simple requirement in California

2013(See Mahnke, at p. 579; Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508-1509 ; see generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. (1968) 393 U.S. 145, 149 [ 89 S.Ct. 337 , 21 L.Ed.2d 301 ] [“[w]e can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealing that might create an impression of possible bias”].) “[U]nless „a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the [arbitrator‟s] impartiality . . . ,‟ t

2013(See Mahnke, at p. 579; Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508-1509 ; see generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. (1968) 393 U.S. 145, 149 [ 89 S.Ct. 337 , 21 L.Ed.2d 301 ] [“[w]e can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealing that might create an impression of possible bias”].) “[U]nless „a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the [arbitrator‟s] impartiality . . . ,‟ t

2015A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implies the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 ; see also Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 48 .) 11 We find there was sufficient evidence to support all of Romo’s convictions.

2015A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implies the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 ; see also Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 48 .) 11 We find there was sufficient evidence to support all of Romo’s convictions.

2025(People v. Martinez (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 178 , 189 (Martinez); People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005 (Schulz).) “Other relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family.” (Cochran, at pp. 14-16.) Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does not require a finding of no duress; the victim’s testimony must be considered in light of her [or his] age and her [or hi

2024“A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implies the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 .) Ortega groomed Jane Doe to accept the abuse, starting with touching her vaginal area with his penis over her underwear, to increasingly more severe sex acts as she grew older.

2025The Arbitrator Did Not Refuse to Hear Evidence Material to the Controversy Within the Meaning of Section 1286.2, Subdivision (a)(5) Section 1286.2 requires vacatur of an arbitration award when “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by . . . the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy . . . .” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5).) Vacatur under this provision “must rest on more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence.” (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 368 .) “Instead, [the provision] was designed as a ‘safety valve in private arbitration that

2025Nor does she claim the panel incorrectly applied the rules of evidence in refusing to consider this evidence.3 Instead, she argues that the panel did 3 Even if she had so argued, however, vacatur under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) “must rest on more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence.” (Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368 (Heimlich).) 10 not “hear” this material evidence, and that this substantially prejudiced her.

2023(Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103 (Huckey).) “It is well established that a property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 (Caloroso).) “Courts have referred to this simple principle as the ‘trivial defect defense,’ although it is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty that plaintiff must plead and prove.

2022The duty of care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects.” (Ursino v. Big Boy Rests. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 398 .) Thus, “[i]t is well established that a property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial or insignificant defect in property. [Citation.] Courts have referred to this simple principle as the ‘trivial defect defense,’ although it is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty that [the] plaintiff must plead and prove.” (Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 927 .) The trivial defect defen

2022Although we conclude this was a reasonable exercise of the arbitrator’s discretion (see Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11 ; SWAB, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1195-1196), even assuming legal error the arbitration’s decision is not reviewable, as we also conclude the error did not prevent the Weisbords from fairly presenting their side of the dispute, including by presenting the expert testimony of Mr. Karelis (see Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 369-370 [noting an arbitration award cannot be set aside based on “a simple error in applying the rules of evidence,” and further noting a contr

2022Although we conclude this was a reasonable exercise of the arbitrator’s discretion (see Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11 ; SWAB, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1195-1196), even assuming legal error the arbitration’s decision is not reviewable, as we also conclude the error did not prevent the Weisbords from fairly presenting their side of the dispute, including by presenting the expert testimony of Mr. Karelis (see Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 369-370 [noting an arbitration award cannot be set aside based on “a simple error in applying the rules of evidence,” and further noting a contr

2013(See Mahnke, at p. 579; Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508-1509 ; see generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. (1968) 393 U.S. 145, 149 [ 89 S.Ct. 337 , 21 L.Ed.2d 301 ] [“[w]e can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealing that might create an impression of possible bias”].) “[U]nless „a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the [arbitrator‟s] impartiality . . . ,‟ t

2010Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 500, 504 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ] [disclosure required when disclosed information might ‘create an impression of possible bias in the eyes of the hypothetical, reasonable person’]; accord, Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 ].)” (Mahnke v. Superior Court, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 573-574.) So important is this duty to disclose potential disqualifying relationships that a failure to disclose serves as a basis for setting aside the arbitration award.

2025(People v. Martinez (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 178 , 189 (Martinez); People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005 (Schulz).) “Other relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family.” (Cochran, at pp. 14-16.) Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does not require a finding of no duress; the victim’s testimony must be considered in light of her [or his] age and her [or hi

2014(People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1319-1320 ; see also Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 7 [total circumstances, including age of victim and the victim’s relationship to the defendant, are factors to be considered in appraising existence of duress].) “A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implies the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (People v. Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 .) Another factor to be considered is the occurrence of the molestation “in an isolated room out of the presence of other adults .

2021(Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 [“[T]he actual amount or subjective value of the consideration given by [a party] as part of the settlement agreement … is immaterial to any consideration of whether [a malicious prosecution plaintiff] can show a termination of the lawsuit in his favor.”]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 27 (Ludwig) [“A simple waiver of costs is alone enough to disqualify a settlement as a ‘favorable termination.’ ”].) Admittedly, we are somewhat in the dark about the particulars of the settlement agreement that resolved the underlying action.

2021(Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 [“[T]he actual amount or subjective value of the consideration given by [a party] as part of the settlement agreement … is immaterial to any consideration of whether [a malicious prosecution plaintiff] can show a termination of the lawsuit in his favor.”]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 27 (Ludwig) [“A simple waiver of costs is alone enough to disqualify a settlement as a ‘favorable termination.’ ”].) Admittedly, we are somewhat in the dark about the particulars of the settlement agreement that resolved the underlying action.

2021(Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 [“[T]he actual amount or subjective value of the consideration given by [a party] as part of the settlement agreement … is immaterial to any consideration of whether [a malicious prosecution plaintiff] can show a termination of the lawsuit in his favor.”]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 27 (Ludwig) [“A simple waiver of costs is alone enough to disqualify a settlement as a ‘favorable termination.’ ”].) Admittedly, we are somewhat in the dark about the particulars of the settlement agreement that resolved the underlying action.

2021(Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1338 [“[T]he actual amount or subjective value of the consideration given by [a party] as part of the settlement agreement … is immaterial to any consideration of whether [a malicious prosecution plaintiff] can show a termination of the lawsuit in his favor.”]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 27 (Ludwig) [“A simple waiver of costs is alone enough to disqualify a settlement as a ‘favorable termination.’ ”].) Admittedly, we are somewhat in the dark about the particulars of the settlement agreement that resolved the underlying action.

2020Co. (2006) 140 Cal. App.4th 658, 664 (Pasadena Metro).) This, then, is the simple analysis that we must apply: the common law rule governs unless the Legislature declares otherwise.

2020Co. (2006) 140 Cal. App.4th 658, 664 (Pasadena Metro).) This, then, is the simple analysis that we must apply: the common law rule governs unless the Legislature declares otherwise.

2014(People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1319-1320 ; see also Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 7 [total circumstances, including age of victim and the victim’s relationship to the defendant, are factors to be considered in appraising existence of duress].) “A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implies the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (People v. Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 .) Another factor to be considered is the occurrence of the molestation “in an isolated room out of the presence of other adults .

2013(People v. Superior Court (Kneip), supra, 219 Cal.App. 3d at pp. 238-239; People v. Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) .) "A simple warning to a child not to report a molestation reasonably implied the child should not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition." (People v. Senior, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 .) The evidence clearly supports the finding that appellant committed the charged offenses by duress. " 'Th[e] record paints a picture of a small, vulnerable and isolated child who engaged in sex acts only in response to [appellant's frequent contact with the family] and

2011An arbitrator’s failure to disclose facts as required by section 1281.9 warrants vacation of his or her award. (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(2), (6); Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 476-477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ]; Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.

2011An arbitrator’s failure to disclose facts as required by section 1281.9 warrants vacation of his or her award. (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(2), (6); Casden Park La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 468, 476-477 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 763 ]; Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.

2010Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 500, 504 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ] [disclosure required when disclosed information might ‘create an impression of possible bias in the eyes of the hypothetical, reasonable person’]; accord, Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 ].)” (Mahnke v. Superior Court, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 573-574.) So important is this duty to disclose potential disqualifying relationships that a failure to disclose serves as a basis for setting aside the arbitration award.

2010Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 500, 504 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ] [disclosure required when disclosed information might ‘create an impression of possible bias in the eyes of the hypothetical, reasonable person’]; accord, Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 ].)” (Mahnke v. Superior Court, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 573-574.) So important is this duty to disclose potential disqualifying relationships that a failure to disclose serves as a basis for setting aside the arbitration award.

1963“The Legislature intended every person engaged in professional activities properly to represent himself in his true capacity by appropriate title.” (Lawton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 143 Cal.App.2d 256, 261 [ 299 P.2d 362 ].) “This simple requirement [of using a doctor’s true name], so easily complied with, was not aimed particularly at the person who was willing to incur the odium of actual fraud, but was designed to offer a much wider protection to the public by assuring to it a reasonable certainty of knowing in every ease precisely with whom it was dealing, the importance of the relati

1963“The Legislature intended every person engaged in professional activities properly to represent himself in his true capacity by appropriate title.” (Lawton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 143 Cal.App.2d 256, 261 [ 299 P.2d 362 ].) “This simple requirement [of using a doctor’s true name], so easily complied with, was not aimed particularly at the person who was willing to incur the odium of actual fraud, but was designed to offer a much wider protection to the public by assuring to it a reasonable certainty of knowing in every ease precisely with whom it was dealing, the importance of the relati

2023(See Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 [holding attorney’s belief that submission of claim was unlikely to settle dispute, but was instead likely to result in litigation, insufficient to make claim automatically protected by anti-SLAPP law, explaining that “an insurance claim cannot be transformed from a simple claim for payment submitted in the usual course of business into protected prelitigation conduct solely on the basis of the 17 subjective intent of the attorney submitting the claim”]; Rubin, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 501 [defendant’s “‘subjective understanding of the purpose’”

2021(Id. at pp. 824, 827.) “That possibility of litigation in the event of nonperformance is not enough to conclude the claim is made in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 828 .) Under the facts in Anapol, the appellate court held that attorneys’ subjective expectations of litigation were not sufficient to establish protected litigation conduct: “We believe that an insurance claim cannot be transformed from a simple claim for payment submitted in the usual course of business into protected prelitigation cond

2016The duty of care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects.’ ” (Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11 , 26–27 (Kasparian).) “Courts have referred to this simple principle as the ‘trivial defect defense,’ although it is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty that plaintiff must plead and prove.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 (Caloroso).) As our high court has noted, “a . . . city is not an insurer of its public ways and is not bound to keep them so as to preclude th

2015(Whiting v. City of National City (1937) 9 Cal.2d 163, 166 .) “Courts have referred to this simple principle as the ‘trivial defect defense,’ although it is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty that plaintiff must plead and prove. . . . [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] The question . . . is not whether [defendant] established a complete defense, but whether plaintiffs showed there is a triable issue as to whether there was a dangerous condition . . . that [defendant] had a duty to repair.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 .) Plaintiff counters that the triv

2026(Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [“we cannot presume prejudice and will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing there was a miscarriage of justice”].) “To establish prejudice, a party must show ‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to [it] would have been reached.’ ” (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1161 .) Tarek does not explain how the judgment would be more favorable to him if the box noting his presence in court were not checked.

2023(Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103 (Huckey).) “It is well established that a property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 (Caloroso).) “Courts have referred to this simple principle as the ‘trivial defect defense,’ although it is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty that plaintiff must plead and prove.

2023The ‘trivial defect defense’ is available to private, nongovernmental landowners.” (Ibid.) “In limited circumstances a court may determine a walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law.” (Fajardo v. Dailey (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 221 , 226 (Fajardo).) “ ‘Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment.’ ” (Ibid.) “But where ‘sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect is dangerous,’ summary judgment is inappropriat