causation requirement in New Mexico

2002See State v. Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 (noting but for causation in the language "without which the death would not have occurred"); Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 14.02[A], at 182-183 (3d ed.2001) (describing factual causation's role in the causation analysis and explaining how factual causation is explained by the but for test).

2002See State v. Muñoz, 1998-NMSC-041, ¶ 22 , 126 N.M. 371 , 970 P.2d 143 (noting but for causation in the language "without which the death would not have occurred"); Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 14.02[A], at 182-183 (3d ed.2001) (describing factual causation's role in the causation analysis and explaining how factual causation is explained by the but for test).

2018Co. v. Klug , 415 N.W.2d 876 , 878 (Minn. 1987) : [A] court first considers whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between the use of the uninsured vehicle and the resulting harm.

1995Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987) (stating that the causation standard for recovery under an uninsured motorist policy is " ‘something less than proximate cause in the tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury’ ”) (quoting Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins.

2014See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-28(B) (1987) (“In all cases where the employer or his 10 insurance carrier deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct result of the 11 accident, the worker must establish that causal connection as a probability by expert 12 testimony of a health care provider . . . testifying within the area of his expertise.”); 13 Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Associates, Inc., 1982-NMCA-109 , ¶ 14, 98 N.M. 379 , 14 648 P.2d 1192 (“This causation requirement applies to any claim for worker’s 15 compensation[.]”).

2014See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-28(B) (1987) (“In all cases where the employer or his 10 insurance carrier deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct result of the 11 accident, the worker must establish that causal connection as a probability by expert 12 testimony of a health care provider . . . testifying within the area of his expertise.”); 13 Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Associates, Inc., 1982-NMCA-109 , ¶ 14, 98 N.M. 379 , 14 648 P.2d 1192 (“This causation requirement applies to any claim for worker’s 15 compensation[.]”).

2024See Sandoval v. Gurley Properties Ltd., 2022-NMCA-004, ¶ 11 , 503 P.3d 410 (“If instructions, considered as a whole, fairly present the issues and the law applicable thereto, they are sufficient.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {13} For all of these reasons, we conclude the jury was not improperly instructed on Plaintiff’s NMHRA claims.

2023See Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 26 (“The appellate court presumes that the district court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the district court erred.”).

2021See, e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 6, 34 , 134 N.M. 43 , 73 P.3d 181 (explaining that a negligence claim requires that a defendant’s conduct be both the proximate cause and the but-for cause (i.e., “cause in fact”) of the injury). {39} The dissent asserts that the majority departs from Nichols by creating a higher causation standard.

2021See, e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 6, 34 , 134 N.M. 43 , 73 P.3d 181 (explaining that a negligence claim requires that a defendant’s conduct be both the proximate cause and the but-for cause (i.e., “cause in fact”) of the injury). {39} The dissent asserts that the majority departs from Nichols by creating a higher causation standard.

2021See, e.g., Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 19 (observing that “a defendant is a but for cause of death if the death would not have occurred at the time it did and in the manner it did but for defendant’s actions” (emphasis added)); Nichols, 2016-NMSC-001, ¶ 40 (requiring “substantial evidence that [the] neglect ‘resulted in’ . . . death or great bodily harm, meaning that medical neglect was at least a significant cause of his death or great bodily injury” (emphasis added)); State v. Simpson, 1993-NMSC-073 , ¶ 14, 116 N.M. 768 , 867 P.2d 1150 (observing that “[g]eneral principles of criminal law do n

2021This case illustrates why medical neglect child abuse cases require careful application of but-for and proximate causation analyses, because it is not atypical that a defendant charged with medical neglect is also charged with a concurrent act of abuse. 2 Nichols suggests, but does not hold, that instructing on proximate cause is necessary. 2016-NMSC-001 , ¶ 40.

2021See Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 19 (“[A] defendant is a but for cause of death if the death would not have occurred at the time it did and in the manner it did but for defendant’s actions.”); LaFave, supra, at 607 (“Failure on the part of a parent to call a doctor for a sick child may often make the parent criminally liable for the child’s death; but only if the doctor could have saved it, not if it would have died in spite of medical attention.”).

2021See, e.g., Montoya, 2003-NMSC-004, ¶ 19 (observing that “a defendant is a but for cause of death if the death would not have occurred at the time it did and in the manner it did but for defendant’s actions” (emphasis added)); Nichols, 2016-NMSC-001, ¶ 40 (requiring “substantial evidence that [the] neglect ‘resulted in’ . . . death or great bodily harm, meaning that medical neglect was at least a significant cause of his death or great bodily injury” (emphasis added)); State v. Simpson, 1993-NMSC-073 , ¶ 14, 116 N.M. 768 , 867 P.2d 1150 (observing that “[g]eneral principles of criminal law do n

2017See Oliver v. City of Albuquerque, 1987-NMSC-096 , ¶ 4, 106 N.M. 5 350 , 742 P.2d 1055 (explaining that Section 52-1-28(A) “requires that a worker’s 6 disability . . . be causally connected to the worker’s injury . . . and that the injury be 7 causally connected to the worker’s accident”); Trujillo, 2016-NMCA-041 , ¶ 46, n.4 8 (holding that there was evidence of the existence of a causal relationship between the 9 worker’s accident and injuries but noting that the WCJ’s conclusions did not address 10 whether causation as to disability had been established).

2017See Oliver v. City of Albuquerque, 1987-NMSC-096 , ¶ 4, 106 N.M. 5 350 , 742 P.2d 1055 (explaining that Section 52-1-28(A) “requires that a worker’s 6 disability . . . be causally connected to the worker’s injury . . . and that the injury be 7 causally connected to the worker’s accident”); Trujillo, 2016-NMCA-041 , ¶ 46, n.4 8 (holding that there was evidence of the existence of a causal relationship between the 9 worker’s accident and injuries but noting that the WCJ’s conclusions did not address 10 whether causation as to disability had been established).

2017See Smith, 2003-NMCA-097 , ¶¶ 15-16 3 (discussing the differences between TTD and PPD and explaining that PPD is 4 determined not by one’s ability or inability to work but rather based on impairment). 5 Thus, following the 1990 amendments, the relevant causation inquiry under Section 6 52-1-28 necessarily changes depending on what type of disability the worker claims. 7 In cases where a worker claims TTD, the relevant question is whether the worker has 8 established a causal connection between his accident and his inability to work.

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2009See State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20, 25 , 139 N.M. 1 , 127 P.3d 537 6 (filed 2005) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because he presented sufficient 7 evidence to support the giving of the definition of “provocation” as required by the 8 use note); State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 9-12 , 135 N.M. 621 , 92 P.3d 633 9 (stating that if the defendant had requested the jury instruction definition mandated 10 by the use note, “it would have been reversible error for the court to deny him”); see 11 also Poore, 94 N.M. at 174-75 , 608 P.2d at 150-51 (finding reversible error after the 12

2005See McMains, 119 N.M. at 25 , 888 P.2d at 471 (“If [the worker] incurred medical expenses relating to a work-related injury in the future, he [or she] would still have to prove them in order to recover.”) (quoted authority omitted); cf. Stanke-Brown, 98 N.M. at 382 , 648 P.2d at 1195 (“This causation requirement applies to any claim for worker’s compensation; it makes no difference whether the claim is for a first, second or successive accidental injury.”).

2005See McMains, 119 N.M. at 25 , 888 P.2d at 471 (“If [the worker] incurred medical expenses relating to a work-related injury in the future, he [or she] would still have to prove them in order to recover.”) (quoted authority omitted); cf. Stanke-Brown, 98 N.M. at 382 , 648 P.2d at 1195 (“This causation requirement applies to any claim for worker’s compensation; it makes no difference whether the claim is for a first, second or successive accidental injury.”).

2001See Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 89 , 823 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct.App.1991) (“Scrutiny of Section 52-1-11 indicates that our legislature, in enacting legislation establishing the affirmative defense of intoxication, followed the approach taken by a majority of states requiring proof that the worker’s intoxication constituted a proximate cause of his or her injury.”) (citations omitted). {30} Respondents warn this Court that any deviation from the actual intent test will “visit an undo hardship upon employers in this State and wreak havoc with New Mexico’s workers’ compensatio

2001See Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 89 , 823 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct.App.1991) (“Scrutiny of Section 52-1-11 indicates that our legislature, in enacting legislation establishing the affirmative defense of intoxication, followed the approach taken by a majority of states requiring proof that the worker’s intoxication constituted a proximate cause of his or her injury.”) (citations omitted). {30} Respondents warn this Court that any deviation from the actual intent test will “visit an undo hardship upon employers in this State and wreak havoc with New Mexico’s workers’ compensatio