simple principle in Oregon

2017It did, however, emphasize that the issue is con- trolled by “the simple principle of necessity—i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge.” Id. at 182 (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence § 1402 (3d ed 1940) (emphasis in original)).2 Thus, at least under Lonergan, it was not enough for the state to show that it had attempted unsuccessfully to produce a witness by a reasonable means.

2017It did, however, emphasize that the issue is con- trolled by “the simple principle of necessity—i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge.” Id. at 182 (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence § 1402 (3d ed 1940) (emphasis in original)).2 Thus, at least under Lonergan, it was not enough for the state to show that it had attempted unsuccessfully to produce a witness by a reasonable means.

1982“Our decision in State v. Hoffman, 236 Or 98 , 385 P2d 741 (1963) illustrates the principle.

1982“Our decision in State v. Hoffman, 236 Or 98 , 385 P2d 741 (1963) illustrates the principle.

1992We construe the word, ‘arguments,’ in ORS 250.085(5) to impose the simple requirement that the party complaining here must first have actually complained, as opposed to having merely made abstract observations about the proposed ballot title.” Kafo-ury v. Roberts, 303 Or 306, 311 , 736 P2d 178 (1987).

1992We construe the word, ‘arguments,’ in ORS 250.085(5) to impose the simple requirement that the party complaining here must first have actually complained, as opposed to having merely made abstract observations about the proposed ballot title.” Kafo-ury v. Roberts, 303 Or 306, 311 , 736 P2d 178 (1987).

2020Defendant’s Waiver We turn to the merits of defendant’s contention that the trial court “denied the request on an improper basis,” and, thus, “it failed to act within the bounds of its discre- tion.” “We review for an abuse of discretion whether the trial court erred in denying consent to defendant’s right to waive a jury.” State v. Austin, 274 Or App 114, 119 , 360 P3d 603 (2015). “[J]udicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct out- comes,” and it should “be exercised acc

2020Defendant’s Waiver We turn to the merits of defendant’s contention that the trial court “denied the request on an improper basis,” and, thus, “it failed to act within the bounds of its discre- tion.” “We review for an abuse of discretion whether the trial court erred in denying consent to defendant’s right to waive a jury.” State v. Austin, 274 Or App 114, 119 , 360 P3d 603 (2015). “[J]udicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct out- comes,” and it should “be exercised acc

2018A trial court can exceed the bounds of its permitted discretion in several ways. "[A] trial court's decision may be legally impermissible because it was guided by the wrong substantive standard." Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. , 359 Or. 63 , 116-17, 376 P.3d 960 (2016) ; see State v. Sarich , 352 Or. 601 , 615, 291 P.3d 647 (2012) (as a prerequisite to the exercise of discretion, a court must apply the correct legal standard for determining the scope of that discretion).

2018A trial court can exceed the bounds of its permitted discretion in several ways. "[A] trial court's decision may be legally impermissible because it was guided by the wrong substantive standard." Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. , 359 Or. 63 , 116-17, 376 P.3d 960 (2016) ; see State v. Sarich , 352 Or. 601 , 615, 291 P.3d 647 (2012) (as a prerequisite to the exercise of discretion, a court must apply the correct legal standard for determining the scope of that discretion).

2007Bowen, 340 Or at 510 .

2002The difference between those statutes and [the murder sentencing scheme at issue], however, is found in the simple principle that the facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize the defendant are for the sentencing court. " Quinn, 290 Or. at 405 , 623 P.2d 630 (emphasis added).

1999First, it effectively ignores *579 the caveat that "application of this simple principle is not always so simple." 293 Or. at 607 , 652 P.2d 773 .

1999First, it effectively ignores *579 the caveat that "application of this simple principle is not always so simple." 293 Or. at 607 , 652 P.2d 773 .

1999First, it effectively ignores the caveat that “application of this simple principle is not always so simple.” 293 Or at 607 .1 start from the general premise that courts are obligated to interpret statutes as constitutional, “if that can be done.” State v. Charlesworth / Parks, 151 Or App 100, 107 , 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den 327 Or 82 (1998).

1999First, it effectively ignores the caveat that “application of this simple principle is not always so simple.” 293 Or at 607 .1 start from the general premise that courts are obligated to interpret statutes as constitutional, “if that can be done.” State v. Charlesworth / Parks, 151 Or App 100, 107 , 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den 327 Or 82 (1998).

1992See also Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or 654, 665 , 791 P2d 489 (1990) (petitioner who did not argue in comments to Secretary of State that word “amendment” should be substituted for word “provision” could not thereafter assert such argument on judicial review); McMurdo v. Roberts, 309 Or 318, 322 , 786 P2d 1268 (1990) (letter to Secretary of State containing writer’s suggested ballot title, without reference to noncompliance with controlling legal standards, is insufficient to permit court to consider writer’s argument on judicial review of certified ballot title).

1992See also Ransom v. Roberts, 309 Or 654, 665 , 791 P2d 489 (1990) (petitioner who did not argue in comments to Secretary of State that word “amendment” should be substituted for word “provision” could not thereafter assert such argument on judicial review); McMurdo v. Roberts, 309 Or 318, 322 , 786 P2d 1268 (1990) (letter to Secretary of State containing writer’s suggested ballot title, without reference to noncompliance with controlling legal standards, is insufficient to permit court to consider writer’s argument on judicial review of certified ballot title).

1987The Supreme Court has a simple test for a search: “A ‘search’ occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded.” State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206 , 729 P2d 524 (1986).

1987The Supreme Court has a simple test for a search: “A ‘search’ occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded.” State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206 , 729 P2d 524 (1986).

1983A simple rule of courtroom ‘fairness’ has been misused to destroy a sacred constitutional right.” Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F2d at 1157, quoting from Braswell v. Florida, 400 US 873 , 91 S Ct 106 , 27 L Ed 2d 111 (1970).

1983In United States v. Johnston, 578 F2d 1352 (10th Cir), cert den 439 US 931 (1978), the court cited Holder for authority to allow the testimony of a witness who violated a sequestration order by stating: “* * * We cannot say that the circumvention of the rule has so discredited the witness as to render his testimony incredible as a matter of law.” Id. at 1356.

1982I am authorized to say that Justice Linde agrees that this would be the better rule, see State v. Brown, 291 Or 642, 656 , 634 P2d 212 (1981) (concurring opinion), although he concurs in the majority’s statement of Oregon law as it stood before State v. Florance, 270 Or 169 , 527 P2d 1202 (1974), abandoned it in order to follow federal cases.

1982I am authorized to say that Justice Linde agrees that this would be the better rule, see State v. Brown, 291 Or 642, 656 , 634 P2d 212 (1981) (concurring opinion), although he concurs in the majority’s statement of Oregon law as it stood before State v. Florance, 270 Or 169 , 527 P2d 1202 (1974), abandoned it in order to follow federal cases.

1982I am authorized to say that Justice Linde agrees that this would be the better rule, see State v. Brown, 291 Or 642, 656 , 634 P2d 212 (1981) (concurring opinion), although he concurs in the majority’s statement of Oregon law as it stood before State v. Florance, 270 Or 169 , 527 P2d 1202 (1974), abandoned it in order to follow federal cases.

1982I am authorized to say that Justice Linde agrees that this would be the better rule, see State v. Brown, 291 Or 642, 656 , 634 P2d 212 (1981) (concurring opinion), although he concurs in the majority’s statement of Oregon law as it stood before State v. Florance, 270 Or 169 , 527 P2d 1202 (1974), abandoned it in order to follow federal cases.

1974The rule of admissibility and the conditions thereof are stated by Professor Wigmore in 5 Wig-more, Evidence 3d ed 148, § 1402, as follows: “ 'The general principle upon which depositions and former testimony should be resorted to is the simple principle of necessity, — i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge. * * * The only inquiry, then, need be: Is her testimony in court unavailable V ” And, at 183 (after quoting what is now ORS 41.900(8)): “These statutes are also in harmony with the rules announced by Professor Wigmore, supra. Admissibility depends upon ne

1974The rule of admissibility and the conditions thereof are stated by Professor Wigmore in 5 Wig-more, Evidence 3d ed 148, § 1402, as follows: “ 'The general principle upon which depositions and former testimony should be resorted to is the simple principle of necessity, — i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge. * * * The only inquiry, then, need be: Is her testimony in court unavailable V ” And, at 183 (after quoting what is now ORS 41.900(8)): “These statutes are also in harmony with the rules announced by Professor Wigmore, supra. Admissibility depends upon ne

1974The rule of admissibility and the conditions thereof are stated by Professor Wigmore in 5 Wig-more, Evidence 3d ed 148, § 1402, as follows: “ 'The general principle upon which depositions and former testimony should be resorted to is the simple principle of necessity, — i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge. * * * The only inquiry, then, need be: Is her testimony in court unavailable V ” And, at 183 (after quoting what is now ORS 41.900(8)): “These statutes are also in harmony with the rules announced by Professor Wigmore, supra. Admissibility depends upon ne

1974The rule of admissibility and the conditions thereof are stated by Professor Wigmore in 5 Wig-more, Evidence 3d ed 148, § 1402, as follows: “ 'The general principle upon which depositions and former testimony should be resorted to is the simple principle of necessity, — i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness’ knowledge. * * * The only inquiry, then, need be: Is her testimony in court unavailable V ” And, at 183 (after quoting what is now ORS 41.900(8)): “These statutes are also in harmony with the rules announced by Professor Wigmore, supra. Admissibility depends upon ne

1965As Justice Warner put it in Keyes v. Chambers et al, 209 Or 640, 662 , 307 P2d 498 (1957), an unpleasant result to the taxpayer does not justify “a judicial amendment in order to avoid what such taxpayers believe to be economically unwise or inequitable results.” The court said in Keyes v. Chambers et al, supra, pgs. 645-646: * * Statutes relating to deductions allowable in computing income must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority.” • '' *318 And also at p. 646: “* * * that such credits, deductions or exemptions as 'the Legislature may allow in the c

1965As Justice Warner put it in Keyes v. Chambers et al, 209 Or 640, 662 , 307 P2d 498 (1957), an unpleasant result to the taxpayer does not justify “a judicial amendment in order to avoid what such taxpayers believe to be economically unwise or inequitable results.” The court said in Keyes v. Chambers et al, supra, pgs. 645-646: * * Statutes relating to deductions allowable in computing income must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority.” • '' *318 And also at p. 646: “* * * that such credits, deductions or exemptions as 'the Legislature may allow in the c