causation test in Colorado

2003However, the majority fails to mention that the very next sentence of McMichael significantly qualifies the causation analysis from Kohl by stating that our precedent follows a "more liberal interpretation" requiring "only that the injury originated in, grew out of, or flowed from a use of a vehicle." 906 P.2d at 103 .

2003However, the majority fails to mention that the very next sentence of McMichael significantly qualifies the causation analysis from Kohl by stating that our precedent follows a "more liberal interpretation" requiring "only that the injury originated in, grew out of, or flowed from a use of a vehicle." 906 P.2d at 103 .

2020Ctr., 914 P.2d at 908 , as reciting the test for causation in fact and noting that legal causation is a separate aspect of the ultimate causation inquiry). ¶28 With respect to what we would now term causation in fact, we have stated: The test for causation is the “but for” test—whether, but for the alleged negligence, the harm would not have occurred.

2019Sharp, 741 P.2d at 720 . 9 ¶ 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit explained in June, the “substantial factor” and but-for standards of causation are not alternatives; but-for causation is a prerequisite to establishing the substantial factor test. 577 F.3d at 1241 . ¶ 29 In explaining the substantial factor test, section 432 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Sharp division did not consider, imposes a causation requirement at least as stringent as the but-for standard consistently applied by our supreme court: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent conduct is no

2019Thus, “the allegedly negligent conduct of the defendant must satisfy” a but-for test “before it can even qualify as a substantial factor under the other Restatement sections.” Reigel, 292 P.3d at 987 . 10 ¶ 30 Regardless of Lorenzen’s theory of liability — that the thirteen- day delay between the request for authorization and the surgery caused his impairment or increased his risk of permanent impairment or aggravated a preexisting condition — he had to show that (1) but for the delay, the injury (or the increased risk or the aggravation) would not have occurred; or (2) the delay was a necessa

2019Sharp, 741 P.2d at 720 . 9 ¶ 28 However, as the Tenth Circuit explained in June, the “substantial factor” and but-for standards of causation are not alternatives; but-for causation is a prerequisite to establishing the substantial factor test. 577 F.3d at 1241 . ¶ 29 In explaining the substantial factor test, section 432 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Sharp division did not consider, imposes a causation requirement at least as stringent as the but-for standard consistently applied by our supreme court: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor’s negligent conduct is no

2018Hoffman , 87 P.3d at 864 (holding that "the district court erred when it considered [the defendant's] need for the information [to establish its defense] as a pertinent factor in determining whether the privilege had been waived"); Johnson v. Trujillo , 977 P.2d 152 , 157 (Colo. 1999) (declining to find an implied waiver even though the plaintiff's mental health records were relevant to the defendant's causation defense).

2007The causation analysis of the Trinity test’s second prong is rooted in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 , 43 S.Ct. 135 , 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922).

2007The causation analysis of the Trinity test’s second prong is rooted in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 , 43 S.Ct. 135 , 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922).

2007The causation analysis of the Trinity test’s second prong is rooted in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 , 43 S.Ct. 135 , 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922).

2006McDorman ex rel Connelly v. Texas-Cola Leasing Co., 288 F.Supp.2d 796 (N.D.Tex. 2003).

1995In doing so, we have distinguished between “injuries that are related to the use of an automobile, and injuries that are related to an automobile only because they coincidentally occurred in the vehicle.” Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136 ; see, e.g., Azar, 178 Colo, at 61, 495 P.2d at 555 (injury caused to passenger when shotgun discharged as driver pulled weapon back into ear after preparing to shoot at rabbit from ear window did not arise out of use of auto); Mason , 161 Colo, at 444, 423 P.2d at 25 (death occurring from discharge of pistol while three youths were toying with the weapon in insured’s ve

1995In doing so, we have distinguished between "injuries that are related to the use of an automobile, and injuries that are related to an automobile *104 only because they coincidentally occurred in the vehicle." Kohl, 731 P.2d at 136 ; see, e.g., Azar, 178 Colo. at 61 , 495 P.2d at 555 (injury caused to passenger when shotgun discharged as driver pulled weapon back into car after preparing to shoot at rabbit from car window did not arise out of use of auto); Mason, 161 Colo. at 444 , 423 P.2d at 25 (death occurring from discharge of pistol while three youths were toying with the weapon in insure

1984Although Colorado case law indicates that legal causation in slander of title cases requires that a pending sale be prevented by publication of the injurious falsehoods, Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, supra; Sussex Real Estate Corp. v. Sbrocca, supra, we conclude that where; (1) the property is on the market for sale; (2) a notice of lis pendens is improperly filed; and (3) such filing is accompanied by malice, the expense of legal proceedings required to remove the notice of lis pendens satisfies the causation requirement.