10 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1953–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 371774green1 sentence2010Arguably, the fact that there even was a trial suggests that jeopardy did not attach upon acceptance of the defendant’s plea. 9 The defendant points out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is among the majority of federal circuits that follows the simple rule that jeopardy attaches upon the mere acceptance of a guilty plea; see, e.g., United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) *388 (double jeopardy protection “clearly prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense following a guilty plea” [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Cambi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Antonio Olmedagreen1 sentence2010Arguably, the fact that there even was a trial suggests that jeopardy did not attach upon acceptance of the defendant’s plea. 9 The defendant points out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is among the majority of federal circuits that follows the simple rule that jeopardy attaches upon the mere acceptance of a guilty plea; see, e.g., United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) *388 (double jeopardy protection “clearly prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense following a guilty plea” [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Cambi | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. Mahergreen1 sentence1990"Where. . . [persons having a direct interest in the subject matter of the action] are reasonably within the reach of process and are not so numerous that it would impose an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff they should be made parties; but if they or some them are not reasonably available for service or to summon them or all of them into the action would put upon the plaintiff a burden he ought not fairly to be asked to assume, the provision for reasonable notice applies." Benz, 154 Conn. at 78 ; see Tucker v. Maher, 192 Conn. 460 , 470 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zaleski v. Clark
green
2 sentences1969The simple inquiry is, what is the contract? and has the plaintiff performed his part of it?’ Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 223 .” Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 704 . 1953The simple inquiry is, what is the contract? and has the plaintiff performed his part of it?” Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 223 ; see 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 541. | 2 | 1953–1969 |
Hunt v. Prior
green
2 sentences2022The purpose of such notice and hear- ing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 441 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). ‘‘However, under Paul v. Davis, [ 424 U.S. 693 , 710–12, 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L. 2022The purpose of such notice and hear- ing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 441 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). ‘‘However, under Paul v. Davis, [ 424 U.S. 693 , 710–12, 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Paul v. Davis
green
2 sentences2022The purpose of such notice and hear- ing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 441 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). ‘‘However, under Paul v. Davis, [ 424 U.S. 693 , 710–12, 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L. 2022The purpose of such notice and hear- ing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 441 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). ‘‘However, under Paul v. Davis, [ 424 U.S. 693 , 710–12, 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager
green
2 sentences2010Second Circuit decisions, however, “although often persuasive, are not binding on this court . . . .” Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69 , 89 n.24, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). 10 Practice Book § 43-10 provides in relevant part: “Before imposing a sentence or making any other disposition after the acceptance of a plea of guilty . . . the judicial authority shall . . . conduct a sentencing hearing as follows: “(1) The judicial authority shall afford the parties an opportunity to be heard and, in its discretion ... to explain or controvert the presentence investigation report . . . “(2) The judic 2010Second Circuit decisions, however, “although often persuasive, are not binding on this court . . . .” Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69 , 89 n.24, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). 10 Practice Book § 43-10 provides in relevant part: “Before imposing a sentence or making any other disposition after the acceptance of a plea of guilty . . . the judicial authority shall . . . conduct a sentencing hearing as follows: “(1) The judicial authority shall afford the parties an opportunity to be heard and, in its discretion ... to explain or controvert the presentence investigation report . . . “(2) The judic | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Valeriano v. Bronson
green
2 sentences1999See Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 454 ; Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 690 , 583 A.2d 1277 (1990). “[T]he burden that the petitioner must sustain for a favorable outcome on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a higher one than he would have had to sustain had the actual merits of the same issue been raised on direct appeal.” Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 87 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). 1999See Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 454 ; Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 690 , 583 A.2d 1277 (1990). “[T]he burden that the petitioner must sustain for a favorable outcome on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a higher one than he would have had to sustain had the actual merits of the same issue been raised on direct appeal.” Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 87 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sekou v. Warden
green
2 sentences1999See Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 454 ; Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 690 , 583 A.2d 1277 (1990). “[T]he burden that the petitioner must sustain for a favorable outcome on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a higher one than he would have had to sustain had the actual merits of the same issue been raised on direct appeal.” Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 87 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). 1999See Bunkley v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 454 ; Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 690 , 583 A.2d 1277 (1990). “[T]he burden that the petitioner must sustain for a favorable outcome on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a higher one than he would have had to sustain had the actual merits of the same issue been raised on direct appeal.” Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 87 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Although CT Page 5202 facts that establish a breach of contract claim may be sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation, Lester v. Resort Complands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59 , 71 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992), many superior courts have held that a simple claim of breach of contract is not sufficient to give rise to a CUTPA violation, particularly where the complaint simply incorporates by reference the breach of contract claim and does not set forth how or in what respect the defendant's activities are either immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, or offensive to public policy. 1999Although CT Page 5202 facts that establish a breach of contract claim may be sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation, Lester v. Resort Complands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59 , 71 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992), many superior courts have held that a simple claim of breach of contract is not sufficient to give rise to a CUTPA violation, particularly where the complaint simply incorporates by reference the breach of contract claim and does not set forth how or in what respect the defendant's activities are either immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, or offensive to public policy. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Long v. Thornton Township High School District 205
green
1 sentence1998For example, on the question of typicality, in Long v. Thornton Township High School, 82 F.R.D. 186 (N.D. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning & Planning Commission
green
2 sentences1994Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning Planning Commission , 153 Conn. 232 , 239 , 215 A.2d 409 (1965). 1994Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning Planning Commission , 153 Conn. 232 , 239 , 215 A.2d 409 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Benz v. Walker
green
2 sentences1990"The simple requirement of the rule, with its provision for notice, is not as onerous as those imposed in most other jurisdictions, a majority of which require that all persons who have or claim an interest in the subject matter of an action for a declaratory judgment or who may be affected by the result must actually be joined as necessary parties." Benz, 154 Conn. at 78 . 1990"Where. . . [persons having a direct interest in the subject matter of the action] are reasonably within the reach of process and are not so numerous that it would impose an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff they should be made parties; but if they or some them are not reasonably available for service or to summon them or all of them into the action would put upon the plaintiff a burden he ought not fairly to be asked to assume, the provision for reasonable notice applies." Benz, 154 Conn. at 78 ; see Tucker v. Maher, 192 Conn. 460 , 470 (1984). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Cimino
green
2 sentences1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Braxton
green
2 sentences1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Stepney v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Arizona v. Atchison
green
1 sentence1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Helton v. United States
green
1 sentence1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Stepney
green
2 sentences1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 1986In reviewing such a claim, we construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Braxton, 196 Conn. 685, 691 , 495 A.2d 273 (1985); State v. Cimino, 194 Conn. 210, 211 , 478 A.2d 1005 (1984); and then determine whether “ ‘the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Braxton, supra, quoting State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255 , 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 , 104 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Bloom
neutral
1 sentence1969The simple inquiry is, what is the contract? and has the plaintiff performed his part of it?’ Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 223 .” Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 704 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
In Re Estate of Cohen
green
1 sentence1969It is beyond the province of courts to substitute terms for those made by the parties to a contract, or to supply terms that have not been agreed upon. “ ‘ [T]he courts do not make a contract for the parties’ ”; 3 Corbin, Contracts § 541, p. 94; or “rewrite their contract.” In re Estate of Cohen, 23 Ill. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.