simple test in Washington

2016I am persuaded that the appropriate line is expressed in this simple test: Did the communications with the former employee, whenever they occurred, "relate to the former employee's conduct and knowledge, or communication with defendant's counsel, during his or her employment?" Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41 .

2016Former employees present their own unique considerations: they probably do not communicate with corporate counsel “at the direction of corporate superiors,” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394 , and they do not hold an agency relationship with the corporate client such that their present or future actions could bind the corporation. ¶39 I am persuaded that the appropriate line is expressed in this simple test: Did the communications with the former employee, whenever they occurred, “relate to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with defendant’s counsel, during his or her employme

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to “build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel.” Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶ 40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel." Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to “build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel.” Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶ 40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel." Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶ 40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel." Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2011Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 479 , 824 P.2d 483 (1992). ¶ 40 There is no dispute that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to "build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel." Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 249 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

2009Id. ¶ 20 Thus, Schrempp does not stand for the proposition that this court can directly review a decision of the secretary of state to determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law. [3] Even assuming that the appellants' arguments in that case raised the question of inherent power to review, we held that their contention of arbitrary and capricious conduct failed.

2009Id. ¶20 Thus, Schrempp does not stand for the proposition that this court can directly review a decision of the secretary of state to determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law. 3 Even assuming that the appellants’ arguments in that case raised the question of inherent power to review, we held that their contention of arbitrary and capricious conduct failed.

2005Tribe, American Constitutional Law 618-19 (2d ed. 1988) ("noting that the most basic purposes of the contract clause point to the simple principle that the government must keep its word"), and citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 , 191 , 112 S.Ct. 1105 , 117 L.

2005Tribe, American Constitutional Law 618-19 (2d ed. 1988) ("noting that the most basic purposes of the contract clause point to the simple principle that the government must keep its word"), and citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 , 191 , 112 S.Ct. 1105 , 117 L.

1991Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 570 (1982) (quoting Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980)).

1983Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 570 (1982) (quoting Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980)).

2021The Families Are Beneficially Interested and Therefore Have Standing To Bring Writs of Mandamus The requirement that a party seeking a writ of mandamus must be beneficially interested is a simple standard: “all that must be shown is that the party has an interest in the matter beyond that of other citizens.” RPECW, 148 Wn.2d at 620 .

2020Instead, the purchase agreement contained an integration clause stating, “‘There are no verbal or other agreements which modify or affect this agreement,’” and the deed “contain[ed] the simple clause that the identified property is ‘Subject to rights, restrictions, easements and covenants of record, if any.’” Black, 75 Wn.2d at 243 .

2020In doing so, the court observed that the deed for the Blacks’ lot contained only a simple clause stating that it was “[s]ubject to rights, restrictions, easements and covenants of record.” Black, 75 Wn.2d at 249 .

2017City ofBremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wn.2d 569, 574 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1 Black's Law Dictionary recognizes this distinction, defining "corpus delicti" differently from the "corpus delicti rnle." According to Black's, corpus delicti is "[t]he fact of a transgression," "reflect[ing] the simple principle that a crime must be proved to have occurred before anyone can be convicted for having committed it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (10th ed. 2014).

2017City ofBremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wn.2d 569, 574 , 723 P.2d 1135 (1986); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1 Black's Law Dictionary recognizes this distinction, defining "corpus delicti" differently from the "corpus delicti rnle." According to Black's, corpus delicti is "[t]he fact of a transgression," "reflect[ing] the simple principle that a crime must be proved to have occurred before anyone can be convicted for having committed it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (10th ed. 2014).

2016Former employees present their own unique considerations: they probably do not communicate with corporate counsel “at the direction of corporate superiors,” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394 , and they do not hold an agency relationship with the corporate client such that their present or future actions could bind the corporation. ¶39 I am persuaded that the appropriate line is expressed in this simple test: Did the communications with the former employee, whenever they occurred, “relate to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with defendant’s counsel, during his or her employme

2015App. at 578 .3 We concluded the remark was an incorrect statement of the law but "a simple instruction from the trial court indicating that the presumption of innocence may be overcome, if at all, only during the jury's deliberations would have been sufficient to overcome any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's remark." Reed. 168 Wn.

2013Noting that this simple standard was in disarray, we discussed relevant Washington case law and 8 The force of the court's holding is questionable given its comment that its discussion of the motion for continuance was "unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal " Butler, 116 Wn.

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2006NOTES [1] Bennett's counsel argued: "[I]nstead of a simple instruction that's been used for years, now there's one that says standard definition of reasonable doubt, it uses firmly convinced and if there is a real possibility of being not guilty. " Report of Proceedings (RP) (7/20/2004) at 102 (emphasis added). [2] The trial court found that the Washington convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) and, therefore, counted them as a single offense in calculating Bennett's offender score. [3] Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 , 658 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 2478 , 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001

2004Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 , 100 S. Ct. 2227 , 65 L.

2004Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 , 100 S. Ct. 2227 , 65 L.

1994McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 305 , 738 P.2d 254 (1987). *326 [4] As to the unfairness prong, we note a simple principle.

1994McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 305 , 738 P.2d 254 (1987). *326 [4] As to the unfairness prong, we note a simple principle.

1969If not so expressed, the question is open to other evidence, and I think in the absence of all proof there is no presumption that either party, in giving or accepting a conveyance, intends to give up the benefit of covenants of which the conveyance is not a performance or satisfaction.” (Italics ours.) (Quoted by this court in Davis v. Lee [ 52 Wash. 330 , 100 Pac. 752 (1909)], supra.) As stated in the facts, the warranty deed of lot 72 sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs contains only the simple clause, “Subject to rights, restrictions, easements and covenants of record,' if any.” We do

1969If not so expressed, the question is open to other evidence, and I think in the absence of all proof there is no presumption that either party, in giving or accepting a conveyance, intends to give up the benefit of covenants of which the conveyance is not a performance or satisfaction.” (Italics ours.) (Quoted by this court in Davis v. Lee [ 52 Wash. 330 , 100 Pac. 752 (1909)], supra.) As stated in the facts, the warranty deed of lot 72 sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs contains only the simple clause, “Subject to rights, restrictions, easements and covenants of record,' if any.” We do

1928While there is no direct evidence going to show that the act of appellant’s servants in setting out the fire was within the scope of their employment, and done in furtherance of its business in which they were engaged, we think the circumstances shown by the evidence tend to establish such fact, and to show that such act was negligent, and caused the damages sued for to appellee’s property.” The rule announced in Wood, Law of Master and Servant is quoted approvingly in Seybold v. Eisle, 154 Iowa 128 , 134 N. W. 578 , as follows: “ ‘The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of

1928While there is no direct evidence going to show that the act of appellant’s servants in setting out the fire was within the scope of their employment, and done in furtherance of its business in which they were engaged, we think the circumstances shown by the evidence tend to establish such fact, and to show that such act was negligent, and caused the damages sued for to appellee’s property.” The rule announced in Wood, Law of Master and Servant is quoted approvingly in Seybold v. Eisle, 154 Iowa 128 , 134 N. W. 578 , as follows: “ ‘The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of

1926That is, as stated by the writers: ‘The rights of the holder are to he determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith.’ The presumption of good faith attaches in favor of a holder who takes the instrument for value prior to its maturity, hut the presumption is rebut-table.” In Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpright, 93 Wash. 361 , 160 Pac. 1046 , the defendant gave to one Pittman a promissory note for $1,600, which was- the purchase price of an automobile.

1926That is, as stated by the writers: ‘The rights of the holder are to he determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith.’ The presumption of good faith attaches in favor of a holder who takes the instrument for value prior to its maturity, hut the presumption is rebut-table.” In Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpright, 93 Wash. 361 , 160 Pac. 1046 , the defendant gave to one Pittman a promissory note for $1,600, which was- the purchase price of an automobile.

1921Code, §3447, providing that to constitute notice of a defect in the title of the person negotiating a promissory note, the person to whom it is negotiated must have actual knowledge of the defect, the rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and it is not enough that the holder was negligent or omitted precautions dictated by prudence.” (Syllabus) To the same effect, see Gray v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 578 , 104 Pac. 828 , 133 Am.

1921Code, §3447, providing that to constitute notice of a defect in the title of the person negotiating a promissory note, the person to whom it is negotiated must have actual knowledge of the defect, the rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and it is not enough that the holder was negligent or omitted precautions dictated by prudence.” (Syllabus) To the same effect, see Gray v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 578 , 104 Pac. 828 , 133 Am.

1921St. 1042; and Scandinavian-American Bank v. Johnston, 63 Wash. 187 , 115 Pac. 102 .

1921St. 1042; and Scandinavian-American Bank v. Johnston, 63 Wash. 187 , 115 Pac. 102 .

1919The court held the actual value and not the assessed value was the proper basis, and, among other things, in discussing the case, said: “So that when we have a statute which requires the assessing officers to assess property for taxation ‘not to exceed fifty per cent of its true and fair value in money,’ and the assessing officers do in fact assess it at fifty per cent of its true value, then, by a simple rule of arithmetic, its real value is as certainly ascertained by the assessment as if it had actually been assessed at its real value.” To the same effect see Halsey & Co. v. City of Belle P