simple test in Maryland

1975Co., 124 Md. 210, 214 , the Court of Appeals gave a capsule statement of the test, as it was set out in Wood on Master and Servant, § 279, and quoted in Sawyer v. Railroad, 142 N. C. 7 , 54 S. E. 793 : “The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to have been authorized by him.

1959In that case, the Court, quoting with approval from the case of Sawyer v. Railroad, 142 N. C. 1 , 54 S. E. 793 , said: “The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to have been authorized by him.

2021App. 170, 171 , 720 A.2d. 1264 (1998), this Court was very emphatic about the difference between generic negligence and contributory negligence: This appeal turns on a simple principle.

2008He stated that, “in my view, the following simple rule should apply to the two-stage interrogation technique: Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2613 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (Breyer, J., concurring).

2008He stated that, “in my view, the following simple rule should apply to the two-stage interrogation technique: Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2613 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (Breyer, J., concurring).

2008Justice Kennedy's concurrence is particularly important, as he represents the fifth vote for the judgment in Seibert . [3] See, *1143 e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 , (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J., writing separately) ("I begin with the premise that the Branzburg [ v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] decision is controlled in the last analysis by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell ( 408 U.S. at 709 , 92 S.Ct. at 2670) as the fifth Justice of the majority.").

2008Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is particularly important, as he represents the fifth vote for the judgment in Seibert. 3 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 , (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J., writing separately) (“I begin with the premise that the Branzburg[v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] decision is controlled in the last analysis by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell ( 408 U.S. at 709 , 92 S.Ct. at 2670 ) as the fifth Justice of the majority.”).

2008Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is particularly important, as he represents the fifth vote for the judgment in Seibert. 3 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 , (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J., writing separately) (“I begin with the premise that the Branzburg[v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] decision is controlled in the last analysis by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell ( 408 U.S. at 709 , 92 S.Ct. at 2670 ) as the fifth Justice of the majority.”).

2008Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is particularly important, as he represents the fifth vote for the judgment in Seibert. 3 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 586 , (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J., writing separately) (“I begin with the premise that the Branzburg[v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)] decision is controlled in the last analysis by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell ( 408 U.S. at 709 , 92 S.Ct. at 2670 ) as the fifth Justice of the majority.”).

2006Alternatively, the trial court may attempt to clarify the juror’s ambiguous response by questioning the juror directly.” 329 Md. at 347 , 619 A.2d at 552 (footnote omitted); Bishop, 341 Md. at 294 , 670 A.2d at 455 .

2006Alternatively, the trial court may attempt to clarify the juror’s ambiguous response by questioning the juror directly.” 329 Md. at 347 , 619 A.2d at 552 (footnote omitted); Bishop, 341 Md. at 294 , 670 A.2d at 455 .

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2001Discussion This court reviews grants of summary judgment “de novo under a simple standard: whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were correct.” McCoy v. Hatmaker, 135 Md.App. 693, 704 , 763 A.2d 1233 (2000); see also Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Barnett v. Sara Lee Corp., 97 Md.App. 140, 146 , 627 A.2d 86 (1993).

2000The simple test for determining vicarious liability under the principle of respondeat superior “is whether they were acts unthin the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to be authorized by him.” 296 Md. at 170 , 460 A.2d 1038 (emphasis supplied).

2000The simple test for determining vicarious liability under the principle of respondeat superior “is whether they were acts unthin the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to be authorized by him.” 296 Md. at 170 , 460 A.2d 1038 (emphasis supplied).

2000And see Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991) (“Scope of public duties” synonymous with “scope of employment” for purposes of analysis.) See also Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285 ; 293-96, 587 A.2d 485 (1991) (Scope of employment determined by whether “conduct was in furtherance of the [master’s] business and incidental to it[.]”) Sawyer v. Humphries listed a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a public official was acting within the scope of his public duties: To be within the scope of the employment the conduct must be of the kind the servant is empl

2000And see Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991) (“Scope of public duties” synonymous with “scope of employment” for purposes of analysis.) See also Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285 ; 293-96, 587 A.2d 485 (1991) (Scope of employment determined by whether “conduct was in furtherance of the [master’s] business and incidental to it[.]”) Sawyer v. Humphries listed a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a public official was acting within the scope of his public duties: To be within the scope of the employment the conduct must be of the kind the servant is empl

2000And see Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991) (“Scope of public duties” synonymous with “scope of employment” for purposes of analysis.) See also Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285 ; 293-96, 587 A.2d 485 (1991) (Scope of employment determined by whether “conduct was in furtherance of the [master’s] business and incidental to it[.]”) Sawyer v. Humphries listed a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a public official was acting within the scope of his public duties: To be within the scope of the employment the conduct must be of the kind the servant is empl

2000And see Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467 (1991) (“Scope of public duties” synonymous with “scope of employment” for purposes of analysis.) See also Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285 ; 293-96, 587 A.2d 485 (1991) (Scope of employment determined by whether “conduct was in furtherance of the [master’s] business and incidental to it[.]”) Sawyer v. Humphries listed a number of factors to be considered when determining whether a public official was acting within the scope of his public duties: To be within the scope of the employment the conduct must be of the kind the servant is empl

2000As one court has said: “There are in the books many cases dealing with judgments against debtors whose names are entered in abbreviated or incorrect forms, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to deduce from them a simple rule which furnishes the key to a ready solution of each and every case.” Coral Gables, 334 Pa. at 444 , 6 A.2d at 277 .

2000As one court has said: “There are in the books many cases dealing with judgments against debtors whose names are entered in abbreviated or incorrect forms, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to deduce from them a simple rule which furnishes the key to a ready solution of each and every case.” Coral Gables, 334 Pa. at 444 , 6 A.2d at 277 .

1999Id., at 149, 89 S.Ct. 337 .

1997Laying out in any significant detail the range of hazards faced by a defendant who subjects himself to cross-examination by a skillful prosecutor can very easily chill a defendant’s desire to tell his side of the story; too brief a summary, conversely, can lure a defendant into dreadful self-incrimination. 73 Md.App. at 603-04 , 535 A.2d 951 .

1997Laying out in any significant detail the range of hazards faced by a defendant who subjects himself to cross-examination by a skillful prosecutor can very easily chill a defendant’s desire to tell his side of the story; too brief a summary, conversely, can lure a defendant into dreadful self-incrimination. 73 Md.App. at 603-04 , 535 A.2d 951 .

1990Rather, Judge Alpert, speaking for this Court, stated the simple rule: “[A] party relying on a matter in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proving such a matter where it is shown that the cause of action accrued earlier than permitted by applicable statute.” World Book, 67 Md.App. at 444 , 508 A.2d 148 .

1990Rather, Judge Alpert, speaking for this Court, stated the simple rule: “[A] party relying on a matter in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense bears the burden of proving such a matter where it is shown that the cause of action accrued earlier than permitted by applicable statute.” World Book, 67 Md.App. at 444 , 508 A.2d 148 .

1989And that is Jones v. State [ 56 Md.App. 101 , 466 *415 A.2d 895 (1983) ]. 1 However, I recognize that the privilege is not absolute.

1985State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893 (N.J.1983); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 NJ.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc.2d 39 , 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); Escobedo v. Ward, 255 Or. 85 , 464 P.2d 698 (1970); Ryan v. Com.

1985State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893 (N.J.1983); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 NJ.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc.2d 39 , 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); Escobedo v. Ward, 255 Or. 85 , 464 P.2d 698 (1970); Ryan v. Com.

1985State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893 (N.J.1983); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 NJ.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc.2d 39 , 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); Escobedo v. Ward, 255 Or. 85 , 464 P.2d 698 (1970); Ryan v. Com.

1985State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893 (N.J.1983); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 NJ.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc.2d 39 , 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); Escobedo v. Ward, 255 Or. 85 , 464 P.2d 698 (1970); Ryan v. Com.

1985State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron, 463 A.2d 893 (N.J.1983); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp., 151 NJ.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc.2d 39 , 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); Escobedo v. Ward, 255 Or. 85 , 464 P.2d 698 (1970); Ryan v. Com.

1979Such interests may be involved in two different situations: the first, in which the trial judge declares a mistrial; the second, in which the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence.” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 75 .

1979Such interests may be involved in two different situations: the first, in which the trial judge declares a mistrial; the second, in which the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence.” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 75 .