causation analysis in Maryland

2014This prong “triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 .

2014This prong “triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 .

2022In order to satisfy the causation requirement inherent in the statute, a defendant’s wrongful act must be the proximate cause of the decedent’s death; in other words, a plaintiff must establish that it is “more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence caused the alleged injury.” Marcantonio v. Moen, 406 Md. 395, 415 , 959 A.2d 764, 776 (2008) (citations omitted).

2022In order to satisfy the causation requirement inherent in the statute, a defendant’s wrongful act must be the proximate cause of the decedent’s death; in other words, a plaintiff must establish that it is “more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence caused the alleged injury.” Marcantonio v. Moen, 406 Md. 395, 415 , 959 A.2d 764, 776 (2008) (citations omitted).

2008“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38 , 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating officer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52, 703 A.2d 1267 (ho

2007“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38, 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating offi *301 cer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson v. State, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52 , 70

2007“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38, 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating offi *301 cer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson v. State, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52 , 70

2007“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38, 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating offi *301 cer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson v. State, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52 , 70

2014As such, Ross recalibrated the causation analysis to (re-)focus it on the quality of the evidence the parties marshal rather than the existence vel non or qualifications of experts. 213 Md.App. at 608-09 , 75 A.3d 327 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

2014As such, Ross recalibrated the causation analysis to (re-)focus it on the quality of the evidence the parties marshal rather than the existence vel non or qualifications of experts. 213 Md.App. at 608-09 , 75 A.3d 327 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

2014Notwithstanding, where a plaintiff relies on the inferences generated by circumstantial evidence, “we require [those] inferences to be sound logically, and we refuse to allow a jury of laymen to engage in ‘guess work, speculation and conjecture.’ ” Hamilton , slip op. at 26 *478 (quoting Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm., 280 Md. 91, 101 , 185 A.2d 715 (1962)).

2013Because the plaintiffs evidence in Dow could have, if believed, established that “chipping and peeling paint inside the [subject property] was the only possible source of Dow’s lead poisoning,” id. at 76 , 796 A.2d 139 , we had held in that case that summary judgment was improper. 9 Against that backdrop, the Ross opinion then explained how its holding drove the causation analysis on remand: [I]t may well be that, once the parties have marshaled the evidence without the expert opinion on source, it is clear which facts are disputed and which are not, and the limits of the inferences in plainti

2013The discussion that followed reviewed the evolution of lead paint cases examining the question of causation, starting with Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994), see Ross, 430 Md. at 667-68 , 63 A.3d 1 , and likening the causation analysis to links in a chain: The theory of causation presented in this case can be conceived of as a series of links: (1) the link between the defendant’s property and the plaintiffs exposure to lead; (2) the link between specific exposure to lead and the elevated blood lead levels, and (3) the link between those blood lead levels and the injuri

2013The discussion that followed reviewed the evolution of lead paint cases examining the question of causation, starting with Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994), see Ross, 430 Md. at 667-68 , 63 A.3d 1 , and likening the causation analysis to links in a chain: The theory of causation presented in this case can be conceived of as a series of links: (1) the link between the defendant’s property and the plaintiffs exposure to lead; (2) the link between specific exposure to lead and the elevated blood lead levels, and (3) the link between those blood lead levels and the injuri

2013Shortly before Ross , we had reconsidered the “probability” test in Taylor , which affirmed summary judgment based on thé defendants’ motion to exclude expert testimony and the trial court’s subsequent conclusion that there was “no factual basis” for the opinion of the expert (again a pediatrician opining that lead-based paint at the subject property caused plaintiffs injury). 10 207 Md.App. at 147 , 51 A.3d 743 .

2013Shortly before Ross , we had reconsidered the “probability” test in Taylor , which affirmed summary judgment based on thé defendants’ motion to exclude expert testimony and the trial court’s subsequent conclusion that there was “no factual basis” for the opinion of the expert (again a pediatrician opining that lead-based paint at the subject property caused plaintiffs injury). 10 207 Md.App. at 147 , 51 A.3d 743 .

2011Co., 335 U.S. 520, 523-24 , 69 S.Ct. 275 , 93 L.Ed. 208 (1949) and Rogers v. Missouri Pac.

2011Co., 335 U.S. 520, 523-24 , 69 S.Ct. 275 , 93 L.Ed. 208 (1949) and Rogers v. Missouri Pac.

2011This causation analysis is consistent with the decisions in Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160 , 359 A.2d 548 (1976), and Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd.

2011This causation analysis is consistent with the decisions in Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160 , 359 A.2d 548 (1976), and Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd.

2010Young Co., 245 Md. 277 , 225 A.2d 865 (1967) (unreasonable refusal to undergo surgery is an intervening cause). *582 Despite the fact that this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously recognized that the causation standard is broader in workers’ compensation cases, appellees contend that “this is simply not true.” Instead, appellees cite Board of Trustees v. Powell, 78 Md.App. at 568, 554 A.2d 440 , for the proposition that there must be “a definite causal connection between the injury and the job,” therefore “this standard is the same in both workers’ compensation cases and negligence

2010Young Co., 245 Md. 277 , 225 A.2d 865 (1967) (unreasonable refusal to undergo surgery is an intervening cause). *582 Despite the fact that this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously recognized that the causation standard is broader in workers’ compensation cases, appellees contend that “this is simply not true.” Instead, appellees cite Board of Trustees v. Powell, 78 Md.App. at 568, 554 A.2d 440 , for the proposition that there must be “a definite causal connection between the injury and the job,” therefore “this standard is the same in both workers’ compensation cases and negligence

2010We further recognized that, in the later case of Moller Motor Car Co. v. Unger, 166 Md. 198 , 170 A. 777 (1934), the Court of Appeals “added a bit” to the causation standard, stating, “[o]f course, such possibility must amount to more than a guess, and the relation of the accident to the death or condition complained of, in point of time and circumstance, must not be merely fanciful.’ ” Id. (citing Moller Motor Car, 166 Md. at 206 , 170 A. 777 ).

2010We further recognized that, in the later case of Moller Motor Car Co. v. Unger, 166 Md. 198 , 170 A. 777 (1934), the Court of Appeals “added a bit” to the causation standard, stating, “[o]f course, such possibility must amount to more than a guess, and the relation of the accident to the death or condition complained of, in point of time and circumstance, must not be merely fanciful.’ ” Id. (citing Moller Motor Car, 166 Md. at 206 , 170 A. 777 ).

2010Thus, the only contested issue was the causal relationship between the accident and the left knee condition. *578 In support of his contention that the causation instruction was erroneous, appellant directs our attention to Continental Group v. Coppage, 58 Md.App. 184 , 472 A.2d 1014 (1984), a case in which this Court had occasion to review the evolution of the standard of causation in workers’ compensation cases.

2010Thus, the only contested issue was the causal relationship between the accident and the left knee condition. *578 In support of his contention that the causation instruction was erroneous, appellant directs our attention to Continental Group v. Coppage, 58 Md.App. 184 , 472 A.2d 1014 (1984), a case in which this Court had occasion to review the evolution of the standard of causation in workers’ compensation cases.

2010Young Co., 245 Md. 277 , 225 A.2d 865 (1967) (unreasonable refusal to undergo surgery is an intervening cause). *582 Despite the fact that this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously recognized that the causation standard is broader in workers’ compensation cases, appellees contend that “this is simply not true.” Instead, appellees cite Board of Trustees v. Powell, 78 Md.App. at 568, 554 A.2d 440 , for the proposition that there must be “a definite causal connection between the injury and the job,” therefore “this standard is the same in both workers’ compensation cases and negligence

2010Young Co., 245 Md. 277 , 225 A.2d 865 (1967) (unreasonable refusal to undergo surgery is an intervening cause). *582 Despite the fact that this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously recognized that the causation standard is broader in workers’ compensation cases, appellees contend that “this is simply not true.” Instead, appellees cite Board of Trustees v. Powell, 78 Md.App. at 568, 554 A.2d 440 , for the proposition that there must be “a definite causal connection between the injury and the job,” therefore “this standard is the same in both workers’ compensation cases and negligence

2010Further, we explained that the Court of Appeals again had occasion to address the issue of causation in workers’ compensation cases in Paul Construction Co. v. Powell, 200 Md. 168, 181 , 88 A.2d 837 (1952), where the Court compared the standard to proximate cause in tort cases.

2010Further, we explained that the Court of Appeals again had occasion to address the issue of causation in workers’ compensation cases in Paul Construction Co. v. Powell, 200 Md. 168, 181 , 88 A.2d 837 (1952), where the Court compared the standard to proximate cause in tort cases.

2006The plaintiff was rendered paralyzed by the surgery... .The court went on to establish a two-pronged causation inquiry that required the plaintiff to prove, first, “that the additional undisclosed risk posed by defendant’s true level of qualifica *419 tions and experience increased plaintiffs risk of paralysis from the corpectomy procedure,” and second, “whether that substantially increased risk would cause a reasonably prudent person not to consent to undergo the procedure.” 800 A.2d at 84-85 .

1998In that vein, the Court repeated the following admonition it had first stated in Balbos : “[N]o supplier enjoys a causation defense solely on the ground that the plaintiff would probably have suffered the same disease from inhaling fibers originating from the products of other -[identified] suppliers.” Asner, 344 Md. at 175 , 686 A.2d 250 (quoting Balbos, 326 Md. at 209 , 604 A.2d 445 ) (emphasis supplied by Asner Court).

1998In that vein, the Court repeated the following admonition it had first stated in Balbos : “[N]o supplier enjoys a causation defense solely on the ground that the plaintiff would probably have suffered the same disease from inhaling fibers originating from the products of other -[identified] suppliers.” Asner, 344 Md. at 175 , 686 A.2d 250 (quoting Balbos, 326 Md. at 209 , 604 A.2d 445 ) (emphasis supplied by Asner Court).

1977In several jurisdictions, the causation requirement has been a formidable barrier to recovery, which has prevented a finding of liability against the agent or broker unless the client is able to clearly show that were it not for the agent’s negligence, he would have been issued a valid policy which would have *656 protected him against the loss which he suffered.” (Footnote omitted.) MacDonald v. Carpenter & Pelton, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 952, 298 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1969); Pacific Dredging Co. v. Hurley, 65 Wash. 2d 394 , 397 P. 2d 819 (1964).

1977In several jurisdictions, the causation requirement has been a formidable barrier to recovery, which has prevented a finding of liability against the agent or broker unless the client is able to clearly show that were it not for the agent’s negligence, he would have been issued a valid policy which would have *656 protected him against the loss which he suffered.” (Footnote omitted.) MacDonald v. Carpenter & Pelton, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 952, 298 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1969); Pacific Dredging Co. v. Hurley, 65 Wash. 2d 394 , 397 P. 2d 819 (1964).

1977In several jurisdictions, the causation requirement has been a formidable barrier to recovery, which has prevented a finding of liability against the agent or broker unless the client is able to clearly show that were it not for the agent’s negligence, he would have been issued a valid policy which would have *656 protected him against the loss which he suffered.” (Footnote omitted.) MacDonald v. Carpenter & Pelton, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 952, 298 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1969); Pacific Dredging Co. v. Hurley, 65 Wash. 2d 394 , 397 P. 2d 819 (1964).