Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
16 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caldwell v. John Morrell & Co.green2 sentences2002This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather, the employee must show that [her] employment was “a contributing factor ” to [her] injury- 489 N.W.2d 353, 358 (S.D.1992) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 2000“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [his] injury.” Id. (citing Caldwell, 489 N.W.2d at 358 ) (emphasis in original). | 5 | 7 |
Kester v. Colonial Manor of Custergreen2 sentences2002"This causation requirement *588 does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a 'contributing factor' to [his] injury." Gilchrist, 2000 SD 68 at ¶ 7 , 612 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting Kester, 1997 SD 127 at ¶ 17 , 571 N.W.2d at 380 (additional citation omitted)) (alterations and emphasis in original). [¶ 14.] As recognized by Department and the circuit court in this case, the medical evidence does establish that Arends suffered work-related injuries. 2002"This causation requirement *588 does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a 'contributing factor' to [his] injury." Gilchrist, 2000 SD 68 at ¶ 7 , 612 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting Kester, 1997 SD 127 at ¶ 17 , 571 N.W.2d at 380 (additional citation omitted)) (alterations and emphasis in original). [¶ 14.] As recognized by Department and the circuit court in this case, the medical evidence does establish that Arends suffered work-related injuries. | 2 | 3 |
Sudrla v. Commercial Asphalt & Materialsgreen2 sentences1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen 1995Caldwell, 489 N.W.2d at 358 ; Sudrla v. Commercial Asphalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D.1991). | 2 | 3 |
Jewett v. Real Tuff, Inc.green2 sentences2020Causation under SDCL 62-1-(7)(b) [¶23.] Under the causation standard set out in SDCL 62-1-1(7)(b), “[t]he question is whether th[e] work-related injury remained a major contributing cause -9- #28824 . . . .” Jewett, 2011 S.D. 33, ¶ 22 , 800 N.W.2d at 350 . “[P]roof of causation ‘must be established to a reasonable degree of medical probability, not just possibility.’” Id. ¶ 23, 800 N.W.2d at 350 (quoting Darling v. W. 2020Causation under SDCL 62-1-(7)(b) [¶23.] Under the causation standard set out in SDCL 62-1-1(7)(b), “[t]he question is whether th[e] work-related injury remained a major contributing cause -9- #28824 . . . .” Jewett, 2011 S.D. 33, ¶ 22 , 800 N.W.2d at 350 . “[P]roof of causation ‘must be established to a reasonable degree of medical probability, not just possibility.’” Id. ¶ 23, 800 N.W.2d at 350 (quoting Darling v. W. | 1 | 1 |
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlifegreen2 sentences2006Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 , 112 S.Ct. at 2136 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364 (citations omitted). [2] [¶ 29.] Furthermore, Landowners bore the burden of proving the causation requirement of standing "in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. *143 (citations omitted). 2006Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 , 112 S.Ct. at 2136 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 364 (citations omitted). [2] [¶ 29.] Furthermore, Landowners bore the burden of proving the causation requirement of standing "in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. *143 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Horn v. Dakota Porkgreen2 sentences2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 | 1 | 1 |
Tischler v. United Parcel Servicegreen2 sentences1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen 1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen | 1 | 1 |
Therkildsen v. Fisher Beveragegreen2 sentences1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen 1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen | 1 | 1 |
Lawler v. Windmill Restaurantgreen1 sentence1997“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ’ to [her] injury.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in original) (citing Sudrla v. Commercial As phalt & Materials, 465 N.W.2d 620, 621 (S.D. 1991)) (other citations omitted); see also Tischler v. United Parcel Serv., 1996 SD 98, ¶ 27 , 552 N.W.2d 597, 602 . [¶ 18.] “ ’Issues of causation in worker’s compensation eases are factual issues that are best determined by the Departmen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gilchrist v. Trail King Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002"This causation requirement *588 does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a 'contributing factor' to [his] injury." Gilchrist, 2000 SD 68 at ¶ 7 , 612 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting Kester, 1997 SD 127 at ¶ 17 , 571 N.W.2d at 380 (additional citation omitted)) (alterations and emphasis in original). [¶ 14.] As recognized by Department and the circuit court in this case, the medical evidence does establish that Arends suffered work-related injuries. 2002“This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [her] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [her] injury; rather the employee must show that [her] employment was a ‘contributing factor ‘ to [her] injury.” Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 583 (citing Gilchrist v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 2000 SD 68, ¶ 7 , 612 N.W.2d 1, 4 .) [¶ 20.] The parties do not dispute that Brown’s injury arose out of the course of her employment. | 3 | 2002–2002 |
Arends v. Dacotah Cement
green
2 sentences2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Darling v. West River Masonry, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020River Masonry, Inc., 2010 S.D. 4 , ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d 363, 367 ). [¶24.] Here, the record contains uncontroverted evidence of Armstrong’s pre- existing degenerative osteoarthritis as it grew worse in the years leading up to the March 31 injury. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Martz v. Hills Materials
green
2 sentences2020Under SDCL 62-1-1(7)(c), “the applicable causation requirement is dependent on whether a second work-related injury contributed independently to -12- #28824 the worker’s current impairment, disability, or need for treatment.” Martz, 2014 S.D. 83, ¶ 25 , 857 N.W.2d at 420 . 2020Under SDCL 62-1-1(7)(c), “the applicable causation requirement is dependent on whether a second work-related injury contributed independently to -12- #28824 the worker’s current impairment, disability, or need for treatment.” Martz, 2014 S.D. 83, ¶ 25 , 857 N.W.2d at 420 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
King v. Graham
green
1 sentence2011(Emphasis added.) “Therefore, to recover for malicious prosecution when the decision to prosecute is within another’s discretion, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that that decision would not have been made but for the false information supplied by the defendant.” King, 126 S.W.3d at 78 . [¶ 13.] Because Danielson carried the trial burden of proving causation, the question is whether he identified any specific facts suggesting that Fitzgerald’s decision to prosecute would not have been made but for the allegedly false and incomplete information. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
green
2 sentences2006Thus, the manner and degree of proof necessary for Landowners to sustain their standing burden changed from the outset when they alleged a takings claim to the final disposition when they were required to prove that claim: At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." [ Lujan v. ] National Wildlife Federation, supra, 497 U.S. [871] at 889, 110 S.Ct. [3177] at 3189[. 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)]. 2006Thus, the manner and degree of proof necessary for Landowners to sustain their standing burden changed from the outset when they alleged a takings claim to the final disposition when they were required to prove that claim: At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we “presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” [Lujan v.] National Wildlife Federation, supra, 497 U.S. [871] at 889, 110 S.Ct. [3177] at 3189[, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)]. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Northeastern Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2006The causation requirement in Portsmouth II, is often referred to as the "natural, probable consequence test." Id. (citing Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355 ). 2006The causation requirement in Portsmouth II, is often referred to as the “natural, probable consequence test.” Id. (citing Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Brown v. Douglas School District
green
2 sentences2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 2006See also Horn v. Dakota Pork, 2006 SD 5, ¶ 14 , 709 N.W.2d 38, 41 (“Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained.”). “ ‘This causation requirement does not mean that the employee must prove that [his] employment was the proximate, direct, or sole cause of [his] injury; rather the employee must show that [his] employment was a ‘contributing factor 1 to [his] injury.’ ” Brown, 2002 SD 92, ¶ 19 , 650 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Arends v. Dacotah Cement, 2002 SD 57, ¶ 13 , 645 N.W.2d 5 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2006The causation requirement in Portsmouth II, is often referred to as the "natural, probable consequence test." Id. (citing Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355 ). 2006The causation requirement in Portsmouth II, is often referred to as the “natural, probable consequence test.” Id. (citing Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.