causation standard in Iowa

2017Haskenhoff argues that (1) under DeBoom, 772 N.W.2d at 12–13, the correct causation standard for all ICRA claims is the motivating-factor test, and (2) unlike federal law, a lower causation standard for retaliation should be used because the ICRA is a unified statute and should be read broadly to effectuate its broad remedial goals.

2017We note DeBoom was not a retaliation case and apply our retaliation decisions that require the higher causation standard. 772 N.W.2d at 13 .

2018"The causation standard in retaliatory discharge cases has been characterized as " 'a high one.' " Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., L.L.C. , 897 N.W.2d 553 , 582 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Hulme v. Barrett , 480 N.W.2d 40 , 42 (Iowa 1992) ).

2017The causation standard in retaliatory discharge cases has been characterized as “a high one.” City of Hampton, 554 N.W.2d at 535 (quoting Hulme, 480 N.W.2d at 42 ).

2018See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc. , 613 N.W.2d 275 , 281 (Iowa 2000) ; see also Rivera , 865 N.W.2d at 898 (defining "determining factor" as "one that tips the balance in an employment decision").

2017See Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 289 ; see also Rivera, 865 N.W.2d at 898 (defining “determining factor” as “one that tips the balance in an employment decision”).5 5 The Iowa Supreme Court recently adopted a “unified approach” to status-based and retaliation causation, concluding the motivating-factor or played-a-part test applies to both claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA).

2018See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc. , 613 N.W.2d 275 , 281 (Iowa 2000) ; see also Rivera , 865 N.W.2d at 898 (defining "determining factor" as "one that tips the balance in an employment decision").

2017See Fitzgerald, 613 N.W.2d at 289 ; see also Rivera, 865 N.W.2d at 898 (defining “determining factor” as “one that tips the balance in an employment decision”).5 5 The Iowa Supreme Court recently adopted a “unified approach” to status-based and retaliation causation, concluding the motivating-factor or played-a-part test applies to both claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA).

2017In Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, Inc. v. Gasper, the Maryland court considered the proper causation test in a retaliatory discharge case. 17 A.3d 676, 686 (Md.

2017In Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Maryland, Inc. v. Gasper, the Maryland court considered the proper causation test in a retaliatory discharge case. 17 A.3d 676, 686 (Md.

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2017In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, another bare 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the proper causation test for a retaliation claim under Title VII is the but-for test. 570 U.S. ___ , ___, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).

2017In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, another bare 5–4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the proper causation test for a retaliation claim under Title VII is the but-for test. 570 U.S. ___ , ___, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).

2016See Mashaney, 355 P.3d at 688 (Stegall, J., concurring).

2016See Mashaney, 355 P.3d at 688 (Stegall, J., concurring).

2015Id. at 975–76.

2015Id. at 976.

2010State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2001).

2010State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Iowa Ct.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2001).

2010State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2001).

2010State v. Brown, 589 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Iowa Ct.App.1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2001).

2009Id. at 240.

2009Id. at 240.

1996Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Casualty Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 1995); see Newman v. John Deere Ottumwa Works of Deere & Co., 372 N.W.2d 199, 202-03 (Iowa 1985); Schreckengast, 369 N.W.2d at 810 and n. 3.

1995See Newman, 372 N.W.2d at 202-03 ; Schreckengast, 369 N.W.2d at 810 -11 & n. 3.

2022The dissent recites, for instance, that our causation test in Dunlavey for mental-mental injuries sought to address “difficulties in the evaluation of psychological injuries, such as the ease with which such claims may be feigned and the difficulty with which fraudulent claims can be detected.” (Quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 855 .) The dissent refers to our choice of the causation test in Dunlavey as “mindful” of an argument “that once ‘mental/mental’ claims are deemed compensable, employees will increasingly make fraudulent claims which the courts will not be able to detect and which will u

2022The dissent recites, for instance, that our causation test in Dunlavey for mental-mental injuries sought to address “difficulties in the evaluation of psychological injuries, such as the ease with which such claims may be feigned and the difficulty with which fraudulent claims can be detected.” (Quoting Dunlavey, 526 N.W.2d at 855 .) The dissent refers to our choice of the causation test in Dunlavey as “mindful” of an argument “that once ‘mental/mental’ claims are deemed compensable, employees will increasingly make fraudulent claims which the courts will not be able to detect and which will u

2015Id. at 371 . 6 Because trial counsel had “not been permitted an opportunity to explain whether a causation defense was considered” or “whether there were plausible strategic reasons for not pursuing it,” the supreme court affirmed Adams’ conviction and preserved his claim of ineffective assistance for possible PCR proceedings.

2015The supreme court preserved Adams’ claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal because “[t]rial counsel ha[d] not been permitted an opportunity to explain whether a causation defense was considered and if it was considered, whether there was plausible strategic reasons for not pursuing it.” Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 373–74.

2021See Iowa Code § 910.1 (6) (defining “pecuniary damages” for purposes of victim restitution as damages “which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event”); State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527, 539 (Iowa 2018) (“[M]any of our criminal restitution cases employ the causation test applicable in ordinary tort settings.”).

2020In State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527 (Iowa 2018), we reviewed our statutory restitution cases dealing with the causation requirement.

2018"The causation standard in retaliatory discharge cases has been characterized as " 'a high one.' " Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., L.L.C. , 897 N.W.2d 553 , 582 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Hulme v. Barrett , 480 N.W.2d 40 , 42 (Iowa 1992) ).

2018See Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., L.L.C. , 897 N.W.2d 553 , 582-85 (Iowa 2017).

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2017See, e.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 , 552 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 , 934–35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680 , 683–84 (lst Cir. 1996).

2006Id. at 1241 .

2006Id. at 1241.

2023See id. at 719 (“We do not need to decide this issue because, either way, we conclude that Hedlund has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). 10 Three justices dissented in part, concluding that we should join other courts in abandoning the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary judgment so that the same causation standard applies at summary judgment and trial.

2023See id. at 726–35 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Cady, C.J. and Wiggins, J.).

2020See Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Iowa 2006) (“A judge cannot exercise the power to substitute its judgment for the judgment of 5 The causation instruction also mandated that a party “could not recover duplicate damages.” The jury awarded Clark $500 for emotional distress related to the invasion-of-privacy claim and nothing for emotional distress in the trespass claim, but no objections to the instructions covered this potential conflict. 6 Some of the acts of trespass alleged against the Downses involve conduct generally tolerated

2020Ludman v. Davenport Assumption High Sch., 895 N.W.2d 902, 916 (Iowa 2017).