), found the decisions so confusing that he proposed a simple rule that an appeal by any party will be an appeal by all parties as to all issues.	1	1990–1990
Adams v. Harleysville Insurance green pasuperct · 1989 2 sentences 1990The Appellant’s argument was rejected by the Superior Court as well in Adams v. Harleysville Insurance Co., 381 Pa.Super. 370 , 553 A.2d 1014 (1989), in which it was also held that a trolley operated on tracks is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the Financial Responsibility Law. 1990The Appellant’s argument was rejected by the Superior Court as well in Adams v. Harleysville Insurance Co., 381 Pa.Super. 370 , 553 A.2d 1014 (1989), in which it was also held that a trolley operated on tracks is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the Financial Responsibility Law.	1	1990–1990
Union City School District v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review green pa · 1982 2 sentences 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19	1	1988–1988
Fairview Sch. Dist. v. COM. UNEM. COMP. green pa · 1982 2 sentences 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19	1	1988–1988
Local 730 v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review green pa · 1984 2 sentences 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19 1988The status quo consists of the previous terms and conditions of employment, nothing more, nothing less. [1] The fundamental error in the Opinion of the Court is its failure to distinguish between instances where the issue is whether the work stoppage resulted from a strike or a lockout, see, e.g., Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 480 , 480 A.2d 1000 (1984); Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 539 , 454 A.2d 517 (1982); Union City School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 548 , 454 A.2d 522 (19	1	1988–1988
Schubach v. Silver green pacommwct · 1973 2 sentences 1987In Schubach v. Silver, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 152 , 305 A.2d 896 (1973), revd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 366 , 336 A.2d 328 (1975), this court stated that a simple violation of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a nuisance per se. 1987In Schubach v. Silver, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 152 , 305 A.2d 896 (1973), revd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 366 , 336 A.2d 328 (1975), this court stated that a simple violation of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a nuisance per se.	1	1987–1987
Schubach v. Silver green pa · 1975 2 sentences 1987In Schubach v. Silver, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 152 , 305 A.2d 896 (1973), revd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 366 , 336 A.2d 328 (1975), this court stated that a simple violation of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a nuisance per se. 1987In Schubach v. Silver, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 152 , 305 A.2d 896 (1973), revd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 366 , 336 A.2d 328 (1975), this court stated that a simple violation of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a nuisance per se.	1	1987–1987
Com. v. Washington green pa · 1981 2 sentences 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an	1	1983–1983
Commonwealth v. Mitchell green pa · 1980 2 sentences 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an 1983See Commonwealth v. Sample, 493 Pa. 347 , 426 A.2d 582 (1981) (Alleged violations of the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were evaluated under the federal standard set forth in Starks); Commonwealth v. Washington, 492 Pa. 572 , 424 A.2d 1340 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75 , 410 A.2d 1232 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505 , 515-16 n. 11, 422 A.2d 583 , 588 n. 11 (1980), where it is mentioned that our Supreme Court evidently treats a simple claim of "double jeopardy" as sufficient to raise both the federal an	1	1983–1983
Commonwealth v. Stewart green pa · 1981 2 sentences 1981Failure to do so will bring the Commonwealth into conflict with the plain wording and meaning of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, as well as Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1974) 1 and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24 , 425 A.2d 346 (1981). 2 In Stewart the defendant was arrested and charged with having a pistol on his person as well as possession of heroin. 1981Failure to do so will bring the Commonwealth into conflict with the plain wording and meaning of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, as well as Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1974) 1 and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24 , 425 A.2d 346 (1981). 2 In Stewart the defendant was arrested and charged with having a pistol on his person as well as possession of heroin.	1	1981–1981
Commonwealth v. Campana green pa · 1973 2 sentences 1981Failure to do so will bring the Commonwealth into conflict with the plain wording and meaning of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, as well as Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1974) 1 and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24 , 425 A.2d 346 (1981). 2 In Stewart the defendant was arrested and charged with having a pistol on his person as well as possession of heroin. 1981Failure to do so will bring the Commonwealth into conflict with the plain wording and meaning of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, as well as Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1974) 1 and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24 , 425 A.2d 346 (1981). 2 In Stewart the defendant was arrested and charged with having a pistol on his person as well as possession of heroin.	1	1981–1981
Nichols v. McCoy green cal · 1952 2 sentences 1979Other courts have held that, because of the simple and precise manner by which the level of intoxication may be determined, and the routine procedures by which hospitals administer and record such events, results of blood alcohol tests may be admitted through the custodian of the records without the presence of the technician who actually performed the test. [3] Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4 Cir., 1962); State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J.Super. 449 , 346 A.2d 618 (1975); Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App.Div. 1002 , 100 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1950); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447 , 240 P.2d 569 (1952). 1979Other courts have held that, because of the simple and precise manner by which the level of intoxication may be determined, and the routine procedures by which hospitals administer and record such events, results of blood alcohol tests may be admitted through the custodian of the records without the presence of the technician who actually performed the test. [3] Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4 Cir., 1962); State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J.Super. 449 , 346 A.2d 618 (1975); Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App.Div. 1002 , 100 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1950); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447 , 240 P.2d 569 (1952).	1	1979–1979
Jonnet v. Bodick green pa · 1968 2 sentences 1979Like all others, he must personally answer for his wrongful acts, . . . [10] See, Public Defender Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1144, No. 358, § 4, 16 P.S. § 9960.4 (power of Board of County Commissioners to fire public defender). [1] See, e.g., Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188 , 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59 , 244 A.2d 751 (1968). [2] "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, § 101 et seq., 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5311.101 et seq. (1979-80 Supp.) [3] While in DuBree , I considered that permitting a suit against the Commonwealth repr 1979Like all others, he must personally answer for his wrongful acts, . . . [10] See, Public Defender Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1144, No. 358, § 4, 16 P.S. § 9960.4 (power of Board of County Commissioners to fire public defender). [1] See, e.g., Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188 , 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59 , 244 A.2d 751 (1968). [2] "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, § 101 et seq., 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5311.101 et seq. (1979-80 Supp.) [3] While in DuBree , I considered that permitting a suit against the Commonwealth repr	1	1979–1979
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. green scotus · 1949	1	1979–1979
Joseph E. Thomas v. Ruth A. Martin Hogan green ca4 · 1962 1 sentence 1979Other courts have held that, because of the simple and precise manner by which the level of intoxication may be determined, and the routine procedures by which hospitals administer and record such events, results of blood alcohol tests may be admitted through the custodian of the records without the presence of the technician who actually performed the test. [3] Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4 Cir., 1962); State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J.Super. 449 , 346 A.2d 618 (1975); Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App.Div. 1002 , 100 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1950); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447 , 240 P.2d 569 (1952).	1	1979–1979
State v. Martorelli green njsuperctappdiv · 1975 2 sentences 1979Other courts have held that, because of the simple and precise manner by which the level of intoxication may be determined, and the routine procedures by which hospitals administer and record such events, results of blood alcohol tests may be admitted through the custodian of the records without the presence of the technician who actually performed the test. [3] Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4 Cir., 1962); State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J.Super. 449 , 346 A.2d 618 (1975); Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App.Div. 1002 , 100 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1950); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447 , 240 P.2d 569 (1952). 1979Other courts have held that, because of the simple and precise manner by which the level of intoxication may be determined, and the routine procedures by which hospitals administer and record such events, results of blood alcohol tests may be admitted through the custodian of the records without the presence of the technician who actually performed the test. [3] Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4 Cir., 1962); State v. Martorelli, 136 N.J.Super. 449 , 346 A.2d 618 (1975); Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App.Div. 1002 , 100 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1950); Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal.2d 447 , 240 P.2d 569 (1952).	1	1979–1979
Boddie v. Connecticut green scotus · 1971	1	1979–1979
Matson v. Margiotti green pa · 1952 2 sentences 1979Like all others, he must personally answer for his wrongful acts, . . . [10] See, Public Defender Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1144, No. 358, § 4, 16 P.S. § 9960.4 (power of Board of County Commissioners to fire public defender). [1] See, e.g., Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188 , 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59 , 244 A.2d 751 (1968). [2] "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, § 101 et seq., 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5311.101 et seq. (1979-80 Supp.) [3] While in DuBree , I considered that permitting a suit against the Commonwealth repr 1979Like all others, he must personally answer for his wrongful acts, . . . [10] See, Public Defender Act, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1144, No. 358, § 4, 16 P.S. § 9960.4 (power of Board of County Commissioners to fire public defender). [1] See, e.g., Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188 , 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59 , 244 A.2d 751 (1968). [2] "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, § 101 et seq., 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5311.101 et seq. (1979-80 Supp.) [3] While in DuBree , I considered that permitting a suit against the Commonwealth repr	1	1979–1979
Commonwealth v. Teamsters Union Local No. 77 green pacommwct · 1975	1	1976–1976
Harnnum v. Oak Lane Shopping Center, Inc. neutral pa · 1956	1	1973–1973
Hoke v. Herman neutral pa · 1853	1	1955–1955
Ridgway, Budd & Co.'s Appeal green · 1850	1	1939–1939
York Bank's Appeal green pa · 1860	1	1939–1939
Smith's Appeal neutral pa · 1864	1	1939–1939
Hamilton's Appeal neutral pa · 1883	1	1939–1939
Thayer v. Dewey green · 1904	1	1937–1937
Clark v. Martin green pa · 1865	1	1935–1935
Farmakis v. Crown neutral pa · 1921	1	1935–1935
Boardman v. Boardman green conn · 1905	1	1927–1927
Streeper v. Eckart neutral pa · 1837	1	1853–1853

Where else courts name it

NY 108 (1860–2026) CA 104 (1944–2026) TX 76 (1891–2025) IL 57 (1875–2026) LA 54 (1923–2020) MA 37 (1900–2026) OH 37 (1875–2025) WA 33 (1907–2024) PA 29 (1853–2026) MD 28 (1959–2021) OR 27 (1961–2025) FL 27 (1952–2023) NJ 26 (1949–2023) KY 17 (1955–2026) MO 16 (1880–2022) NC 15 (1891–2005) MI 15 (1884–2024) MN 14 (1964–2017) AL 13 (1887–2003) UT 13 (1987–2026) GA 13 (1947–1999) WI 13 (1887–2024) KS 13 (1884–2015) VA 12 (1925–2024) IN 11 (1869–2016) OK 10 (1912–2019) CT 10 (1953–2022) NM 10 (1959–2018) AK 9 (1979–2017) SD 8 (1916–2012) RI 8 (1889–2014) AR 8 (1886–2016) WV 8 (1908–2007) IA 7 (1887–2022) TN 7 (1896–2014) DE 7 (1934–2025) CO 7 (1925–2026) ND 6 (1893–2015) WY 6 (1982–2017) HI 6 (1974–2021) MS 5 (1872–2016) SC 5 (1952–1990) VT 5 (1915–2017) AZ 4 (1922–2011) NH 4 (1976–2020) MT 3 (1966–2007) DC 3 (1980–2010) NV 3 (1950–1959) ID 2 (1991–1994)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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