simple requirement in Texas

2015We held that, although the expert “did not testify as to every conceivable factor that might affect the reliability of eyewitness identification present,” his testimony “was sufficiently tied to the facts to meet the simple requirement that it be ‘helpful’ to the jury on the issue of eye witness reliability.” Id. at 556 .

2015Nevertheless, the Court held that, although the expert “did not testify as to every conceivable factor that might affect the reliability of eyewitness identification present,” his testimony “was sufficiently tied to the facts to meet the simple requirement that it be ‘helpful’ to the jury on the issue of eye witness reliability.” Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 556 .

2020That is not Lehmann’s rule.” In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) 3 (per curiam).

2020That is not Lehmann’s rule.” In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam).

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child."); Stout v. Stout , 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D. 1997) ("This court considers the child's best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally."); Aaby v. Strange , 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996) (Court emphasized that "the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they ar

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child."); Stout v. Stout , 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D. 1997) ("This court considers the child's best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally."); Aaby v. Strange , 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996) (Court emphasized that "the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they ar

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child."); Stout v. Stout , 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D. 1997) ("This court considers the child's best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally."); Aaby v. Strange , 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996) (Court emphasized that "the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they ar

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2008“It must be sufficiently tied to the facts to meet the simple requirement that it be ‘helpful’ to the jury.” Morales, 32 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 555 ).

2008"It must be sufficiently tied to the facts to meet the simple requirement that it be 'helpful' to the jury." Morales , 32 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting Jordan , 928 S.W.2d at 555 ).

2014However, “an initially innocent trial error may be tainted by a prosecutor’s intentional efforts to exacerbate its effect,” and, “as a jury has its attention focused on improper testimony, the initial impression created by said testimony, curable by a simple instruction, escalates [into] cumulative harm.” Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim.

1993Stahl , at 832.

2007Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144 , 119 S.Ct. 2018 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1999).

2007Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale , 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1144 , 119 S. Ct. 2018 (1999).

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2002Since that time, social science research has uniformly confirmed the simple principle that, in general, what is good for the custodial parent is good for the child.”); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903, 915 (N.D.1997) (“This court considers the child’s best interests inextricably interwoven with the quality of life of the custodial parent, with whom the child lives and upon whom the child relies emotionally.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn.1996) (Court emphasized that “the interest of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated, even if they are no

2015In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., the United States Supreme Court imposed “the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create the impression of possible bias.” Burlington, 960 S.W.2d at 633 (quoting Commonwealth, 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).

2014To further that goal, the Court imposed “the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” Id. at 149 , 89 S.Ct. 337 . 6 Despite the fact that the Court found no evidence of actual bias, it found the arbitrator evidently partial due to his failure to disclose his relationship with the prime contractor, justifying vacatur of the award.

2003In the instant case, the State cites both Brick and Beaver , but limits its argument with respect to attenuation of taint to its statement that “[n]o matter what had transpired between the observation of the contraband and then the withdrawal from the shed, the voluntary giving of consent removes any perceived taint from the ultimate search and seizure.” However, in Brick , when considering the court of appeals’ holding that the “Appellant’s consent removed the taint of an illegal arrest, if any, and vitiated the need for a showing of probable cause[,]” the court of criminal appeals noted that

2003In the instant case, the State cites both Brick and Beaver , but limits its argument with respect to attenuation of taint to its statement that "[n]o matter what had transpired between the observation of the contraband and then the withdrawal from the shed, the voluntary giving of consent removes any perceived taint from the ultimate search and seizure." However, in Brick , when considering the court of appeals' holding that the "[a]ppellant's consent removed the taint of an illegal arrest, if any, and vitiated the need for a showing of probable cause[,]" the court of criminal appeals noted th

2001McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 341 (stating that “[c]arving exceptions to this simple requirement that the motion for summary judgment state the specific grounds frustrates the purpose of Rule 166a(c))”.

1994Eventually the exceptions would consume the rule, and inject uncertainty into summary judgment proceedings concerning what issues were presented for consideration.” McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 341 .

2025The Edwards court asserted that cases in which lay testimony had been determined to be sufficient had included “something more than a simple claim the signature is forged.” Id. (citing Wasserberg v. 84 Lumber Co., L.P., No. 14- 10-00136-CV, 2011 WL 3447493 , at *1, *3–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that assertions in affidavit (1) that signature affixed to credit application was not authentic and was not affiant’s signature and (2) that affiant did not sign credit application or authorize anybody to sign it on his behalf were statements of fact and

2025The Edwards court continued, stating that, “[c]onversely, bare opinions that a signature is a forgery are insufficient.” In re Est. of Wynn Page 13 Id. (citing In re Est. of Price, No. 04-05-00438-CV, 2006 WL 3725542 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 20, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that, without establishing familiarity with her aunt’s signature, niece’s assertion in her deposition that the “initials and the signature [of her aunt] look different” was conclusory and therefore not enough evidence to raise fact issue regarding validity of signature), and Cotten v. Cotten, 169 S.W.3d

2025In Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., the Fifth Circuit made an Erie guess and “conclude[d] that the Texas Supreme Court would consider attorney immunity to be a true immunity from suit” and not just “a simple defense to liability.” 816 F.3d 341, 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2016).

2025The court wrestled with whether the “denial of a motion to dismiss based on attorney immunity [was] appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 344.

2020Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1999).

2019Further, the trial court’s order was not just a simple instruction prohibiting Villarreal from discussing his testimony with his attorney; rather, it was an ambiguous order where Villarreal’s defense counsel, prior to advising Villarreal on his defensive strategy, was left to question whether the matter to be discussed was “something that is going to be considered to be conferring with [Villarreal] on the witness stand while the jury is there or not.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Werner, 214 A.2d 276, 278 (Pa. Super.

2017However, MIS’s contention “that such a simple instruction will ‘nudge’ jurors toward a defense verdict reflects a very low opinion of their intelligence. … [T]hey are not cattle who will be stampeded to an improper verdict by something like this.” Urista, 211 S.W.3d at 760 (Medina, J., dissenting). {1737446;} 26 46.

2015See, e.g., Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 719 ("courts and commentators have come to identify this simple rule as the fairness principle”); Bilzeri-an, 926 F.2d at 1292 ("the privilege may implicitly be waived when defendant asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications”); see also United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1979) ("We obviously cannot condone a practice that enables a defendant or any witness, after giving the jury his version of a privileged communication, to prevent the cross-examiner from utilizing the communication itself to get at the