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24 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaCaze v. Colliergreen2 sentences2010In a no consent case that involves no physical damages, "the usual causation inquiry into whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have consented if he or she had known of the risk that materialized is not applicable.” Lugenbuhl , 96-1575 at p. 14, 701 So.2d at 455, n. 9 ; LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So.2d 1039, 1040, n. 1 (La.6/17/83)(noting that in a case where the plaintiff alleges there has been no consent, the law requires only proof of a material risk that was not disclosed and the occurrence of that risk.) . 1984The causation test was outlined by the Supreme Court in LaCaze v. Collier, supra, as follows: Lack of valid consent gives rise to an action for damages. | 3 | 4 |
Jones v. Trailorgreen2 sentences2019See Jones v. Trailor , 1993-2144 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94) , 636 So.2d 1112 , 1118. 2019See Jones v. Trailor , 1993-2144 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94) , 636 So.2d 1112 , 1118. | 2 | 2 |
Lugenbuhl v. Dowlinggreen2 sentences2010In a no consent case that involves no physical damages, "the usual causation inquiry into whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have consented if he or she had known of the risk that materialized is not applicable.” Lugenbuhl , 96-1575 at p. 14, 701 So.2d at 455, n. 9 ; LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So.2d 1039, 1040, n. 1 (La.6/17/83)(noting that in a case where the plaintiff alleges there has been no consent, the law requires only proof of a material risk that was not disclosed and the occurrence of that risk.) . 2005However, in a no-consent case that involves no physical damages, "the usual causation inquiry into whether a reasonable person in the patient's position would have consented if he or she had known of the risk that materialized is not applicable.. . ." Lugenbuhl, supra . | 1 | 4 |
Jenkins v. Sonat Offshore USA Inc.green2 sentences2004See Jenkins v. Sonat Offshore U.S.A., Inc., *488 96-2504 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97) , 705 So.2d 1184, 1187 . 2004Jenkins v. Sonat Offshore U.S.A., Inc., 96-2504, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 705 So.2d 1184, 1187 . | 1 | 2 |
McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of La., Inc.green1 sentence1997Because the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a common character of their claims, we cannot say that certification of a class action would achieve "economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural *1173 fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., 456 So.2d 612, 616 (La.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Companygreen2 sentences1990We quote from Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1975): ... [T]he line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular defendant? *917 Canizaro , at 287, citing Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1971). 1990We quote from Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1975): ... [T]he line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular defendant? *917 Canizaro , at 287, citing Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Buckleygreen1 sentence1986Victim fault was recognized as a defense to a C.C. 2321 strict liability action in Holland v. Buckley, supra at 117-18. | 1 | 1 |
Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc.green2 sentences1985(Brackets supplied.) In Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626, 633 (La.1982), Calogero, J., for the Court, stated the causation requirement, in part, as follows: For the heart accident to arise out of or be connected with the employment, the exertion[,] stress or strain, acting upon the pre-existing disease, must be of a degree greater than that generated in every-day non-employment life (e.g., as compared to the more or less sedentary life of the average non-worker). ... [I]f the activities in which the worker with a pre-existing heart disease is engaged, whether for his jo 1985(Brackets supplied.) Guidry, supra, at 633 , makes it clear that the burden of proving the causal link between the employment and the accident has not been altered. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zimko v. American Cyanamid
green
2 sentences2015Zimko v. American Cyanamid, 2003-0658, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905 So.2d 465, 485 , writ denied, 2005-2102 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 538 . 2006Zimko v. American Cyanamid , XXXX-XXXX, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905 So.2d 465, 485 , writ denied, 2005-2102 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 538 . | 2 | 2006–2015 |
Zimko v. American Cyanamid
green
2 sentences2015Zimko v. American Cyanamid, 2003-0658, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905 So.2d 465, 485 , writ denied, 2005-2102 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 538 . 2006Zimko v. American Cyanamid , XXXX-XXXX, p. 26 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905 So.2d 465, 485 , writ denied, 2005-2102 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 538 . | 2 | 2006–2015 |
State v. Small
green
1 sentence2017However, in Small, the Supreme Court was generally addressing the type of causal connection the State must show between a defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death for a defendant to be criminally culpable “where multiple causes led to the death.” Small, 100 So.3d at 812 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
1 sentence2002The plaintiff's burden of proof of causation in a personal injury case was set forth by our Supreme Court in Maranto v. Good-year Tire & Rubber Co., 94-2603, p. 3 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 757, 759 , as follows: In a personal injury suit, plaintiff bears the burden of proving a causal relationship between the injury sustained and the accident which caused the injury. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
cluster 718203
green
2 sentences1997Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.... ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2250 (citing 83 F.3d 610, 626 ). 1997These factors were highlighted by the Third Circuit "[i]n contrast to mass torts involving a single accident." The Court did find that "mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement." Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Charles D. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997As the Fifth Circuit indicated in Gautreaux, 107 F.3d 331 , the Jones Act contains a liberal causation requirement. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
green
1 sentence1997Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.... ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2250 (citing 83 F.3d 610, 626 ). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Barry Brister and Karen Brister, Cross-Appellees v. A.W.I., Inc., Cross-Appellants
green
1 sentence1995Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir.1991), rehearing denied, 949 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brister (Barry, Karen) v. A.W.I., Inc
neutral
1 sentence1995Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir.1991), rehearing denied, 949 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Sinitiere v. Lavergne
green
1 sentence1990Sinitiere v. Lavergne, supra ; Fowler v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., supra . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,213 Hill York Corporation v. American International Franchises, Inc., Gurn H. Freeman
green
1 sentence1990We quote from Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1975): ... [T]he line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular defendant? *917 Canizaro , at 287, citing Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
George Brown v. Harlan E. O'leary, the First National Bank of Hereford, Hereford, Texas, and William P. Maroski
green
1 sentence1990We quote from Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.La.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1975): ... [T]he line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of this particular defendant? *917 Canizaro , at 287, citing Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mitchell v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin
neutral
1 sentence1988Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973); Mitchell v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 341 So.2d 35 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied 342 So.2d 1121 (Watson, J., concurring); Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 724 (La.1988). [3] The record does not indicate any employment requirement that plaintiff had to be treated by the company doctor. [4] From the standpoint of a normal causation analysis in tort cases, the tort liability of the original tortfeasor extends to a worsening of the initial injury by negligent medical treatment, because the risk in | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Company
green
1 sentence1988Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973); Mitchell v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 341 So.2d 35 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied 342 So.2d 1121 (Watson, J., concurring); Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 724 (La.1988). [3] The record does not indicate any employment requirement that plaintiff had to be treated by the company doctor. [4] From the standpoint of a normal causation analysis in tort cases, the tort liability of the original tortfeasor extends to a worsening of the initial injury by negligent medical treatment, because the risk in | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Raybol v. Louisiana State University
green
1 sentence1988Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973); Mitchell v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 341 So.2d 35 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied 342 So.2d 1121 (Watson, J., concurring); Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 724 (La.1988). [3] The record does not indicate any employment requirement that plaintiff had to be treated by the company doctor. [4] From the standpoint of a normal causation analysis in tort cases, the tort liability of the original tortfeasor extends to a worsening of the initial injury by negligent medical treatment, because the risk in | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mitchell v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1988Lisonbee v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So.2d 5 (La.1973); Mitchell v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 341 So.2d 35 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied 342 So.2d 1121 (Watson, J., concurring); Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 724 (La.1988). [3] The record does not indicate any employment requirement that plaintiff had to be treated by the company doctor. [4] From the standpoint of a normal causation analysis in tort cases, the tort liability of the original tortfeasor extends to a worsening of the initial injury by negligent medical treatment, because the risk in | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.