causation standard in Michigan

2022See Hrapkiewicz v Wayne State Univ Bd of Governors, 501 Mich 1067 , 1067, 1069 (2018) (MARKMAN, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that because this Court’s caselaw has produced “inconsistent” interpretations of the ELCRA’s causation standard, the Court should “grant leave to appeal to address whether the ‘because of’ language in MCL 37.2202(1)(a) [of the ELCRA] should be interpreted” as imposing but-for causation); Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 240 ; 109 S Ct 1775 ; 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion; superseded by statute on other grounds) (“To construe the words ‘because of’ as

2022See Hrapkiewicz v Wayne State Univ Bd of Governors, 501 Mich 1067 , 1067, 1069 (2018) (MARKMAN, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that because this Court’s caselaw has produced “inconsistent” interpretations of the ELCRA’s causation standard, the Court should “grant leave to appeal to address whether the ‘because of’ language in MCL 37.2202(1)(a) [of the ELCRA] should be interpreted” as imposing but-for causation); Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 240 ; 109 S Ct 1775 ; 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion; superseded by statute on other grounds) (“To construe the words ‘because of’ as

1997In Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 650-651 ; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), the Court adopted the causation standard set forth in Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1, 17 ; 235 NW2d 42 (1975): *75 See also Marzonie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 441 Mich 522 ; 495 NW2d 788 (1992); Bourne, 449 Mich 195 -196, 198. *74 “[W]hile the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile and which causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for.

1997In Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 650-651 ; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), the Court adopted the causation standard set forth in Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1, 17 ; 235 NW2d 42 (1975): *75 See also Marzonie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 441 Mich 522 ; 495 NW2d 788 (1992); Bourne, 449 Mich 195 -196, 198. *74 “[W]hile the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the injury, there still must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile and which causal connection is more than incidental, fortuitous or but for.

2023In Ykimoff v WA Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 87 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009), this Court stated: -5- Our Legislature has defined the applicable causation standard for medical malpractice cases in MCL 600.2912a(2), which provides in relevant part: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” The general principles pertaining to causation in an action for medical malpractice were recently reviewed by this Court in Robins v Gar

2023In Ykimoff v WA Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 87 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009), this Court stated: -5- Our Legislature has defined the applicable causation standard for medical malpractice cases in MCL 600.2912a(2), which provides in relevant part: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” The general principles pertaining to causation in an action for medical malpractice were recently reviewed by this Court in Robins v Gar

2023Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86 ; 684 NW2d 296 (2004).

2023Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86 ; 684 NW2d 296 (2004).

2018“To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that his [or her] participation in activity protected by the CRA was a ‘significant factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link between the two.” Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 315 ; 628 NW2d 63 (2001).

2018“To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that his [or her] participation in activity protected by the CRA was a ‘significant factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link between the two.” Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 315 ; 628 NW2d 63 (2001).

2017For this reason, I would apply our general rule and conclude that the need for expert testimony regarding causation in a toxic tort case is determined on the basis of whether the matter “is so obvious that it is within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layperson.” Elher, 499 Mich at 21-22 .

2016The Supreme Court next “reject[ed] plaintiff’s contention that this [is] a case in which the breach of the standard of care is so obvious to a layperson that no expert testimony is required.” Elher, 499 Mich at 24 .

2025Id. at 447-449 .

2023In Ykimoff v WA Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 87 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009), this Court stated: -5- Our Legislature has defined the applicable causation standard for medical malpractice cases in MCL 600.2912a(2), which provides in relevant part: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” The general principles pertaining to causation in an action for medical malpractice were recently reviewed by this Court in Robins v Gar

2023In Ykimoff v WA Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 87 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009), this Court stated: -5- Our Legislature has defined the applicable causation standard for medical malpractice cases in MCL 600.2912a(2), which provides in relevant part: “In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant or defendants.” The general principles pertaining to causation in an action for medical malpractice were recently reviewed by this Court in Robins v Gar

2023Under the motor vehicle exception, a governmental agency is “liable for bodily injury ‘resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle’ owned by the governmental agency.” Curtis v City of Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 559 ; 655 NW2d 791 (2002), quoting MCL 691.1405 (emphasis added).

2023Under the motor vehicle exception, a governmental agency is “liable for bodily injury ‘resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle’ owned by the governmental agency.” Curtis v City of Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 559 ; 655 NW2d 791 (2002), quoting MCL 691.1405 (emphasis added).

2022The causation requirement outlined in Griffith, 472 Mich at 531 , was derived from the language of MCL 500.3105(1), which states that an insurer “is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” This section of the no-fault act was not altered by the 2019 amendment, nor does this language convey that a healthcare provider’s claim should be treated differently.2 Plaintiff’s reliance on Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588 ; 648 NW2d 591 (2002), is also misplaced.

2022The causation requirement outlined in Griffith, 472 Mich at 531 , was derived from the language of MCL 500.3105(1), which states that an insurer “is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” This section of the no-fault act was not altered by the 2019 amendment, nor does this language convey that a healthcare provider’s claim should be treated differently.2 Plaintiff’s reliance on Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588 ; 648 NW2d 591 (2002), is also misplaced.

2022The causation requirement outlined in Griffith, 472 Mich at 531 , was derived from the language of MCL 500.3105(1), which states that an insurer “is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” This section of the no-fault act was not altered by the 2019 amendment, nor does this language convey that a healthcare provider’s claim should be treated differently.2 Plaintiff’s reliance on Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588 ; 648 NW2d 591 (2002), is also misplaced.

2020In support of its argument, defendant relies on Univ of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr v Nassar, 570 US 338, 342-343 ; 133 S Ct 2517 ; 186 L Ed 2d 503 (2013), in which the Supreme Court was asked to consider the causation standard applicable to claims of unlawful employer retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq.

2020In support of its argument, defendant relies on Univ of Texas Southwestern Med Ctr v Nassar, 570 US 338, 342-343 ; 133 S Ct 2517 ; 186 L Ed 2d 503 (2013), in which the Supreme Court was asked to consider the causation standard applicable to claims of unlawful employer retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq.

2020We initially note that we are not addressing statutory demands comparable to those to 4 On application for leave, our Supreme Court originally vacated this specific legal proposition set forth in Scott. 482 Mich 1074 (2008).

2020In Associated Builders & Contractors v Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 191-192 ; 880 NW2d 765 (2016), our Supreme Court cautioned this Court from “anticipatorily ignor[ing]” decisions from the Michigan Supreme Court, even if more recent developments in the law have “undercut the foundation” on which a case has stood.

2020In Associated Builders & Contractors v Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 191-192 ; 880 NW2d 765 (2016), our Supreme Court cautioned this Court from “anticipatorily ignor[ing]” decisions from the Michigan Supreme Court, even if more recent developments in the law have “undercut the foundation” on which a case has stood.

2019Assuming that the box truck was being used as a motor vehicle at the time of plaintiff’s injury, we conclude—as will be explained—that here was not a sufficient causal connection between plaintiff’s injury and the use of the box truck as a motor vehicle. -3- Similarly, this Court held in Mueller v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 203 Mich App 86, 90-91 ; 512 NW2d 46 (1993), that an injury was not more than but for, incidental, or fortuitous when an occupant of a pickup truck was struck by a stray bullet during firearm deer hunting season.

2019Assuming that the box truck was being used as a motor vehicle at the time of plaintiff’s injury, we conclude—as will be explained—that here was not a sufficient causal connection between plaintiff’s injury and the use of the box truck as a motor vehicle. -3- Similarly, this Court held in Mueller v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 203 Mich App 86, 90-91 ; 512 NW2d 46 (1993), that an injury was not more than but for, incidental, or fortuitous when an occupant of a pickup truck was struck by a stray bullet during firearm deer hunting season.

2018West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) (“Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.”).2 1 It is immaterial whether Mitchell was “laid off” or “terminated.” Michigan caselaw has recognized both outright termination, see Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 277 , and being “laid off and not recalled,” see Chiles, 238 Mich App at 470 , as adverse employment actions. 2 West involved an employer’s retaliatory discrimination against an employee fo

2018More recently, however, the Supreme Court has clarified that an ADEA plaintiff must demonstrate that his "age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action." Michigan courts, on the other hand, have held that [a CRA] plaintiff can prove discrimination if his age was merely a "motivating," or "determining factor in the employer's decision." [ Lewis v. Detroit , 702 Fed.Appx. 274 , 278 (C.A. 6, 2017) (citations omitted).] I recognize, of course, that in cases concerning interpretation of the CRA, we are not bound to follow federal caselaw interpreting a federal antidiscrimi

2018West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 186 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) (“Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.”).2 1 It is immaterial whether Mitchell was “laid off” or “terminated.” Michigan caselaw has recognized both outright termination, see Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 277 , and being “laid off and not recalled,” see Chiles, 238 Mich App at 470 , as adverse employment actions. 2 West involved an employer’s retaliatory discrimination against an employee fo

2017In McCarthy v Allstate Ins Co, the Court of Appeals, after quoting the same passage from Shellenberger, observed that “the movements that [the claimant] made to lift [a box of pasties]— twisting, turning, reaching behind her, attempting to lift the box—could have occurred in 40 See note 36 of this opinion. 41 Shellenberger, 182 Mich App at 605 . 42 See Thornton, 425 Mich at 643 . 14 her home, her place of work, and ‘countless other settings where no-fault insurance does not attach.’ ” 43 The McCarthy Court held that the causation requirement was not satisfied, stating as follows: We therefore

2017We recognized as much in McKenzie, when we instructed that “what constitutes use of a motor vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle’ also figures in a causation analysis, i.e., whether an injury’s relation to the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than but for, incidental, and fortuitous.” McKenzie, 458 Mich at 222 n 8, quoting Thornton, 454 Mich at 661 (quotation marks omitted).