causation requirement in Illinois

2019Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 891 . ¶ 17 In light of Burrage, defendant proposed modifying the causation instruction to read: “In order for you to find that the acts of the defendant caused the death of Augustina Taylor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act of delivering heroin and Augustina Taylor injecting that heroin was the proximate cause of her death and that her death did not result from a cause unconnected with Augustina Taylor’s injection of the heroin defendant delivered.

2019Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 891 . ¶ 17 In light of Burrage, defendant proposed modifying the causation instruction to read: “In order for you to find that the acts of the defendant caused the death of Augustina Taylor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s act of delivering heroin and Augustina Taylor injecting that heroin was the proximate cause of her death and that her death did not result from a cause unconnected with Augustina Taylor’s injection of the heroin defendant delivered.

2019The court stated that it could see counsel’s point and had wrestled with the issue itself, but ultimately decided not to modify the causation instruction to read “defendant’s act of delivering heroin.” The court explained that the appellate court had approved the use of IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (Supp. 2011) for use in drug-induced homicide cases in People v. Kidd, 2013 IL App (2d) 120088 , and the court was bound by that decision.

2018The court stated that it could see counsel's point and had wrestled with the issue itself, but ultimately decided not to modify the causation instruction to read "defendant's act of delivering heroin." The court explained that the appellate court had approved the use of IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (Supp 2011) for use in drug-induced homicide cases in People v. Kidd , 2013 IL App (2d) 120088 , 375 Ill.Dec. 323 , 997 N.E.2d 634 , and the court was bound by that decision.

2015The legislature provided different requirements for line-of-duty and occupational disease pensions, but the causation requirement under the Benefits - 11 - 2015 IL App (2d) 130920 Act is specifically set forth in section 10(b), but not 10(a), such that the differences are not relevant to identifying a catastrophic injury suffered in the line of duty under section 10(a). ¶ 35 The Krohe court held that any injury required for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4-110 of the Pension Code satisfies the “catastrophic injury” element of section 10(a) of the Benefits Act.

2015The legislature provided different requirements for line-of-duty and occupational disease pensions, but the causation requirement under the Benefits - 11 - 2015 IL App (2d) 130920 Act is specifically set forth in section 10(b), but not 10(a), such that the differences are not relevant to identifying a catastrophic injury suffered in the line of duty under section 10(a). ¶ 35 The Krohe court held that any injury required for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4-110 of the Pension Code satisfies the “catastrophic injury” element of section 10(a) of the Benefits Act.

2018The State cited People v. Griffith , 334 Ill.

2018The State cited People v. Griffith, 334 Ill.

2017Christman, 249 P.3d at 686-87 .

2017Christman, 249 P.3d at 686-87 .

2015The court found “no meaningful difference between the ‘line of duty’ standard in PEDA and the causation test in workers’ compensation claimsBthat the injury ‘arose out of and in the course of employment.’ ” Id. at 761 .

2015The court found “no meaningful difference between the ‘line of duty’ standard in PEDA and the causation test in workers’ compensation claimsBthat the injury ‘arose out of and in the course of employment.’ ” 19 1-14-1350 Id. at 761 .

2014The court noted that “[i]t was never established that being a professional football player or being a mechanical engineer gave [the expert] the expertise to analyze the cause of a football injury, and no testimony was given to indicate that he ever utilized engineering skills to determine the causation factors of football injuries.” Galindo, 107 Ill.

2014The court noted that “[i]t was never established that being a professional football player or being a mechanical engineer gave [the expert] the expertise to analyze the cause of a football injury, and no testimony was given to indicate that he ever utilized engineering skills to determine the causation factors of football injuries.” Galindo, 107 Ill.

2010In Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill.

2010In Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill.

2007Vaughn, 217 Ill.

2007Rather the evidence is sufficient if it affords the jury a reasonable basis to conclude that the negligence was “probably” or “more likely than not” a cause of the death. ***’ While Hare involved medical malpractice, the same causation analysis applies to the instant case because both cases were filed under the Act.” (Emphasis added.) Vaughn, 217 Ill.

2002We explained: "In order for a plaintiff to recover for a violation of Rule 10(b)-5, the great majority of Federal courts require plaintiffs to show two types of causation: (1) transaction causation; and (2) loss causation. [Citation.] Transaction causation has been defined as meaning that the investor would not have engaged in the transaction had the other party made truthful statements at the time required.' [Citation.] Loss causation, on the other hand, has been defined as meaning `that the investor would not have suffered a loss if the facts were what he believed them to be.' * * * We find

2002We explained: “In order for a plaintiff to recover for a violation of Rule 10(b) — 5, the great majority of Federal courts require plaintiffs to show two types of causation: (1) transaction causation; and (2) loss causation. [Citation.] Transaction causation has been defined as meaning that ‘the investor would not have engaged in the transaction had the other party made truthful statements at the time required.’ [Citation.] Loss causation, on the other hand, has been defined as meaning ‘that the investor would not have suffered a loss if the facts were what he believed them to be.’ We find Ill

2025This comports with our interpretation of Robbins, namely, that the Robbins court was primarily concerned with the appellate court’s decision to 3 While the Board suggests that Kelly v. Retirement Board of Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 210483 , supports its interpretation, that case concerned the source of the plaintiff’s disability, not the causal analysis at issue here, and its discussion of Robbins occurred in that context. 4 The only case which even arguably addresses the Robbins court’s causation analysis is Marquardt v. City of Des Plaines, 2018

2025This comports with our interpretation of Robbins, namely, that the Robbins court was primarily concerned with the appellate court’s decision to 3 While the Board suggests that Kelly v. Retirement Board of Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 210483 , supports its interpretation, that case concerned the source of the plaintiff’s disability, not the causal analysis at issue here, and its discussion of Robbins occurred in that context. 4 The only case which even arguably addresses the Robbins court’s causation analysis is Marquardt v. City of Des Plaines, 2018

2025The 23 No. 1-23-1381 reviewing court pointed out that the plaintiffs’ approach to causation was “simply inconsistent with governing Supreme Court and Federal Circuit authority, particularly in flooding cases,” and that authority determined that “the causation analysis must consider the impact of the entirety of government actions that address the relevant risk.” Id. at 1364 .

2021Id. - 10 - No. 1-17-3182 ¶ 44 This case is different than King and Morley in many key respects, but the one that matters for the causation inquiry is this: Here, Driver did not take the fifth, nor at any point did he say— at least on the record—that he changed his mind and was no longer willing to testify for the defense in this case.

2020Id. at 711-12 .

2020Thus, nothing about this instruction improperly undermined Mr. Peacock’s defense. ¶ 56 Mr. Peacock points out that in Pinkney, we recognized that “the cases that are cited by the committee suggest that the instruction was created to be given where an intervening and alternative explanation for the cause of death is argued by the defense.” Pinkney, 322 Ill.

2020Prawdzik v. Board of Trustees of the Homer Township Fire Protection District Pension Fund, 2019 IL App (3d) 170024, ¶ 40 ; Scepurek v. Board of Trustees of the Northbrook Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27 ; Village of Oak Park v. Village of Oak Park Firefighters Pension Board, 362 Ill.

2020Prawdzik v. Board of Trustees of the Homer Township Fire Protection District Pension Fund, 2019 IL App (3d) 170024, ¶ 40 ; Scepurek v. Board of Trustees of the Northbrook Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 27 ; Village of Oak Park v. Village of Oak Park Firefighters Pension Board, 362 Ill.

2018The court stated that it could see counsel's point and had wrestled with the issue itself, but ultimately decided not to modify the causation instruction to read "defendant's act of delivering heroin." The court explained that the appellate court had approved the use of IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (Supp 2011) for use in drug-induced homicide cases in People v. Kidd , 2013 IL App (2d) 120088 , 375 Ill.Dec. 323 , 997 N.E.2d 634 , and the court was bound by that decision.

2017In Kidd, the only Illinois opinion - 24 - 2017 IL App (2d) 141143 construing the causation requirement specifically in the former context, the State alleged that the defendant knowingly delivered cocaine to his girlfriend and that she later ingested it, which caused her death.

2017(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Domagala , 2013 IL 113688 , ¶ 39, 370 Ill.Dec. 1 , 987 N.E.2d 767 . ¶ 54 Once Dr. Day's testimony was given at trial, if the defense felt that "ample evidence to support a causation defense" had been presented, as defendant now claims, it could have approached the judge upon the close of the evidence and requested permission to argue to the jury that the *230 State had failed to prove causation based on the "ample evidence" that had been unknown at the time the judge made his ruling on the motion in limine in December 2013.

2014Mars, 2012 IL App (2d) 110695, ¶ 19 .

2012The instruction tendered in the case sub judice stated “the death of an -9- individual results as a direct and foreseeable consequence of a chain of events set into motion by his commission of the offense of attempt to commit aggravated vehicular hijacking” whereas in Hudson, the instruction stated that defendant “sets in motion a chain of events which cause the death of an individual.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 397 .