8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1916–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sheraton-Midcontinent Corp. v. County of Penningtongreen2 sentences2000In fact, we have stated that the determination of true and full value “permits evidence of all relevant factors and does not authorize assessing authorities to fix an assessment within a specific formula.” See Sheraton-Midcon- tinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 77 S.D. 554 , 95 N.W.2d 892, 896 (S.D.1959). [¶ 40.] It is a simple principle that when property is recently purchased through an arm’s length transaction with no unique circumstances or surrounding market conditions affecting the sale, the sale price should not be disregarded in considering what that property is worth. 2000In fact, we have stated that the determination of true and full value “permits evidence of all relevant factors and does not authorize assessing authorities to fix an assessment within a specific formula.” See Sheraton-Midcon- tinent Corp. v. County of Pennington, 77 S.D. 554 , 95 N.W.2d 892, 896 (S.D.1959). [¶ 40.] It is a simple principle that when property is recently purchased through an arm’s length transaction with no unique circumstances or surrounding market conditions affecting the sale, the sale price should not be disregarded in considering what that property is worth. | 3 | 3 |
Willow, Inc. v. Yankton Countygreen2 sentences1997Likewise, here, the assessment machinery has gotten so engrossed in Marshall and Swift appraisal manuals and computer programs, various methods of valuation, outside consultants, etc., that it forgot the simple principle that if you recently bought property at an arm’s length sale, there have been no changes in the property and surrounding conditions or the general market conditions, then the sale price is what the property is worth. 6 Compare with Willow, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 643 , 237 N.W.2d 660 (S.D.1975) and Sheraton-Midcontinent, 95 N.W.2d at 896 (as to change of conditions sin 1997Likewise, here, the assessment machinery has gotten so engrossed in Marshall and Swift appraisal manuals and computer programs, various methods of valuation, outside consultants, etc., that it forgot the simple principle that if you recently bought property at an arm’s length sale, there have been no changes in the property and surrounding conditions or the general market conditions, then the sale price is what the property is worth. 6 Compare with Willow, Inc. v. Yankton County, 89 S.D. 643 , 237 N.W.2d 660 (S.D.1975) and Sheraton-Midcontinent, 95 N.W.2d at 896 (as to change of conditions sin | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2012The majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings was written by Justice Black, who wrote that the Court “can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will by hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 149 , 89 S.Ct. at 339 . 2012The majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings was written by Justice Black, who wrote that the Court “can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will by hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 149 , 89 S.Ct. at 339 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2000For example, in State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.Super. 75, 78 , 615 A.2d 279 (App.Div.1992) we stated that a police officer’s observations of a motor vehicle being driven at less than 10 m.p.h. “suggest[ed] a number of objectively reasonable concerns,” including that “something might be wrong with the car ... [or] its driver.” Consequently, we held that these concerns justified “the minimal intrusion involved in a simple inquiry stop.” Id. 2000For example, in State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.Super. 75, 78 , 615 A.2d 279 (App.Div.1992) we stated that a police officer’s observations of a motor vehicle being driven at less than 10 m.p.h. “suggest[ed] a number of objectively reasonable concerns,” including that “something might be wrong with the car ... [or] its driver.” Consequently, we held that these concerns justified “the minimal intrusion involved in a simple inquiry stop.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Goetaski
green
2 sentences2000Similarly, in State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J.Super. 362 , 507 A.2d 751 (App.Div.1986), we upheld the validity under the community care-taking doctrine of a stop of a person who was driving slowly on the shoulder of a state highway with his left turn directional signal flashing. 2000Similarly, in State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J.Super. 362 , 507 A.2d 751 (App.Div.1986), we upheld the validity under the community care-taking doctrine of a stop of a person who was driving slowly on the shoulder of a state highway with his left turn directional signal flashing. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Clifford Griggs v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, a Corporation
green
2 sentences1986Therefore, Budd may have breached its duty to warn under Griggs, supra, in view of the foreseeability of mismatched parts, the inherent danger therein, the failure of its warning literature to “trickle down” to service stations using its products, and the inability of even an experienced repairman to notice the mismatched parts. 1986Therefore, Budd may have breached its duty to warn under Griggs, supra, in view of the foreseeability of mismatched parts, the inherent danger therein, the failure of its warning literature to "trickle down" to service stations using its products, and the inability of even an experienced repairman to notice the mismatched parts. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gibbons v. Mahon
green
2 sentences1942Dec. 705 , early announced: 'A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital.’ This may fairly be said to be the rule adopted by the English courts and by the Supreme Court of the United States (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , 10 S. Ct. 1057 , 34 L. 1942Dec. 705 , early announced: 'A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital.’ This may fairly be said to be the rule adopted by the English courts and by the Supreme Court of the United States (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 , 10 S. Ct. 1057 , 34 L. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Towne v. Eisner
green
2 sentences1942Ed. 525 , reaffirmed in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 , 38 S. Ct. 158 , 62 L. 1942Ed. 525 , reaffirmed in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 , 38 S. Ct. 158 , 62 L. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Stolzman v. Wyman
neutral
2 sentences1916Hollinshead v. John Stuart Co., supra; Stolzman v. Wyman, 8 N. D. 108 , 77 N. W. 285 . 1916Hollinshead v. John Stuart Co., supra; Stolzman v. Wyman, 8 N. D. 108 , 77 N. W. 285 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.