simple violation in Georgia

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1983Co., 112 Ga. App. 226 ( 144 SE2d 547 ), appellee contends that the contract must be construed to exclude appellant’s negligence because the indemnity clause does not expressly state that it covers liability arising from appellant’s negligence. “ [Construction [of a contract] allowing indemnification of the indemnitee against his own negligence is not against public policy if, and only if, such an intent is expressed in plain, clear and unequivocal terms. [Cits.] ‘In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result[s] reached ... can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fai

1983Co., 112 Ga. App. 226 ( 144 SE2d 547 ), appellee contends that the contract must be construed to exclude appellant’s negligence because the indemnity clause does not expressly state that it covers liability arising from appellant’s negligence. “ [Construction [of a contract] allowing indemnification of the indemnitee against his own negligence is not against public policy if, and only if, such an intent is expressed in plain, clear and unequivocal terms. [Cits.] ‘In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result[s] reached ... can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fai

1999Brooks v. State, 141 Ga.App. 725 (1), 234 S.E.2d 541 (1977).

1999Brooks v. State, 141 Ga.App. 725 (1), 234 S.E.2d 541 (1977).

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1969Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 ( 150 SE 208 ); Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 ( 59 SE2d 421 ); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 ( 130 SE2d 136 )." Smith v. Liberty Mut.

1965“In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result reached by [the courts’] interpretational efforts can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fail to refer expressly to negligence in their contract such failure evidences the parties’ intention not to provide for indemnity for the indemnitee’s negligent acts.” 175 ALR 8 , 30, citing cases, including Fisk Tire Co. v. Hood Coach Lines, 54 Ga. App. 401 ( 188 SE 57 ).

1965“In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result reached by [the courts’] interpretational efforts can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fail to refer expressly to negligence in their contract such failure evidences the parties’ intention not to provide for indemnity for the indemnitee’s negligent acts.” 175 ALR 8 , 30, citing cases, including Fisk Tire Co. v. Hood Coach Lines, 54 Ga. App. 401 ( 188 SE 57 ).

1961In the Universal Concrete Pipe Co. case the Supreme Court of Ohio said that there is no such thing as wilful negligence and there is no such thing as wanton negligence, and cited and quoted with approval Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428 ( 147 A. 136 ) as follows: “An action based upon wilful or wanton misconduct is apart from the action for negligent conduct . . .

1961In the Universal Concrete Pipe Co. case the Supreme Court of Ohio said that there is no such thing as wilful negligence and there is no such thing as wanton negligence, and cited and quoted with approval Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428 ( 147 A. 136 ) as follows: “An action based upon wilful or wanton misconduct is apart from the action for negligent conduct . . .

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1960This case on its facts is not distinguishable from the cases of Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 50 Ga. App. 660 ( 179 S. E. 563 ) (affirmed without opinion, 182 Ga. 568 ); Suttles v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 206 Ga. 849 ( 59 S. E. 2d 392 ); Redwine v. Dan River Mills, 207 Ga. 381 ( 61 S. E. 2d 771 ); and Redwine v. United States Tobacco Co., 209 Ga. 725 ( 75 S. E. 2d 556 ).

1959The facts alleged in a petition and not the prayer are determinative of the relief sought (Kinzy v. Waddell, 203 Ga. 689 , 47 S. E. 2d 872 ), and this court is required to know judicially, as a matter of common knowledge of the science of mathematics that the sum of “$75 for doctor’s bills, $20 for operating room, $10 for X-rays, medicines $7.50, penicillin $10,” is $122.50 and not “113.50” and that the sum of $122.50 and “$180 for hospital bills” is $302.50 and not “$293.50.” The trae amount for which suit is brought being in excess of $300, this court has jurisdiction of the writ of error. 2

1959The facts alleged in a petition and not the prayer are determinative of the relief sought (Kinzy v. Waddell, 203 Ga. 689 , 47 S. E. 2d 872 ), and this court is required to know judicially, as a matter of common knowledge of the science of mathematics that the sum of “$75 for doctor’s bills, $20 for operating room, $10 for X-rays, medicines $7.50, penicillin $10,” is $122.50 and not “113.50” and that the sum of $122.50 and “$180 for hospital bills” is $302.50 and not “$293.50.” The trae amount for which suit is brought being in excess of $300, this court has jurisdiction of the writ of error. 2

1959Co. v. Wilson, 74 Ga. App. 63 (1), 38 S. E. 2d 747 ; Millikin v. Johnson, 78 Ga. App. 479 , 51 S. E. 2d 561 ), this court will not dismiss the writ of error in a case where it appears that, although the plaintiff prays recovery of the sum of $293.50 for hospital expenses and medicines under the terms of a policy of insurance upon which the suit was brought, the allegations of the petition reveal that in computing the total of the enumerated sums alleged to be due the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company, counsel for the plaintiff has committed a simple error in addition and that the tr

1959Co. v. Wilson, 74 Ga. App. 63 (1), 38 S. E. 2d 747 ; Millikin v. Johnson, 78 Ga. App. 479 , 51 S. E. 2d 561 ), this court will not dismiss the writ of error in a case where it appears that, although the plaintiff prays recovery of the sum of $293.50 for hospital expenses and medicines under the terms of a policy of insurance upon which the suit was brought, the allegations of the petition reveal that in computing the total of the enumerated sums alleged to be due the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company, counsel for the plaintiff has committed a simple error in addition and that the tr

1959Co. v. Wilson, 74 Ga. App. 63 (1), 38 S. E. 2d 747 ; Millikin v. Johnson, 78 Ga. App. 479 , 51 S. E. 2d 561 ), this court will not dismiss the writ of error in a case where it appears that, although the plaintiff prays recovery of the sum of $293.50 for hospital expenses and medicines under the terms of a policy of insurance upon which the suit was brought, the allegations of the petition reveal that in computing the total of the enumerated sums alleged to be due the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company, counsel for the plaintiff has committed a simple error in addition and that the tr

1959Co. v. Wilson, 74 Ga. App. 63 (1), 38 S. E. 2d 747 ; Millikin v. Johnson, 78 Ga. App. 479 , 51 S. E. 2d 561 ), this court will not dismiss the writ of error in a case where it appears that, although the plaintiff prays recovery of the sum of $293.50 for hospital expenses and medicines under the terms of a policy of insurance upon which the suit was brought, the allegations of the petition reveal that in computing the total of the enumerated sums alleged to be due the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company, counsel for the plaintiff has committed a simple error in addition and that the tr

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1958In Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292 (7) ( 34 S. E. 2d 28 ) it is said: “A request to charge should itself be correct, and even perfect.” The requested charge was not sound for the reason that it instructed the jury that in order for the plaintiff’s negligence to bar her right of recovery she must have been guilty of a failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety and likewise have failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the negligence of the defendants, whereas under the law if she failed in the latter duty only her action was barred.

1958In Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292 (7) ( 34 S. E. 2d 28 ) it is said: “A request to charge should itself be correct, and even perfect.” The requested charge was not sound for the reason that it instructed the jury that in order for the plaintiff’s negligence to bar her right of recovery she must have been guilty of a failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety and likewise have failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the negligence of the defendants, whereas under the law if she failed in the latter duty only her action was barred.

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1958Ground 5 assigns error because the court erred in refusing the defendants’ request to charge the jury: “I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that the plaintiff in this case was required to be in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and if you believe that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety and that by the exercise of ordinary care she could and should have avoided any injuries which she may have sustained then the plaintiff cannot recover and it would be your duty to return a verdict for the defendants.” The fate of this ground rests upon the s

1947In State v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382 ( 12 S. E. 2d, 574 ), it was shown that a defendant was violating the law by loaning money at usurious rates of interest.

1947In State v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382 ( 12 S. E. 2d, 574 ), it was shown that a defendant was violating the law by loaning money at usurious rates of interest.