6 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1893–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sorum v. Schwartzgreen1 sentence2015“A reasonable time must be allowed for production in paying quantities in order to determine the average production of oil and gas, the cost of production, and the availability of markets.” Sorum v. Schwartz, 411 N.W.2d 652, 654 (N.D.1987) (“Sorum II”). [¶ 15] Texas courts apply a two-step analysis to determine whether a well produces in paying quantities: 1) whether the well yields a profit exceeding operating costs over a reasonable period of time, and 2) whether a reasonably prudent operator would continue operating the well in the manner being operated for the purpose of making a profit an | 1 | 1 |
Schestler v. Schestlergreen2 sentences2006I would request that he apply the statute in the way it was intended by the legislature." 486 N.W.2d at 515 (Levine, J., dissenting). [¶ 34] Dale V. 2006I would request that he apply the statute in the way it was intended by the legislature.” 486 N.W.2d at 515 (Levine, J., dissenting). [¶ 34] Dale V. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Tonneson's Estate
green
1 sentence1973Without going into the historical and technical meanings of latent and patent ambiguities, as was done in Harney v. Wirtz, supra, In re Tonneson’s Estate, supra, gives a simple test for determining whether an ambiguity exists: “Good arguments can be made for either position, which is proof that the designation is ambiguous.” The decision goes on to say that when language used is not clear, definite, and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to remove the ambiguity. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Fisher v. Harrison
green
2 sentences1973The appellant argues that the will contains ambiguity as to the meaning of the word “separated” and as to the term “living as husband and wife.” She argues that the word “separated” is subject to two meanings, one the technical meaning in matrimonial law of cessation of cohabitation by husband and wife by mutual agreement or a judicial separation under decree of court, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), and Fisher v. Harrison, 165 Va. 323 , 182 S.E. 543 (1935), and In re Rogers’ Estate, 91 N.Y.S.2d 250 , 253 (S.Ct. 1973The appellant argues that the will contains ambiguity as to the meaning of the word “separated” and as to the term “living as husband and wife.” She argues that the word “separated” is subject to two meanings, one the technical meaning in matrimonial law of cessation of cohabitation by husband and wife by mutual agreement or a judicial separation under decree of court, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), and Fisher v. Harrison, 165 Va. 323 , 182 S.E. 543 (1935), and In re Rogers’ Estate, 91 N.Y.S.2d 250 , 253 (S.Ct. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Black v. Smith
green
2 sentences1954In Black v. Smith, supra [ 58 N.D. 109 , 224 N.W. 920 ], this court said: "The capacity to execute a will has so often been defined as being the ability of the testator to know the extent and character of his property, to be mindful of the natural objects of his bounty, and to appreciate the character of the act in which he is engaged, that this simple test may be applied as elementary and without the citation of authority." In 1 Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Sec. 132, we find that: "The standard of testamentary capacity which has finally been agreed upon, in substance, by the great weight 1954In Black v. Smith, supra [ 58 N.D. 109 , 224 N.W. 920 ], this court said: “The capacity to execute a will has so often been defined as being the, ability of the testator to know the extent and character of his property, to be mindful of the natural objects of his bounty, and to appreciate the character of the act in which he is engaged, that this simple test may be applied as elementary and without the citation of authority.” In 1 Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Sec. 132, we find that: “The standard of testamentary capacity which has finally been agreed upon, in substance, by the great weight | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Dutton v. . Willner
green
1 sentence1901The rule, and the reasons therefore are well stated by Rapallo, J., in Dutton v. Willner, 52 N. Y. 312 , in the following language: “It is a well settled and salutary rule that 'a person who undertakes to act for another in any matter shall not, in the same matter, act for himself.’ It. is only by a rigid adherence to this simple rule that all temptation can be removed from one acting in a fiduciary capacity to abuse his trust, or seek his own advantage in the position which it affords him. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Canham v. Plano Manufacturing Co.
neutral
1 sentence1893We have carefully considered the points raised, and finding no error the judgment is affirmed. ( 55 N. W. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.