17 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnelgreen2 sentences2020For example, in Elk Horn Coal, while the Court discussed Tabler, Perkins and other cases, the Court ultimately applied equal protection provisions under §§ 1, 2 and 3 holding that no rational basis existed for KRS 26A.300’s 10% penalty against unsuccessful appellants. 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 18 The concurring opinion concludes, quoting from Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 839 , 155 S.W.2d 469, 472 (1941), by criticizing that we are departing from an interpretation consistently adhered to. 2020For example, in Elk Horn Coal, while the Court discussed Tabler, Perkins and other cases, the Court ultimately applied equal protection provisions under §§ 1, 2 and 3 holding that no rational basis existed for KRS 26A.300’s 10% penalty against unsuccessful appellants. 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 18 The concurring opinion concludes, quoting from Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 839 , 155 S.W.2d 469, 472 (1941), by criticizing that we are departing from an interpretation consistently adhered to. | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Clubgreen2 sentences2020The terms used are to be construed according to their meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 751 , 38 S.W.2d 987, 992 (1931) (internal quotation and citation omitted).18 Some may say that with this simple test legislators will be able to draft around the Section 59 prohibition by avoiding express reference to a specific 17 We importantly note that while we return to § 59’s proper analysis, we do not necessarily “overrule” the results of any prior decision, except to the extent that those decisions have erroneously applied an inap 2020The terms used are to be construed according to their meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Ky. Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 751 , 38 S.W.2d 987, 992 (1931) (internal quotation and citation omitted).18 Some may say that with this simple test legislators will be able to draft around the Section 59 prohibition by avoiding express reference to a specific 17 We importantly note that while we return to § 59’s proper analysis, we do not necessarily “overrule” the results of any prior decision, except to the extent that those decisions have erroneously applied an inap | 3 | 3 |
Kennedy v. Commonwealthred1 sentence2026Parties should abide by this simple instruction: Let your “yes” be “yes” and your “no” be “no.” 14 It is an oft-repeated statement that “[t]he appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976), overruled on other grounds by, Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321, 326-29 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Wilburn v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026Parties should abide by this simple instruction: Let your “yes” be “yes” and your “no” be “no.” 14 It is an oft-repeated statement that “[t]he appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976), overruled on other grounds by, Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321, 326-29 (Ky. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Englishgreen1 sentence2022Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). 15 Welsh points out that under KRE 608(b), a simple inquiry into evidence that reflects on the witness’s truthfulness is allowed on cross-examination. | 1 | 1 |
Maxie v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2017In such • 3 Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky. 2002). • Eames v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d·564, 568 (Ky. 2002). s See West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989). 6 See Bowers v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 241,243 (Ky. 1977). 5 event, we only reverse rf misconduct is flagrant. 7 Flagrant misconduct requires evaluating the following four factors: (1) whether that remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence | 1 | 1 |
West v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2017In such • 3 Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky. 2002). • Eames v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d·564, 568 (Ky. 2002). s See West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989). 6 See Bowers v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 241,243 (Ky. 1977). 5 event, we only reverse rf misconduct is flagrant. 7 Flagrant misconduct requires evaluating the following four factors: (1) whether that remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence | 1 | 1 |
Bowers v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2017In such • 3 Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky. 2002). • Eames v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d·564, 568 (Ky. 2002). s See West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989). 6 See Bowers v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 241,243 (Ky. 1977). 5 event, we only reverse rf misconduct is flagrant. 7 Flagrant misconduct requires evaluating the following four factors: (1) whether that remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence | 1 | 1 |
Bayless v. Boyergreen1 sentence2009Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 450 (Ky.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009In addition, RCr 7.24 does not explicitly provide for independent testing. 5 In fact, Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13 (Ky.App.1984), specifically notes that “the right to [independent] testing is implicit under RCr 7.24.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 2009In addition, RCr 7.24 does not explicitly provide for independent testing. 5 In fact, Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13 (Ky.App.1984), specifically notes that “the right to [independent] testing is implicit under RCr 7.24.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. Conley Ex Rel. Conleygreen2 sentences2006A simple violation suffices."); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. 2006A simple violation suffices.”); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2006A simple violation suffices."); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. 2006A simple violation suffices.”); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Batesgreen2 sentences2006A simple violation suffices."); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. 2006A simple violation suffices.”); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Whitakergreen2 sentences2006A simple violation suffices."); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. 2006A simple violation suffices.”); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Wardgreen1 sentence1981Nevertheless, because it is the wife’s actual and not legal residence which is involved, Gross v. Ward, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 456, 457 (1965), the simple inquiry may be complicated by the need to ascertain her intent to establish an actual residence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nichols Ex Rel. Nichols v. Union Underwear Co.
green
2 sentences2010This is the “special liability” in § 402A of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling products and the standard for such liability is if the product is “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer....” In Nichols, [Nichols v. Union Underwear Co. Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky.1980) ] we arrived at a simple standard for the trier of fact to use to apply the words in § 402A. 1984The manufacturer is presumed to know the qualities and characteristics, and the actual condition, of his product at the time he sells it, and the question is whether the product creates “such a risk” of an accident of the general nature of the one in question “that an ordinarily prudent company engaged in the manufacture” of such a product “would not have put it on the market.” Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., supra, 602 S.W.2d at 433 . | 2 | 1984–2010 |
Dietz v. Bouldin
green
2 sentences2025The exercise of “inherent power must [1] be a reasonable response to a specific problem and [2] the power cannot contradict any express rule or statute[.]” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 , 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 , 195 L. 2025The exercise of “inherent power must [1] be a reasonable response to a specific problem and [2] the power cannot contradict any express rule or statute[.]” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 , 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 , 195 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Resources, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020For example, in Elk Horn Coal, while the Court discussed Tabler, Perkins and other cases, the Court ultimately applied equal protection provisions under §§ 1, 2 and 3 holding that no rational basis existed for KRS 26A.300’s 10% penalty against unsuccessful appellants. 163 S.W.3d at 421 . 18 The concurring opinion concludes, quoting from Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 839 , 155 S.W.2d 469, 472 (1941), by criticizing that we are departing from an interpretation consistently adhered to. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hayden v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006A simple violation suffices."); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. 2006A simple violation suffices.”); Wells v. Conley, 384 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky.1964); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ky.1960); Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1959); Williams v. Whitaker, 293 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Ky.1956); Pendly, 92 S.W. at 2; Hayden, 49 Ky. (10 B. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pryor v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences2006Mon.) at 126 ; Pryor, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) at 298 ; Clarke, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. 2006Mon.) at 126 ; Pryor, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) at 298 ; Clarke, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Clarke v. Goode
green
2 sentences2006Mon.) at 126 ; Pryor, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) at 298 ; Clarke, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. 2006Mon.) at 126 ; Pryor, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) at 298 ; Clarke, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Davis v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2006However, if the evidence would support a conviction under only one of two alternative theories, the requirement of unanimity is violated.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cook
green
2 sentences1999“To show actual prejudice, the complaining litigant would be required to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and never was, a jury properly constituted after running the gauntlet of challenge performed in accordance with the prescribed rule of the game.” Cook, 590 S.W.2d at 877 . 1999"To show actual prejudice, the complaining litigant would be required to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and never was, a jury properly constituted after running the gauntlet of challenge performed in accordance with the prescribed rule of the game." Cook, 590 S.W.2d at 877 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby
green
1 sentence1977Appellee argues that the court laid down the simple rule that where an employee was injured and received a subsequent independent injury which incapacitates him, the prior injury should not be deducted, citing International Harvester Company v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712 (1959); Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 268 (1964); Cabe v. Skeens, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 884 (1967); and Young v. Young, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 832 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
International Harvester Company v. Poff
green
1 sentence1977Appellee argues that the court laid down the simple rule that where an employee was injured and received a subsequent independent injury which incapacitates him, the prior injury should not be deducted, citing International Harvester Company v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712 (1959); Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 268 (1964); Cabe v. Skeens, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 884 (1967); and Young v. Young, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 832 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Cabe v. Skeens
green
1 sentence1977Appellee argues that the court laid down the simple rule that where an employee was injured and received a subsequent independent injury which incapacitates him, the prior injury should not be deducted, citing International Harvester Company v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712 (1959); Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 268 (1964); Cabe v. Skeens, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 884 (1967); and Young v. Young, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 832 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Young v. Young
green
1 sentence1977Appellee argues that the court laid down the simple rule that where an employee was injured and received a subsequent independent injury which incapacitates him, the prior injury should not be deducted, citing International Harvester Company v. Poff, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 712 (1959); Inland Steel Co. v. Mosby, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 268 (1964); Cabe v. Skeens, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 884 (1967); and Young v. Young, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 832 (1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway
green
2 sentences1955Co., ( 232 U.S. 340 , 34 S.Ct. 415 , 58 L.Ed. 631 ), ‘Depart from the simple requirement of the law, that everyone must use his property so as not to injure others, and you pass to refinements and confusing considerations.’ ” We believe that the opinion rendered in the Atlas Assurance Co. case, 102 Cal.App. 2d 789 , 229 P.2d 13 , applies equally as well to the case under consideration. 1955Co., ( 232 U.S. 340 , 34 S.Ct. 415 , 58 L.Ed. 631 ), ‘Depart from the simple requirement of the law, that everyone must use his property so as not to injure others, and you pass to refinements and confusing considerations.’ ” We believe that the opinion rendered in the Atlas Assurance Co. case, 102 Cal.App. 2d 789 , 229 P.2d 13 , applies equally as well to the case under consideration. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
ATLAS ASSUR. CO. LTD. v. State of California
green
2 sentences1955Co., ( 232 U.S. 340 , 34 S.Ct. 415 , 58 L.Ed. 631 ), ‘Depart from the simple requirement of the law, that everyone must use his property so as not to injure others, and you pass to refinements and confusing considerations.’ ” We believe that the opinion rendered in the Atlas Assurance Co. case, 102 Cal.App. 2d 789 , 229 P.2d 13 , applies equally as well to the case under consideration. 1955Co., ( 232 U.S. 340 , 34 S.Ct. 415 , 58 L.Ed. 631 ), ‘Depart from the simple requirement of the law, that everyone must use his property so as not to injure others, and you pass to refinements and confusing considerations.’ ” We believe that the opinion rendered in the Atlas Assurance Co. case, 102 Cal.App. 2d 789 , 229 P.2d 13 , applies equally as well to the case under consideration. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.