simple rule in Alabama

1920In Adler v. Martin, 179 Ala. 97 , 59 South. 597 , is the following quotation, here applicable, from Baker v. Close, supra: “A pedestrian who crosses a street at a place where there is no 'regular crossing may be chargeable with some additional vigilance, because it is not a place set aside for the cross *62 ing of foot passengers, although even at such a place drivers are required to be watchful and careful.” In Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304 , 58 South. 276 , this court said: “The simple rule is that drivers on the street and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are require

1920In Adler v. Martin, 179 Ala. 97 , 59 South. 597 , is the following quotation, here applicable, from Baker v. Close, supra: “A pedestrian who crosses a street at a place where there is no 'regular crossing may be chargeable with some additional vigilance, because it is not a place set aside for the cross *62 ing of foot passengers, although even at such a place drivers are required to be watchful and careful.” In Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304 , 58 South. 276 , this court said: “The simple rule is that drivers on the street and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are require

1997For a case somewhat similar to this one, see Williams v. Wiewel , 36 Ill.

1997For a case somewhat similar to this one, see Williams v. Wiewel, 36 Ill.App.3d 478 , 344 N.E.2d 34 (1976).

1993The rule states: "A person cannot maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must rely in whole or part on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party." 242 Ala. at 378 , 6 So.2d at 417 .

1993The rule states: "A person cannot maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must rely in whole or part on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party." 242 Ala. at 378 , 6 So.2d at 417 .

1992Ex parte Rutledge, 482 So.2d 1262 (Ala.1984).

1935Rep. 261 , note), yet we are of the opinion that the following language of our Supreme Court, used in deciding the case of Bullock v. Knox, 96 Ala. 195 , 11 So. 339 , 340, is all that we need for our guidance in disposing of the instant appeal (Code 1923, § 7318), to wit: “The ancient common-law authorities declared the issue of every married woman to be legitimate, except in the two special cases of the impoteney of the husband and his absence from the realm. * * * That rule has long since been exploded. * * * The rule was first relaxed by permitting the conclusion of illegitimacy to be drawn

1926By authorized is not meant authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties intrusted to him by the master, even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.” In Hardeman v. Williams, 169 Ala. 50 , 53 So. 794 , it was said, per Sayre, J.: “The principal is responsible for the acts of his agent done within the scope of his employment, and in the accomplishment of objects within the line of his duties.” In 39 Corp. Jur. 1286, it is said that: “The test of the master’s responsibility for the acts of his servants is not whethe

1926By authorized is not meant authority expressly conferred, but whether the act was such as was incident to the performance of the duties intrusted to him by the master, even though in opposition to his express and positive orders.” In Hardeman v. Williams, 169 Ala. 50 , 53 So. 794 , it was said, per Sayre, J.: “The principal is responsible for the acts of his agent done within the scope of his employment, and in the accomplishment of objects within the line of his duties.” In 39 Corp. Jur. 1286, it is said that: “The test of the master’s responsibility for the acts of his servants is not whethe

1926In Steele v. May, 135 Ala. 483, 488 , 33 So. 30 , 32, it was said, per Haralson, J.: “The simple test is, whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not *7 whether they were done while'prosecuting the master’s business; but whether they were done by the servant in -furtherance thereof, and were such as may be fairly said to have been authorized by him.

1920Corona Coal & Iron Co. v. White, 158 Ala. 627 , 48 South. 362 , 20 L.

1920Corona Coal & Iron Co. v. White, 158 Ala. 627 , 48 South. 362 , 20 L.

1920In Adler v. Martin, 179 Ala. 97 , 59 South. 597 , is the following quotation, here applicable, from Baker v. Close, supra: “A pedestrian who crosses a street at a place where there is no 'regular crossing may be chargeable with some additional vigilance, because it is not a place set aside for the cross *62 ing of foot passengers, although even at such a place drivers are required to be watchful and careful.” In Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304 , 58 South. 276 , this court said: “The simple rule is that drivers on the street and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are require

1920In Adler v. Martin, 179 Ala. 97 , 59 South. 597 , is the following quotation, here applicable, from Baker v. Close, supra: “A pedestrian who crosses a street at a place where there is no 'regular crossing may be chargeable with some additional vigilance, because it is not a place set aside for the cross *62 ing of foot passengers, although even at such a place drivers are required to be watchful and careful.” In Barbour v. Shebor, 177 Ala. 304 , 58 South. 276 , this court said: “The simple rule is that drivers on the street and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are require

1917Co. v. Hamper, 73 Ala. 325 , recognized and gave force to the same principle, and in discussion of the question used the following language: “The case, in this aspect, resolves itself into the simple inquiry whether the company had the implied pdwer to take subscriptions for stock, after the capital stock, as expressed in the declaration of incorporation, had been subscribed for ahd taken; in other words, had it the power at its own option to enlarge the amount of its capital stock and the number of its shares? * * * The implied or the incidental powers corporations may rightfully exercise nev

1916Most of the cases in the note referred to are trade-mark cases, but the principle and policy of the protection afforded are substantially the same in cases of unfair competition. — 38 Cyc. 762, 763. (2) With respect to such imitative devices, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion which has been very generally quoted, lays down a simple test: “Where the similarity is sufficient to convey a false impression to the public mind, and is of a character to mislead and deceive the ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution in such matters, it is sufficient to give

1912The simple rule is that drivers on the streets and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are required to exercise reasonable care.— Hennesey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583 . 76 N. E. 224 , 3 L.

1912The simple rule is that drivers on the streets and pedestrians, each recognizing the rights of the other, are required to exercise reasonable care.— Hennesey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583 . 76 N. E. 224 , 3 L.

1909It is useless to go through the numerous cases cited by counsel for appellant, as this court has carefully considered the matter in a recent case, and announced the simple rule (according to the best considered authorities in cases like this) to be “whether or not, taking all things into consideration, the property has deteriorated in value as the result of the work done, or has increased in value. * * * In other words, the test is the difference between the market value before and after the work done.” —Town of Eutaw v. Botnick, 150 Ala. 429 , 43 South. 739, 741 .

1909It is useless to go through the numerous cases cited by counsel for appellant, as this court has carefully considered the matter in a recent case, and announced the simple rule (according to the best considered authorities in cases like this) to be “whether or not, taking all things into consideration, the property has deteriorated in value as the result of the work done, or has increased in value. * * * In other words, the test is the difference between the market value before and after the work done.” —Town of Eutaw v. Botnick, 150 Ala. 429 , 43 South. 739, 741 .

1887Dig. 337, § 26; Jones v. Pullen, 66 Ala. 306 .