causation standard in Oregon

2024But using “substantial factor” causation to include legal or proximate cause—which are matters that would be decided by the court—was the reason that this court in Babler Bros. overruled an earlier case that had misapplied the causation analysis. 244 Or at 464 .

2011Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 463 , 415 P2d 735 (1966) (noting that, in most negligence cases, “the factual inquiry whether the actor’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the harm is relatively uncomplicated”); Dewey v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 233 Or 515, 541 , 379 P2d 560 (1963) (phrasing the causation standard as whether the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in physically producing the injury).

2024Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 464-65 , 415 P2d 735 (1966) (adopting the views of the concurring opinion in Dewey and holding that “it is for the trier of fact to say whether (a) the conduct complained of was a substantial cause of the harm, and (b) whether the conduct in question was negligent”); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 606 , 469 P2d 783 (1970) (describing “[t]he scope of the liability of an actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury”); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or 494, 511 , 466 P2d 605 (1970) (approving substantial factor jury instruct

2024Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 464-65 , 415 P2d 735 (1966) (adopting the views of the concurring opinion in Dewey and holding that “it is for the trier of fact to say whether (a) the conduct complained of was a substantial cause of the harm, and (b) whether the conduct in question was negligent”); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 606 , 469 P2d 783 (1970) (describing “[t]he scope of the liability of an actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury”); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or 494, 511 , 466 P2d 605 (1970) (approving substantial factor jury instruct

2011In McEwen , the court considered the conduct of both defendants in the causation analysis and explained that the plaintiff need not show that each defendant's negligence was "sufficient to bring about plaintiffs harm by itself; it is enough that [each defendant] substantially contributed to the injuries eventually suffered by [the plaintiff.]" Id. at 418 , 528 P.2d 522 .

2011In McEwen , the court considered the conduct of both defendants in the causation analysis and explained that the plaintiff need not show that each defendant’s negligence was “sufficient to bring about plaintiffs harm by itself; it is enough that [each defendant] substantially contributed to the injuries eventually suffered by [the plaintiff.]” Id. at 418 .

2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993).

2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993).

2024Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 464-65 , 415 P2d 735 (1966) (adopting the views of the concurring opinion in Dewey and holding that “it is for the trier of fact to say whether (a) the conduct complained of was a substantial cause of the harm, and (b) whether the conduct in question was negligent”); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 606 , 469 P2d 783 (1970) (describing “[t]he scope of the liability of an actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury”); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or 494, 511 , 466 P2d 605 (1970) (approving substantial factor jury instruct

2024Intermountain, 244 Or 459, 464-65 , 415 P2d 735 (1966) (adopting the views of the concurring opinion in Dewey and holding that “it is for the trier of fact to say whether (a) the conduct complained of was a substantial cause of the harm, and (b) whether the conduct in question was negligent”); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603, 606 , 469 P2d 783 (1970) (describing “[t]he scope of the liability of an actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury”); Furrer v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or 494, 511 , 466 P2d 605 (1970) (approving substantial factor jury instruct

2023In other words, in enacting subsection (2), the legislature significantly narrowed the meaning of “as a result of” and thus the causation analysis to be applied under subsection (1). 12 The court was making the point there that, “[i]n ordinary usage, the term ‘result’ is not limited to the concept of sole causation.” Meiser II, 369 Or at 359-60 .

2023We noted that some jurisdictions had characterized lost chance theories of recovery, in the medical malpractice context, as involving a “relaxation of the causation standard.” Id. at 469 .

2023But we further noted that commentators and a majority of courts in the jurisdic- tions that had approved the lost chance doctrine had favored an “injury-based analytical approach.” Id.

2022Ossanna, 365 Or at 210 .

2022Ossanna, 365 Or at 210 .

2019We reaffirmed the causation standard for legal malpractice cases in *626 Watson v. Meltzer , 247 Or.

2019App. 558 , 565-66, 270 P.3d 289 (2011), rev. den. , 352 Or. 266 , 286 P.3d 1231 (2012) (quoting Jeffries v. Mills , 165 Or.

2019Id . at 488-89, 142 P.3d 496 . 1 *1014 We have since adhered to Obie and have continued to treat Spurgeon and Buckallew as precedent.

2019The court held that, because the workers' compensation statutes imposed a heightened causation standard beyond what common-law negligence required, the exclusive remedy requirement deprived workers of a right to that common-law remedy, in violation of the remedy guarantee of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. 332 Or. at 86 , 23 P.3d 333 .

2019The court held that, because the workers' compensation statutes imposed a heightened causation standard beyond what common-law negligence required, the exclusive remedy requirement deprived workers of a right to that common-law remedy, in violation of the remedy guarantee of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. 332 Or. at 86 , 23 P.3d 333 .

2019App. 558 , 565-66, 270 P.3d 289 (2011), rev. den. , 352 Or. 266 , 286 P.3d 1231 (2012) (quoting Jeffries v. Mills , 165 Or.

2017Nevertheless, Sprague’s construction of ORS 656.245(l)(a) is consistent with claimant’s argument that compensability of a medical service is governed by the causation standard that applies to the condition that a particular service is “directed to.” Claimant also relies on SAIF v. Carlos-Macias, 262 Or App 629, 633 , 325 P3d 827 (2014), in which we affirmed a board decision that the employer was responsible for medical services “aimed at determining the ‘extent’ of claimant’s injury” to his shoulder, even though SAIF had denied that the claimant’s current shoulder complaints were caused by his

2017Nevertheless, Sprague’s construction of ORS 656.245(l)(a) is consistent with claimant’s argument that compensability of a medical service is governed by the causation standard that applies to the condition that a particular service is “directed to.” Claimant also relies on SAIF v. Carlos-Macias, 262 Or App 629, 633 , 325 P3d 827 (2014), in which we affirmed a board decision that the employer was responsible for medical services “aimed at determining the ‘extent’ of claimant’s injury” to his shoulder, even though SAIF had denied that the claimant’s current shoulder complaints were caused by his

2017Smith, 270 Or App at 331-32 .

2015The Supreme Court has subsequently suggested that Joshi “left open the question whether ‘deprivation of a 30 percent chance of survival’ would be sufficient proof of causation if the plaintiff suffered an injury that did not lead to death.” Lowe, 344 Or at 413 (quoting Joshi, 342 Or at 164 ).

2015The Supreme Court has subsequently suggested that Joshi “left open the question whether ‘deprivation of a 30 percent chance of survival’ would be sufficient proof of causation if the plaintiff suffered an injury that did not lead to death.” Lowe, 344 Or at 413 (quoting Joshi, 342 Or at 164 ).

2009Much less did that exception “cogently present for the trial court’s consideration the alleged deficiencies in that instruction that plaintiff! ] urge[s] on appeal.” Peitsch, 219 Or App at 116 .

2006The lost chance theory applied by certain jurisdictions incorporates a “substantial factor” standard of causation: “Once the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s negligence increased the risk that the plaintiffs injury would occur, sec. 323(a) [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] allows the trier of fact to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” Ehlinger v. Sipes, 155 Wis 2d 1, 11-12 , 454 NW2d 754 (1990) (emphasis added). 2 Other courts reduce the causation standard to that of a “substantial possibility,” as announced in Hicks v. United States, 368

2006The lost chance theory applied by certain jurisdictions incorporates a “substantial factor” standard of causation: “Once the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s negligence increased the risk that the plaintiffs injury would occur, sec. 323(a) [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] allows the trier of fact to determine whether the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury.” Ehlinger v. Sipes, 155 Wis 2d 1, 11-12 , 454 NW2d 754 (1990) (emphasis added). 2 Other courts reduce the causation standard to that of a “substantial possibility,” as announced in Hicks v. United States, 368

2002Id. at 328 .

1998Defendants also argue that the Oregon Supreme Court’s causation analysis in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or 256 , 751 P2d 215 (1988), is applicable here.

1998Defendants also argue that the Oregon Supreme Court’s causation analysis in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or 256 , 751 P2d 215 (1988), is applicable here.

1995Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or. 337, 342-43 , 605 P.2d 1175 (1980).

1995Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or. 337, 342-43 , 605 P.2d 1175 (1980).