108 New York opinions name it 10 courts 1860–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.green2 sentences2026The doctrine gives extreme deference to arbitrators and "requires 'more than a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law'" ( Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 6 NY3d at 481 , quoting Duferco Intl. 2024We agree with respondent that the court erred in vacating the award on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the substantive law applicable to the parties' dispute. "[M]anifest disregard of law is a severely limited doctrine" inasmuch as "[i]t is a doctrine of last resort limited to the rare occurrences of apparent egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrator[ ]" that "requires more than a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrator[ ] to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law" ( Wien & Malkin LLP , 6 NY3d at 480-481 [i | 2 | 5 |
People v. Lucaranogreen2 sentences2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). 2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bookergreen2 sentences2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). 2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cabangreen2 sentences2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). 2013Indeed, while noting that it is most logical for police to begin their inquiry regarding representation with the defendant himself or herself, the Court of Appeals stated that “a simple inquiry of the defendant is not an unrealistic burden to place on the authorities” (People v Rosa, 65 NY2d at 385-386; see People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d at 147 ; see also People v Calcaterra, 127 AD2d at 779 [stating that police are entitled to end their inquiry in reliance on a defendant’s statement that he or she is not represented]; compare People v Booker, 53 AD3d at 701 ). | 2 | 2 |
Magee v. . Badgergreen2 sentences1961Perhaps the doctrine is in accord with the general rule in New York, that “ The rights of the holder [of a negotiable instrument] are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence ” (Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N. Y. 226, 230 ; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247, 249 ). “ The requirement of the statute is good faith, and bad faith is not mere carelessness. 1959The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence (Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247, 249 ). | 1 | 9 |
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitchgreen2 sentences1961Perhaps the doctrine is in accord with the general rule in New York, that “ The rights of the holder [of a negotiable instrument] are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence ” (Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 296 N. Y. 226, 230 ; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247, 249 ). “ The requirement of the statute is good faith, and bad faith is not mere carelessness. 1959As held in Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch ( 296 N. Y. 226, 230 ), the bank’s rights as a holder “ are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith ’ ’. | 1 | 6 |
Dutton v. . Willnergreen2 sentences1940Different courts have defined this rule in different words, but in unanimity of substance (Dutton v. Willner, 52 N. Y. 312, 318, 319 ): “ It is a well settled and salutary rule that ' a person who undertakes to act for another in any matter shall not, in the same manner, act for himself.’ It is only by a rigid adherence to this simple rule that all temptation can be removed from one acting in a fiduciary capacity to abuse his trust, or seek his own advantage in the position which it affords him. 1932The opinion in Dutton v. Willner ( 52 N. Y. 312 ) reads (at p. 318): “ It is a well settled and salutary rule that ‘ a person who undertakes to act for another in any matter shall not, in the same matter, act for himself.’ It is only by a rigid adherence to this simple rule that all temptation can be removed from one acting in a fiduciary capacity to abuse his trust, or seek his own advantage in the position which it affords him.” Sage v. Culver ( 147 N. Y. 241 ) contributes the following (at p. 247): “ When it appears that the trustee or officer has violated the moral obligation to refrain fr | 1 | 3 |
People v. Beltongreen1 sentence2026Not only does today's holding undercut the due process protections embedded into our requirements for jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instruments, it undermines the Legislature's longstanding allowance of driving while having consumed a small amount of a potentially impairing substance as well as the public policy against unfettered police discretion ( People v Belton , 55 NY2d 49, 52 [1982] ["the State Constitution protects the privacy interests of the people of our State . . . against the unfettered discretion of government officials to search or seize"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rossgreen1 sentence2024Finally, in People v Nichols ( 250 AD2d 370, 370-371 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 881 [1998]), the defendant was "uncooperative," "his conduct was extremely suspicious," and he exhibited "severe" "agitation and nervousness . . . involving uncontrollable shaking and trembling" after "merely being detained for a simple violation" such that, "when combined with his failure to answer the officer's inquiry," there was "reasonable basis for believing that the defendant might be armed." Again, although Mr. Torres failed to answer Officer Galarza's inquiry regarding his license and registration, | 1 | 1 |
Schiferle v. Capital Fence Co., Inc.green1 sentence2024"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Schiferle , 155 AD3d at 127 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wien & Malkin LLP , 6 NY3d at 481 ; Barone v Haskins , 193 AD3d 1388, 1391 [4th Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 1032 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 919 [2022]). | 1 | 1 |
Barone v. Haskinsgreen1 sentence2024"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Schiferle , 155 AD3d at 127 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wien & Malkin LLP , 6 NY3d at 481 ; Barone v Haskins , 193 AD3d 1388, 1391 [4th Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 1032 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 919 [2022]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nicholsgreen1 sentence2024Finally, in People v Nichols ( 250 AD2d 370, 370-371 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 881 [1998]), the defendant was "uncooperative," "his conduct was extremely suspicious," and he exhibited "severe" "agitation and nervousness . . . involving uncontrollable shaking and trembling" after "merely being detained for a simple violation" such that, "when combined with his failure to answer the officer's inquiry," there was "reasonable basis for believing that the defendant might be armed." Again, although Mr. Torres failed to answer Officer Galarza's inquiry regarding his license and registration, | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Wilkinsgreen1 sentence2018"The potential for . . . mistakes [by the arbitrators] is the price for agreeing to arbitration" ( Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter , 569 US 564 , 572-573 [2013]), and, "however disappointing [an award] may be," parties that have bargained for arbitration "must abide by it" ( Wilkins v Allen , 169 NY 494, 497 [1902]; see also Matter of Pine St. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beneventogreen1 sentence2018To the extent the existing record permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668 [1984]). | 1 | 1 |
| Blake Electric Contracting Co. v. Paschallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Danann Realty Corp. v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Faygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Castrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Castrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ginesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Becker v. Schwartzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph v. Ruffogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mounsey v. Ellardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank v. Fazzari
green
2 sentences1994Bank v Fazzari, 10 NY2d 394, 399 ).” Defendant had asserted in opposition to the plaintiffs cross motion that summary judgment should not be granted in plaintiffs favor without further discovery on the issue of when Rabobank learned of the default or defenses to the note. 1979Bank of Odessa v Fazzari ( 10 NY2d 394, 399-400 ) stated the rule in New York: " 'The rights of the holder [of a negotiable instrument] are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence’ [citations omitted]. 'The requirement of the statute is good faith, and bad faith is not mere carelessness. | 3 | 1979–1994 |
Duferco International Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/s
green
2 sentences2018The Second Circuit has also indicated that the doctrine requires more than a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law" ( Duferco , 333 F3d at 389 ). 2006The doctrine of manifest disregard, therefore, “gives extreme deference to arbitrators” (DiRussa, 121 F3d at 821 ). 11 The Second Circuit has also indicated that the doctrine requires “more than a simple error in law or a failure by the arbitrators to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law” (Duferco, 333 F3d at 389 ). | 2 | 2006–2018 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2008Finally, there was no interrogation requiring warnings because the officer’s simple inquiry was made to clarify the situation (see People v Johnson, 59 NY2d 1014 [1983]). 1991Rather, the question was justified in order to permit the officers to clarify the nature of the situation and, if warranted, to permit the two men to proceed on their way (see, People v Johnson, 59 NY2d 1014 ; People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 , 34; People v Schipski, 130 AD2d 781 ). | 2 | 1991–2008 |
Basso v. Miller
green
2 sentences2006Finding these distinctions unduly complicated and difficult to apply, we discarded them in Basso in favor of what we called “the simple rule of reasonable care under the circumstances” ( 40 NY2d at 240-241 ). 2002More than a quarter century ago, property owner duties were reformulated to eliminate arcane distinctions between licensees and invitees and to adopt “the simple rule of reasonable care under the circumstances” (Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 240-241 ). | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. American Express Co.
green
2 sentences1995Co. v American Express Co., 74 NY2d 153, 162-163 ). 1992Co. v American Express Co. ( 74 NY2d 153, 163 ), the court herein noted that " ’[hjolders in due course are to be determined by the simple test of what they actually knew, not by speculation as to what they had reason to know or what would have aroused the suspicion of a reasonable person in their circumstances’ ”. | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola
green
2 sentences1981Co. v. Compania T.E., 134 N. Y. 461 .)’ “The thrust of the above statements is the simple principle that ‘everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own acts and this responsibility extends not only to the person directly injured, but also to one indirectly harmed by being cast in damages by operation of law for the negligent act’ (IB Warren’s NY Negligence, ch 10, § 2.01, p 641). 1979Co. v. Compania T.E., 134 N. Y. 461 .)” The thrust of the above statements is the simple principle that "everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own acts and this responsibility extends not only to the person directly injured, but also to one indirectly harmed by being cast in damages by operation of law for the negligent act” (IB Warren’s NY Negligence, ch 10, § 2.01, p 641). | 2 | 1979–1981 |
People v. . Fielding
green
2 sentences1965(People v. Lombard, 4 A D 2d 666, 671.) “The primary duty of lawyers engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done,” (.Canons of Professional Ethics, canon 5.) “‘Language which might be permitted to counsel in summing up a civil action cannot with propriety be used by a public prosecutor, who is a quasi-judicial officer, representing the People of the State, and presumed to act impartially in the interest only of justice.’ (People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 547 .) That pronouncement by this court is declaratory of the simple principle of fairness which was d 1950Lewis, J. 1 ‘ Language which might be permitted to counsel in summing up a civil action cannot with propriety be used by a public prosecutor, who is a quasi-judicial officer, representing the People of the state, and presumed to act impartially in the interest only of justice.” (People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 547 .) That pronouncement by this court is declaratory of the simple principle of fairness which was decisive in the cited case and pervades those rules which govern the administration of criminal law. | 2 | 1950–1965 |
Hall v. Bank of Blasdell
green
2 sentences1962The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence (Hall v. Bank of Bias- dell, 306 N. Y. 336, 341 ; italics supplied.) Moreover, as a holder in due course, the plaintiff holds the instrument free from any defenses available to prior parties among themselves (Negotiable Instruments Law, § 96; North Amer. 1962The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by speculation in regard to the purchaser’s diligence or negligence ’.” (Italics supplied.) (Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N. Y. 336, 341 .) Moreover, as a holder in due course, the plaintiff holds the instrument free from any defenses available to prior parties among themselves (Negotiable Instruments Law, § 96; North Amer. | 2 | 1962–1962 |
Kittredge v. Grannis
green
2 sentences1961It is nothing less than guilty knowledge or willful ignorance ” (Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, supra, p. 229 ; Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 168,178-179 ; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137, 140 , supra). 1947These principles have often been restated in varying forms and have never been questioned in the decisions of this court (Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N. Y. 223, 233 ; New York Bankers, Inc., v. Duncan, 257 N. Y. 160, 165 ; Kittredge v. Grannis, supra; Kittredge v. Grannis, 236 N. Y. 375, 388-389 ; Second Nat. | 2 | 1947–1961 |
Alling v. Boston & Albany Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1900Co., 126 Mass. 121 .) The case, therefore, is solved by a very simple inquiry, and that is, whether there is in the record anything showing, or tending to show, that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the trunk in question when it received and checked it upon the train on the 23rd of October, 1897, other than the appearance of the same, which, it is held, is no evidence of knowledge at all. 1900Co., 126 Mass. 121 .) The case, therefore, is solved by a very simple inquiry, and that is, whether there is in the record anything showing, or tending to show, that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the trunk in question when it received and checked it upon the train on the 23rd of October, 1897, other than the appearance of the same, which, it is held, is no evidence of knowledge at all. | 2 | 1900–1900 |
BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg
green
1 sentence2024Although this simple rule of reason analysis is similar to the factors examined in the context of employment contracts ( see BDO Seidman v Hirshberg , 93 NY2d at 388 ), in cases involving restrictive covenants in ordinary commercial contacts, courts should accord more deference to parties' freedom to contract ( see Express Frgt. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
DAR & Associates, Inc. v. Uniforce Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024However, we agree with those courts that have analyzed "these types of covenants under a simple rule of reason, balancing the competing public policies in favor of robust competition and freedom to contract" ( DAR & Assoc., Inc. v Uniforce Servs., Inc. , 37 F Supp 2d at 197 ; see Express Frgt. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rinehart v. Pirkey
green
2 sentences2023It arises from the simple principle that one person may not "enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another." Rinehart v. Pirkey , 126 Va. 346, 351 , 101 S.E. 353 (1919).") Footnote 10: See also Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. All. 2023It arises from the simple principle that one person may not "enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another." Rinehart v. Pirkey , 126 Va. 346, 351 , 101 S.E. 353 (1919).") Footnote 10: See also Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. All. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter
green
1 sentence2018"The potential for . . . mistakes [by the arbitrators] is the price for agreeing to arbitration" ( Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter , 569 US 564 , 572-573 [2013]), and, "however disappointing [an award] may be," parties that have bargained for arbitration "must abide by it" ( Wilkins v Allen , 169 NY 494, 497 [1902]; see also Matter of Pine St. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2018To the extent the existing record permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards ( see People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668 [1984]). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Boreali v. Axelrod
green
2 sentences2017In Boreali v Axelrod ( 71 NY2d 1 [1987]), the Court of Appeals identified four “coalescing circumstances” present in that case, which persuaded it “that the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making ha[d] been transgressed” ( 71 NY2d at 11 ). 2017In Boreali v Axelrod ( 71 NY2d 1 [1987]), the Court of Appeals identified four “coalescing circumstances” present in that case, which persuaded it “that the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making ha[d] been transgressed” ( 71 NY2d at 11 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Jana L. v. West 129th Street Realty Corp. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Clark green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Sostre green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Thompson green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Sostre green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Galpern green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Boyd neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Owens neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Drowne green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Most v. Monti green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Schumaker v. . Mather green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| In re of Brendan KK. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Oneida City School District v. Seiden & Sons, Inc. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Cornelius green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Howard green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Howard green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Drew v. Thaw green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Schipski neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Hinton green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Brockington green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Ryan Ready Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Coons green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| City of White Plains v. City of New York green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.