9 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hildrie H. Tolbert v. Frank A. Eyman, Warden, Arizona State Prisongreen1 sentence2017Id. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285 ; see also Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Prison officials and medical officers have wide discretion in treating prisoners, and a simple claim of malpractice does not give rise to a claim under sections 1981 or 1983. | 1 | 1 |
Johns v. Johnsgreen1 sentence2014Phillip did not dispute that the lot was marital, writing in his trial brief that “[t]he parties seem to be in agreement that Phillip will receive the marital home given to them by Phillip’s mother, and that it has a fair market value of $370,000 plus an additional $75,000 for the adjacent lot.” His trial testimony followed the same track; he agreed that he would take both the house and the 6 Beals, 303 P.3d at 460 (citing Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Alaska 1997)). 7 “[W]here title is documented but the documents are not produced, a simple claim of ownership by a spouse is sufficient | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ricegreen1 sentence2000Waiste unfortunately muddies this simple claim by arguing that, since we have held that Alaska's Due Process Clause requires the State to afford "innocent" owners a remission procedure in forfeiture schemes, see State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 113 (Alaska 1981), and since remission is impossible for owners like him who suffer a taking but not a forfeiture, we should order compensation under the Takings Clause as a substitute for remission. | 1 | 1 |
Continental Insurance Companies v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.green1 sentence1988Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds in DeLisio v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987); Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 431 (Alaska 1977); Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless and Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Weidner, 715 P.2d at 268-69. | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial Districtgreen1 sentence1988Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds in DeLisio v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987); Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 431 (Alaska 1977); Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless and Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Weidner, 715 P.2d at 268-69. | 1 | 1 |
Weidner v. Superior Court for the State, Third Judicial Districtgreen1 sentence1988Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds in DeLisio v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987); Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 431 (Alaska 1977); Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless and Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Weidner, 715 P.2d at 268-69. | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1988Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds in DeLisio v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987); Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 431 (Alaska 1977); Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless and Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Weidner, 715 P.2d at 268-69. | 1 | 1 |
DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1988Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds in DeLisio v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987); Weaver v. Superior Court, 572 P.2d 425, 431 (Alaska 1977); Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless and Roberts, Inc., 548 P.2d 398, 407 (Alaska 1976); Weidner, 715 P.2d at 268-69. | 1 | 1 |
Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co.green2 sentences1980While the dissenters felt this was not a new or even expanded industry, and that there had therefore been no clear showing of public purpose, the majority was content to respect the community's political decision as to the economic desirability of the project. [17] Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 188 Miss. 98 , 191 So. 129, 134 (1939), stated the following simple test, which is helpful in this case: We think that the test is whether the factory now being operated by the present exemptionist is a new factory compared with that which was actually operated by the former owner... . 1980While the dissenters felt this was not a new or even expanded industry, and that there had therefore been no clear showing of public purpose, the majority was content to respect the community's political decision as to the economic desirability of the project. [17] Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 188 Miss. 98 , 191 So. 129, 134 (1939), stated the following simple test, which is helpful in this case: We think that the test is whether the factory now being operated by the present exemptionist is a new factory compared with that which was actually operated by the former owner... . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moloso v. State
green
2 sentences1988Calling it an “exception,” however, appears to be nothing more than a circuitous route around the simple rule that anyone, in- eluding an employer of an independent contractor, may be held liable for his or her own negligence. 644 P.2d at 211 n. 5 (emphasis in original). 1983Most recently, in Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 , 211 n. 5 (Alaska 1982), we held that § 414 embodied “the simple rule that anyone, including the employer of an independent contractor, may be held liable for his or her own negligence.” (Emphasis in original.) In Hammond v. Bechtel, 606 P.2d at 1274 , we spoke of § 414 as a “source of ... independent responsibility.” The view that § 414 has been accepted as an independent source of duty is strengthened by our reference in Bechtel to the analytical similarity of the analysis under § 414 and the appropriate inquiry under § 324A. 606 P.2d at 1277 | 2 | 1983–1988 |
Estelle v. Gamble
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285 ; see also Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Prison officials and medical officers have wide discretion in treating prisoners, and a simple claim of malpractice does not give rise to a claim under sections 1981 or 1983. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Beals v. Beals
green
1 sentence2014Phillip did not dispute that the lot was marital, writing in his trial brief that “[t]he parties seem to be in agreement that Phillip will receive the marital home given to them by Phillip’s mother, and that it has a fair market value of $370,000 plus an additional $75,000 for the adjacent lot.” His trial testimony followed the same track; he agreed that he would take both the house and the 6 Beals, 303 P.3d at 460 (citing Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Alaska 1997)). 7 “[W]here title is documented but the documents are not produced, a simple claim of ownership by a spouse is sufficient | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hammond v. Bechtel Inc.
green
2 sentences1983Most recently, in Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 , 211 n. 5 (Alaska 1982), we held that § 414 embodied “the simple rule that anyone, including the employer of an independent contractor, may be held liable for his or her own negligence.” (Emphasis in original.) In Hammond v. Bechtel, 606 P.2d at 1274 , we spoke of § 414 as a “source of ... independent responsibility.” The view that § 414 has been accepted as an independent source of duty is strengthened by our reference in Bechtel to the analytical similarity of the analysis under § 414 and the appropriate inquiry under § 324A. 606 P.2d at 1277 1983Most recently, in Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 , 211 n. 5 (Alaska 1982), we held that § 414 embodied “the simple rule that anyone, including the employer of an independent contractor, may be held liable for his or her own negligence.” (Emphasis in original.) In Hammond v. Bechtel, 606 P.2d at 1274 , we spoke of § 414 as a “source of ... independent responsibility.” The view that § 414 has been accepted as an independent source of duty is strengthened by our reference in Bechtel to the analytical similarity of the analysis under § 414 and the appropriate inquiry under § 324A. 606 P.2d at 1277 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Sandstrom v. State
green
2 sentences1980On further appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, although three judges dissented on the merits and would have held in favor of the attorney. 336 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1976). 1980On further appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, although three judges dissented on the merits and would have held in favor of the attorney. 336 So.2d 572 (Fla.1976). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Sandstrom v. State
green
2 sentences1980In our judgment the court's order requiring appellant to wear a tie in court was a simple requirement bearing a reasonable relationship to the proper administration of justice in that court." Id. at 23 . 1980In our judgment the court’s order requiring appellant to wear a tie in court was a simple requirement bearing a reasonable relationship to the proper administration of justice in that court.” Id. at 23 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Rubey v. City of Fairbanks
green
2 sentences1979In Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969), a majority of this court, with Justice Rabinowitz dissenting, approved a warning very similar to that involved in this case. 1979In Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969), a majority of this court, with Justice Rabinowitz dissenting, approved a warning very similar to that involved in this case. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.