simple rule in Louisiana

2020Dupree, 65 So.2d at 1012; Reed, 708 So.2d at 364 .

2010Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 97-1174 (La.3/4/98), 708 So.2d 362 .

1987See Officer v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 175 La. 581 , 143 So. 500 (1932); Hardy v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 172 La. 500 , 134 So. 407 (1931).

1987See Officer v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 175 La. 581 , 143 So. 500 (1932); Hardy v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 172 La. 500 , 134 So. 407 (1931).

1995In Thompson v. Ewin, 457 So.2d 303, 306 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 460 So.2d 1043 (La.1984), this court stated: The unreasonable risk of harm criterion, however, is not a simple rule of law which may be applied mechanically to the facts of every case.

1991This court succinctly stated in Thompson v. Ewin, 457 So.2d 303, 306 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 460 So.2d 1043 (La.1984), the law applicable to the issues presented herein: "The unreasonable risk of harm criterion, however, is not a simple rule of law which may be applied mechanically to the facts of every case.

1987May v. Market Insurance Co., 387 So.2d 1081 (La.1980); Couch on Insurance § 42:682 (2d rev. ed. 1982).

1984The simple clause "merely makes the mortgagee an appointee, whereas the standard mortgage clause operates as a distinct and separate contract." Couch on Insurance, supra § 42:683.

1970The court said: `We believe that clearly Mrs. Simmons' actions form the basis for a reasonable belief on the part of Mr. Brock that she had committed a theft.' `In addition, while the actions of Mr. Brock might technically be classified as a detention of Mrs. Simmons for purposes of questioning, we do not believe that this is the type of situation evisioned by the statute [LSA-R.S. 15:84.5 and 84.6; now LSA-C.C.P. art. 215], but rather was a simple inquiry made by Mr. Brock, which inquiry was reasonable in the light of the prior actions of the plaintiff.' "The facts in Banks v. Food Town, supr

1969The court said: "We believe that clearly Mrs. Simmons' actions form the basis for a reasonable belief on the part of Mr. Brock that she had committed a theft." "In addition, while the actions of Mr. Brock might technically be classified as a detention of Mrs. Simmons for purposes of questioning, we do not believe that this is the type of situation envisioned by the statute [LSA-R.S. 15:84.5 and 84.6; now LSA-C.C.P. art. 215], but rather was a simple inquiry made by Mr. Brock, which inquiry was reasonable in the light of the prior actions of the plaintiff." The facts in Banks v. Food Town, supr

2015Grant v. Martin, supra. Therefore, we hold that the burden of proof in an action to modify a previous consent decree awarding all or part of a child’s custody to a nonparent lies with the modification-seeking parent.

2010Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 2003-2220 (La.04/14/04), 875 So.2d 22 ; Metro Ambulance Service, Inc., supra. In the case sub judice, Boggs & Poole relies on Hamp’s Const, supra, arguing that the case stands for the simple principle that public bid form requirements must be followed precisely and that if the requirement is not followed, the bid is non-responsive.

2010Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 2003-2220 (La.04/14/04), 875 So.2d 22 ; Metro Ambulance Service, Inc., supra. In the case sub judice, Boggs & Poole relies on Hamp’s Const, supra, arguing that the case stands for the simple principle that public bid form requirements must be followed precisely and that if the requirement is not followed, the bid is non-responsive.

2006The holding in Sanches v. Morris, 01-398 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/14/01) , 802 So.2d 755 , suggests that the *517 court applied the simple test that coverage is determined by whether or not notice is given to the insurer during the policy period without regard to the presence of any other factors, including any statutory mandate.

2006The case of Burns v. CLD, Inc., 38,998 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/27/04), 886 So.2d 607 , writ denied, 04-2906 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 31 , expressly rejected the reasoning of Hedgepeth, Gary, and Bennett and held that because a claim was not made during the policy period there was no coverage.

2006The case of Burns v. CLD, Inc., 38,998 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/27/04), 886 So.2d 607 , writ denied, 04-2906 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d 31 , expressly rejected the reasoning of Hedgepeth, Gary, and Bennett and held that because a claim was not made during the policy period there was no coverage.

2002Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California, 94-1868 (La.4/10/95), 652 So.2d 1299 ; Sistler, supra. The unreasonable risk of harm criterion is not a simple rule of law which can be applied mechanically to the facts of a case.

2002Semtek International Incorporated v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, 531 U.S. 497 , 121 S.Ct. 1021, 1025-27 , 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001).

2002Semtek International Incorporated v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, 531 U.S. 497 , 121 S.Ct. 1021, 1025-27 , 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001).

2002Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California, 94-1868 (La.4/10/95), 652 So.2d 1299 ; Sistler, supra. The unreasonable risk of harm criterion is not a simple rule of law which can be applied mechanically to the facts of a case.

1988Hines, supra at 726 . 3 In Hines , we looked to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146 (La.1983) for guidance as to how to make a determination of whether or not there is an unreasonable risk of harm: “ Tn Entrevia, Supra, the Supreme Court instructed the lower Court not to consider the unreasonable risk of harm criteria as a simple rule of law to be applied mechanically, but instructed the Courts to consider ideals of justice and social utility, acting somewhat as a legislator and also stated: “As this Court has noted in relation to other forms of strict li

1987By Act 36 the legislature has substituted the simple requirement of three months residence, which can be proved with certainty, for the nebulous concept of domicile, which usually cannot be proved. 318 S.W.2d at 795-797 .

1987Bohn, 482 So.2d at 852 .

1979Co., supra (evidence of a prior inconsistent statement was introduced into the record where she admitted she knew her husband was not divorced when she married him). [4] The author was among the dissenters in Summerell v. Phillips, 258 La. 587 , 247 So.2d 542 (1971), which held that the court of appeal could not declare an ordinance unconstitutional if unconstitutionality had not been pleaded in the district court.

1979Co., supra (evidence of a prior inconsistent statement was introduced into the record where she admitted she knew her husband was not divorced when she married him). [4] The author was among the dissenters in Summerell v. Phillips, 258 La. 587 , 247 So.2d 542 (1971), which held that the court of appeal could not declare an ordinance unconstitutional if unconstitutionality had not been pleaded in the district court.

1979Spillman first suggested, as we later held in Chambers v. Parker, La.App. 4 Cir. 1977, 349 So.2d 424 , writ refused, La., 351 So.2d 170 , that the simple requirement of a court "order" did not affect an adoptee's right to access to his sealed original birth certificate—a right he had expressly had since the very first "sealing" statute in 1938.

1979Spillman first suggested, as we later held in Chambers v. Parker, La.App. 4 Cir. 1977, 349 So.2d 424 , writ refused, La., 351 So.2d 170 , that the simple requirement of a court "order" did not affect an adoptee's right to access to his sealed original birth certificate—a right he had expressly had since the very first "sealing" statute in 1938.