Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
27 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2022In criminal trials, the State must independently present “‘substantial evidence’ tending to show the commission of the charged crime.” State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1976). 2022In criminal trials, the State must independently present “‘substantial evidence’ tending to show the commission of the charged crime.” State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1976). | 2 | 2 |
Gries Inv. Co. v. Cheltongreen2 sentences1991Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So.2d 1281, 1292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). 1987Gries Investment Co. v. Chelton, 388 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mitrogreen1 sentence2017This unnecessary confusion would be properly avoided if we followed the simple rule that “where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001) (citing State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brakegreen1 sentence2017This unnecessary confusion would be properly avoided if we followed the simple rule that “where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001) (citing State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Doig v. Doiggreen1 sentence2014See Worley v. Worley, 855 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also Doig v. Doig, 787 So.2d 100, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (a prenuptial agreement providing that “[n]either party shall make any claim or acquire any interest in the other party’s separate property if it increases in value during the marriage” addressed only passive appreciation of property and did not preclude application of section 61.075). | 1 | 1 |
Worley v. Worleygreen1 sentence2014See Worley v. Worley, 855 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also Doig v. Doig, 787 So.2d 100, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (a prenuptial agreement providing that “[n]either party shall make any claim or acquire any interest in the other party’s separate property if it increases in value during the marriage” addressed only passive appreciation of property and did not preclude application of section 61.075). | 1 | 1 |
Beasley v. Stategreen1 sentence2012This case is controlled by a simple rule: “[I]t is fundamental error to instruct the jury on an uncharged alternate theory of an offense when it is impossible to ascertain whether the jury convicted the defendant of the uncharged theory rather than the charged theory.” Beasley v. State, 971 So.2d 228, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Szymanowski v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Szymanowski v. State, 771 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because appellant did not indicate what erroneous information he received from counsel which affected his decision to accept a plea). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Broomfieldgreen1 sentence2004See Broomfield, 201 F.3d at 1274 (failure to advise of right to refuse is factor that court can consider in consensual encounter determination). | 1 | 1 |
Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Younggreen1 sentence2003For instance, in Fritz v. Courtyard by Marriott, 592 So.2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), we stated, "[a]lthough the JCC is authorized to accept the testimony of one doctor over that of others, he must give reasons therefor that are supported by the record." See also Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 596 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Fritz v. Courtyard by Marriottgreen1 sentence2003For instance, in Fritz v. Courtyard by Marriott, 592 So.2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), we stated, "[a]lthough the JCC is authorized to accept the testimony of one doctor over that of others, he must give reasons therefor that are supported by the record." See also Gainesville Coca-Cola v. Young, 596 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Dumas v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 462 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Dumas v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See Dumas v. State, 439 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), review denied, 462 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Carberry v. Foleygreen1 sentence1989A payment not thus made does not reach the debt. 39 Fla.Jur.2d Payment and Tender § 18, at 92 (1982); see Carberry v. Foley, 213 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968); Waits v. Orange Creek Turpentine Corp., 123 Fla. 31 , 166 So. 449 (1936); Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609 , 20 *1031 So. 800 (1896). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1957In United States v. Two Obscene Books, D.C.N.D.S.D. 1951, 99 F. Supp. 760 , 762 the court said: "Our circuit has approved the simple standard that obscenity has `the meaning of that which is offensive to chastity and modesty. * * *'." In King v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.2d at page 523, supra, the court said: "`* * * The word obscenity cannot be said to be a technical term of the law and is not susceptible of exact definition in its judicial uses, although it has been defined in a general sense as meaning offensive to morality or chastity, indecent, or nasty. * * *'" In Davidson v. State, supra [ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Lugassy
green
2 sentences2023The trial court also awarded some prejudgment interest for the late payment of the arbitral award, but correctly denied Hawks Nest’s request for prejudgment interest from the date of loss. 2 As explained, Lugassy stands for a simple principle—denial of a claim that is eventually found to be covered is tantamount to breach of the contractual obligation to cover a loss and therefore triggers payment of prejudgment interest from the time of loss. 593 So. 2d at 571–72. 2023Westchester timely paid the appraisal award, and its actions were not tantamount to a denial of coverage. 2 The trial court correctly denied Hawks Nest’s request for prejudgment interest. 2 As explained, Lugassy stands for a simple principle—denial of a claim that is eventually found to be covered is tantamount to breach of the contractual obligation to cover a loss and therefore triggers payment of prejudgment interest from the time of loss. 593 So. 2d at 571–72. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Locklear v. Sampson
green
2 sentences1998As indicated in Locklear v. Sampson, 478 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the proceeding should not be viewed "as if it were no more than a simple claim between private parties to enforce a monetary obligation." It is the child, who was not a party to the discovery violation, for whom the support is intended. 1986As indicated in Locklear v. Sampson, 478 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the proceeding should not be viewed "as if it were no more than a simple claim between private parties to enforce a monetary obligation." It is the child, who was not a party to the discovery violation, for whom the support is intended. | 2 | 1986–1998 |
City National Bank of Florida v. City of Tampa
green
1 sentence2017Finally, we reject Richman's assertion that in reversing the final judgment at issue here we would need to overrule our decision in City National Bank of Florida v. City of Tampa, 67 So. 3d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Leroux
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 237 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2006For example, the analysis in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), provides a simple framework to make that determination. 2006For example, the analysis in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), provides a simple framework to make that determination. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Stuyvesant Insurance Company v. Butler
green
1 sentence2000Co. v. Butler, 314 So.2d 567 (Fla.1975), therefore, structure coverage must be regarded as severable from a *491 contents claim so that the fraud may be attributed only to the latter. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cummings v. State
green
1 sentence1994Likewise, authorizing a prosecutor or defense lawyer to ask the more detailed question concerning whether the felony convictions involved dishonesty or false statement could create an inference that the crime was one such as perjury, requiring a defendant or witness to explain the nature of the crimes to dispel any contrary inference. [2] This is especially true in light of the broad interpretation our supreme court has given to the terms "dishonesty or false statement." Page . [3] Defendant cites Cummings v. State, 412 So.2d 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), as authority for his argument that he shoul | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. v. Matthews
green
1 sentence1990This simple principle was laid out clearly by the Supreme Court of Florida in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Matthews, 498 So.2d 421 (Fla.1986), wherein it said: The direct purpose and effect of the statute is to prevent double recovery by plaintiffs of collateral source payments in personal injury suits arising from motor vehicle accidents. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Waits v. Orange Creek Turpentine Corp.
green
2 sentences1989A payment not thus made does not reach the debt. 39 Fla.Jur.2d Payment and Tender § 18, at 92 (1982); see Carberry v. Foley, 213 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968); Waits v. Orange Creek Turpentine Corp., 123 Fla. 31 , 166 So. 449 (1936); Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609 , 20 *1031 So. 800 (1896). 1989A payment not thus made does not reach the debt. 39 Fla.Jur.2d Payment and Tender § 18, at 92 (1982); see Carberry v. Foley, 213 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968); Waits v. Orange Creek Turpentine Corp., 123 Fla. 31 , 166 So. 449 (1936); Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609 , 20 *1031 So. 800 (1896). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Hendry v. Benlisa
green
1 sentence1989A payment not thus made does not reach the debt. 39 Fla.Jur.2d Payment and Tender § 18, at 92 (1982); see Carberry v. Foley, 213 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1968); Waits v. Orange Creek Turpentine Corp., 123 Fla. 31 , 166 So. 449 (1936); Hendry v. Benlisa, 37 Fla. 609 , 20 *1031 So. 800 (1896). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Turner
green
1 sentence1985Cited in M.M. is People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App.2d Supp. 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), where the California legislature's approval of private schooling, on the one hand, and instruction by a private tutor, on the other, as alternatives to public schooling clearly showed that at-home schooling may not be conducted without a private tutor. "[A] mere reading of [the relevant California statute] clearly indicates that the legislature intended to distinguish between private schools, upon the one hand, and home instruction by a private tutor or other person, on the other. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Boulden v. Holman
green
2 sentences1971These cases are Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 1578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970). 1971These cases are Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 1578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Maxwell v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1971These cases are Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 1578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970). 1971These cases are Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 1578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co.
green
1 sentence1962In a well reasoned opinion prepared for this Court by Mr. Justice Drew in the case of Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Fla. 1961, 128 So.2d 594, 596 , we said: "[2-4] The second contention that we are limited in our review to the `question' is seen to be without merit by a simple analysis of the constitutional provision itself. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Mosley
green
1 sentence1957Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 2396, which defines the word as "`Something which is offensive to chastity; that which is offensive to chastity and modesty'." In Hallmark Productions, Inc., v. Mosley, supra, 190 F.2d at page 910 , the court said: "* * * one of the tests often *881 used is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. * * *" Measured by the above definitions we are convinced that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the article is not obscene. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| United States v. Two Obscene Books neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Davidson v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Price v. State neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Beckham v. Cline green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Rammage v. Kendall green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.