causation requirement in North Carolina

2019There are two general ways in which the amount of exposure impacts the Commission’s causation analysis: (1) Was the exposure sufficient to be a “significant causal factor” in the development of Plaintiffs’ alleged asbestosis; and (2) was the exposure “significantly greater” than the background environmental exposure.22 “[T]he ‘causative danger must be peculiar to the work and 22 “Significant means ‘having or likely to have influence or effect: deserving to be considered: important, weighty, notable.’ Significant is to be contrasted with negligible, unimportant, present but not worthy of note,

2019There are two general ways in which the amount of exposure impacts the Commission’s causation analysis: (1) Was the exposure sufficient to be a “significant causal factor” in the development of Plaintiffs’ alleged asbestosis; and (2) was the exposure “significantly greater” than the background environmental exposure.22 “[T]he ‘causative danger must be peculiar to the work and 22 “Significant means ‘having or likely to have influence or effect: deserving to be considered: important, weighty, notable.’ Significant is to be contrasted with negligible, unimportant, present but not worthy of note,

2014Id. at_, 748 S.E.2d at 348 (Geer, J., dissenting).

2014Id. at_, 748 S.E.2d at 348 (Geer, J., dissenting).

2013App. 491, 499 , 459 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1995)) A “link” between wage loss and the compensable injury is the causation requirement set out in the third prong of Hilliard , which is the basis for the conclusion reached by the Commission and the majority opinion.

2010LEXIS 4359 at *13 (holding that "as a result of" did not impose "a greater causation requirement than the `but for' causation applied by courts in cases with clauses using `arising out of'"); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 357 N.C. 149 , 579 S.E.2d 249 (2003), adopting the dissent from Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 146 N.C.App. 82, 88 , 551 S.E.2d 902, 906 (2001) ("In the common vernacular, the *747 phrases `but for,' ` because of, ' and `on account of' are used interchangeably.") (emphasis added); Warren v. Wilmington, 43 N.C.App. 748, 750 , 259 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1979) ("`Arising out

2010LEXIS 4359 at *13 (holding that "as a result of" did not impose "a greater causation requirement than the `but for' causation applied by courts in cases with clauses using `arising out of'"); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 357 N.C. 149 , 579 S.E.2d 249 (2003), adopting the dissent from Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 146 N.C.App. 82, 88 , 551 S.E.2d 902, 906 (2001) ("In the common vernacular, the *747 phrases `but for,' ` because of, ' and `on account of' are used interchangeably.") (emphasis added); Warren v. Wilmington, 43 N.C.App. 748, 750 , 259 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1979) ("`Arising out

2010LEXIS 4359 at *13 (holding that "as a result of" did not impose "a greater causation requirement than the `but for' causation applied by courts in cases with clauses using `arising out of'"); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 357 N.C. 149 , 579 S.E.2d 249 (2003), adopting the dissent from Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 146 N.C.App. 82, 88 , 551 S.E.2d 902, 906 (2001) ("In the common vernacular, the *747 phrases `but for,' ` because of, ' and `on account of' are used interchangeably.") (emphasis added); Warren v. Wilmington, 43 N.C.App. 748, 750 , 259 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1979) ("`Arising out

2010LEXIS 4359 at *13 (holding that "as a result of" did not impose "a greater causation requirement than the `but for' causation applied by courts in cases with clauses using `arising out of'"); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 357 N.C. 149 , 579 S.E.2d 249 (2003), adopting the dissent from Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 146 N.C.App. 82, 88 , 551 S.E.2d 902, 906 (2001) ("In the common vernacular, the *747 phrases `but for,' ` because of, ' and `on account of' are used interchangeably.") (emphasis added); Warren v. Wilmington, 43 N.C.App. 748, 750 , 259 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1979) ("`Arising out

2009See State v. Hardy, 67 N.C.

2005The causation requirement "is satisfied if the employment `significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease's development.'" Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 136 N.C.App. 351, 354 , 524 S.E.2d 368, 371 (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369-70 ), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 473 , 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000).

2005The causation requirement "is satisfied if the employment `significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease's development.'" Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 136 N.C.App. 351, 354 , 524 S.E.2d 368, 371 (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369-70 ), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 473 , 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000).

2000“The causation requirement is rigorous; it is not enough that the protected expression played a role or was a motivating factor in the retaliation; claimant must show that ‘but for’ the protected expression the employer would not have taken the alleged retaliatory action.” Huang v. Board of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1990).