causation requirement in California

2025(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138; State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353; see Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235, fn. 1 [“Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages: determining cause in fact and considering various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability”].) Here, we focus on the cause in fact component of proximate cause. “ ‘ “ ‘An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event’ ” ’ ” [citations], and it is commonly referred to as the ‘but-for’ cause . . .” (People v. Carney, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.

2022(See Viner, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1240, fn. 4 [the “requirement that the plaintiff prove causation should not be confused with the method or means of doing so”; “[p]hrases such as ‘trial within a trial’ [and] ‘case within a case’ . . . describe methods of proving causation, not the causation requirement itself or the test for determining whether causation has been established”].) Moreover, because applying defendants’ narrow reading of this passage to pre-filing professional negligence claims would produce the absurd results outlined above, we must decline to follow that narrow reading on th

1996(Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ]; Nola M. v. University of Southern California, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 .) In the context of this case, the causation analysis is unaffected by the fact that the assailant’s conduct was criminal and not merely negligent.

1996(Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 , 819 P.2d 872 ]; Nola M. v. University of Southern California, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 .) In the context of this case, the causation analysis is unaffected by the fact that the assailant’s conduct was criminal and not merely negligent.

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2024Indeed, Pruitt noted, “[t]o be sure, had Pruitt’s probation been summarily revoked immediately after his arrest on June 10, 2006, as often occurs when a probationer is arrested on felony charges, he could have earned approximately 300 days of additional presentence custody credit.” (Pruitt, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 649 .) Neither of the parties address the complexities presented by a “ ‘multiple restraint’ ” case such as Hinsdale’s, where credit is being sought for a period of custody with “multiple, unrelated causes.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180 .)15 The strict causation rule app

2024And our interpretation is not foreclosed by Joyner or Bruner because the strict causation test they describe applies “where the defendant has already received credit for such custody in another proceeding.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1180 .) We note that the outcome we conclude is required by section 2900.5 on these facts applies to concurrent sentences.

2026Under McDonnell Douglas, “the temporal proximity between an employee’s [protected conduct] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement at the first step of the burden-shifting process.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 [italics omitted]).

2025Lee cites Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 (Arteaga) for the proposition that “the temporal proximity between an employee’s disclosure . . . and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement at the first step of the burden-shifting process.” Lee’s temporal proximity argument fails because there is no evidence Childers was aware of Lee’s protected activity of making complaints of racism to LLAC.

2022“It is reasonably well settled . . . that the causation inquiry has two facets: whether the defendant’s conduct was the ‘cause in fact’ of the injury; and, if so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be held legally responsible for the injury.” (Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 252 .) To determine causation in fact, California has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 431.

2015“It is reasonably well settled . . . that the causation inquiry has two facets: whether the defendant’s conduct was the ‘cause in fact’ of the injury; and, if so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be held legally responsible for the injury.” (Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 252 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ].) To determine causation in fact, California has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 431.

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2025(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138; State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353; see Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235, fn. 1 [“Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages: determining cause in fact and considering various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability”].) Here, we focus on the cause in fact component of proximate cause. “ ‘ “ ‘An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event’ ” ’ ” [citations], and it is commonly referred to as the ‘but-for’ cause . . .” (People v. Carney, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.

2025(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130 , 1138; State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353; see Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235, fn. 1 [“Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages: determining cause in fact and considering various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability”].) Here, we focus on the cause in fact component of proximate cause. “ ‘ “ ‘An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event’ ” ’ ” [citations], and it is commonly referred to as the ‘but-for’ cause . . .” (People v. Carney, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2024Wawrzenski Created a Triable Issue of Material Fact Regarding Whether Her Termination Was Causally Linked to Her Complaints “Because the employee’s burden of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is fairly minimal, the temporal proximity between an employee’s [complaint] and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation requirement.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 ; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 990 .) “A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the pro

2012(See Allen v. Leybourne (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1966) 190 So.2d 825, 829 ; Bohannan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 210 N.C. 679 [ 188 S.E. 390, 393-394 ]; Prosser & Keeton, Torts, supra, § 130, p. 1007.) Courts have dealt with this issue with respect to other interference torts by developing “a threshold causation requirement... for maintaining a cause of action . . . namely, proof that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s interference.” (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 ] (Youst).) A

2012(See Allen v. Leybourne (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1966) 190 So.2d 825, 829 ; Bohannan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. (1936) 210 N.C. 679 [ 188 S.E. 390, 393-394 ]; Prosser & Keeton, Torts, supra, § 130, p. 1007.) Courts have dealt with this issue with respect to other interference torts by developing “a threshold causation requirement... for maintaining a cause of action . . . namely, proof that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s interference.” (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 ] (Youst).) A

2017Rossmoor argues that plaintiffs "presented no substantial evidence that [Marline] was exposed to asbestos-containing products from the Rossmoor project with such frequency, regularity, and proximity as to satisfy the causation standard articulated in Rutherford [ v. Owens-Illinois, Inc . (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953 , 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ( Rutherford ) ], Hernandez [ v. Amcord, Inc . (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 659 , 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 90 ], and Lineaweaver [ v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ( Lineaweaver ) ]." Plaintiffs reply that "[e]xpert testimony con

2017Rossmoor argues that plaintiffs "presented no substantial evidence that [Marline] was exposed to asbestos-containing products from the Rossmoor project with such frequency, regularity, and proximity as to satisfy the causation standard articulated in Rutherford [ v. Owens-Illinois, Inc . (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953 , 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ( Rutherford ) ], Hernandez [ v. Amcord, Inc . (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 659 , 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 90 ], and Lineaweaver [ v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ( Lineaweaver ) ]." Plaintiffs reply that "[e]xpert testimony con

2024(Leyva v. Garcia 23 (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103 (Leyva).) “[F]or a plaintiff to satisfy the causation element of a negligence cause of action, he or she must show the defendant’s act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. . . . ‘In other words, [the] plaintiff must show some substantial link or nexus between omission and injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104, citation omitted.) Although the trial court appeared to rely on an unalleged premises liability theory to hold defendants negligent, the causation requirement is the same.

2024(Leyva v. Garcia 23 (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103 (Leyva).) “[F]or a plaintiff to satisfy the causation element of a negligence cause of action, he or she must show the defendant’s act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. . . . ‘In other words, [the] plaintiff must show some substantial link or nexus between omission and injury.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104, citation omitted.) Although the trial court appeared to rely on an unalleged premises liability theory to hold defendants negligent, the causation requirement is the same.

2017(See Carson Harbor I, supra , 270 F.3d at pp. 870-871 ; Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Olin Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2009) 655 F.Supp.2d 1048 , 1057 ["Cases within the Ninth Circuit support the conclusion that a CERCLA prima facie case requires a plaintiff to show that a release caused the incurrence of some response costs but it does not require that the release cause all of the recoverable response costs."].) Once the District has shown a release or threatened release caused it to incur some necessary response costs, the causation standard is satisfied.

2017(See Carson Harbor I, supra, 270 F.3d at pp. 870-871; Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Olin Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2009) 655 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1057 ["Cases within the Ninth Circuit support the conclusion that a CERCLA prima facie case requires a plaintiff to show that a release caused the incurrence of some response costs but it does not require that the release cause all of the recoverable response costs."].) Once the District has shown a release or threatened release caused it to incur some necessary response costs, the causation standard is satisfied.

2025(Vasquez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 260 .) Under a catalyst theory, a fee claimant must show the defendant has “change[d] its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 560 (Graham), italics added.) This causation prong does not require proof that “ ‘litigation [was] the only cause of defendant’s acquiescence.’ ” (Kennedy Com., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) “ ‘Rather, [the] litigation need only be a substantial factor contributing to the defendant’s action.’ [Citation.] ‘In conducting the causation analys

2013Rather, [the] litigation need only be a substantial factor contributing to defendant’s action.” (Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Development Com. of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1365 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 250 ]; see Californians for Responsible Toxics Management v. Kizer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 961, 967 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 599 ].) “Put another way, courts check to see whether the lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff was ‘demonstrably influential’ in overturning, remedying, or prompting a change in the state of affairs challenged by the lawsuit. [Citations.]” (Karuk Tribe of Northern Califo

2014It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 546, com. b, p. 103.)”].) This reasoning is reflected also in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 ], in which the Supreme Court reiterated the Engalla decision’s analysis of the causation requirement.

2014It is enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 546, com. b, p. 103.)”].) This reasoning is reflected also in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 326 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 , 207 P.3d 20 ], in which the Supreme Court reiterated the Engalla decision’s analysis of the causation requirement.

2024(People v. Snell, supra, C095676; see e.g., People v. Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 22-23 [because the earlier action had been dismissed, the strict causation rule did not prohibit the awarding of credit for the period where the latter case had placed a custody hold on the defendant then in custody in the earlier action]; People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1128-1129 [custody attributable to both cases such that once resentenced in one matter, excess credit could be applied to the other]; People v. Shropshire (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 938 , 948-949 [same].) However, we disagree with def

2023(See, e.g., Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 22-23 [because the earlier action had been dismissed, the strict causation rule did not prohibit the awarding of credit for the period where the latter case had placed a custody hold on the defendant then in custody in the earlier action].) Nothing in Marquez signals an intent to discard the “attributable” requirement for the awarding of custody credit.

2022(See, e.g., Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 753 [“the trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude speculative expert testimony”].) “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086 .) A claim for attorney professional negligence likewise requires proof of “a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury.” (Mart

2022(See, e.g., Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 753 [“the trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude speculative expert testimony”].) “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086 .) A claim for attorney professional negligence likewise requires proof of “a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury.” (Mart

1995The Fireman's Fund court suggested: "In Garvey , the Supreme Court held it is `important to separate the causation analysis necessary in a first party property loss case from that which must be undertaken in a third party tort liability case.' ( Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 406 , italics added.) However, although there are important differences between property damage insurance and liability insurance — not the least of which is causation analysis — the issues here do not even remotely involve causation.

1995The Fireman’s Fund court suggested: “In Garvey , the Supreme Court held it is ‘important to separate the causation analysis necessary in a first party property loss case from that which must be undertaken in a third party tort liability case.’ (Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 406 , italics added.) However, although there are important differences between property damage insurance and liability insurance—not the least of which is causation analysis—the issues here do not even remotely involve causation.

2025(Leslie G., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 481 .) The court explained: “In California, the causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. [Citations.] In the context of this case, the causation analysis is unaffected by the fact that the assailant’s conduct was criminal and not merely negligent.

2024(Leslie G., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 481 .) The court explained: “In California, the causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. [Citations.] In the context of this case, the causation analysis is unaffected by the fact that the assailant’s conduct was criminal and not merely negligent.

2022(See, e.g., Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 753 [“the trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude speculative expert testimony”].) “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086 .) A claim for attorney professional negligence likewise requires proof of “a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury.” (Mart

2022(See, e.g., Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 753 [“the trial court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude speculative expert testimony”].) “The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086 .) A claim for attorney professional negligence likewise requires proof of “a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury.” (Mart

2019In Milton [ v. Perceptual Development Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861 , 867, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ], the *454 appellate court considered the causation requirement of the mandatory relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , supra , 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) The court concluded that the proximate cause standard for legal malpractice actions should also apply to the causation requirement of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) Under that standard, 'a lawyer's negligence need not be the only prox

2019In Milton [ v. Perceptual Development Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861 , 867, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ], the *454 appellate court considered the causation requirement of the mandatory relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , supra , 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) The court concluded that the proximate cause standard for legal malpractice actions should also apply to the causation requirement of the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). ( Milton , at p. 867 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 ].) Under that standard, 'a lawyer's negligence need not be the only prox

1992(See generally 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) §§ 132, 133, 157 and authorities cited [burden of proof in civil cases]; Rest.2d Torts, § 433B.) The concept of proximate or legal cause has “defied precise definition.” (Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 521 ]; see also Wright, Causation in Tort Law (1985) 73 Cal.L.Rev. 1735, 1737.) It is reasonably well settled, however, that the causation inquiry has two facets: whether the defendant’s conduct was the “cause in fact” of the injury; and, if so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be held

1992(See generally 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) §§ 132, 133, 157 and authorities cited [burden of proof in civil cases]; Rest.2d Torts, § 433B.) The concept of proximate or legal cause has “defied precise definition.” (Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 521 ]; see also Wright, Causation in Tort Law (1985) 73 Cal.L.Rev. 1735, 1737.) It is reasonably well settled, however, that the causation inquiry has two facets: whether the defendant’s conduct was the “cause in fact” of the injury; and, if so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be held

1993(Id. at p. 1106.) *1405 In doing so, it recognized the issue that is presented if the defendant has bail set in both cases. ( 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1106 .) That is, in each case the prosecution could argue the defendant was not entitled to credit due to the inability to post bail in that case.

1992(In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ]; People v. Gibbs (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 420,424-425 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 338 ]; People v. Goodson (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 277, 280-281 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 60 ]; People v. Huff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1103-1105 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 44 ]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910-911 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) In the decision of In re Nickles, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pages 423-424, the Court of Appeal held that when a defendant’s presentence incarceration is due in part to a parole revocation based upon grounds other than the new offen

2024(Carlin, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1112 .) To succeed on a strict liability failure-to-warn claim, the plaintiff need only prove that the manufacturer “did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.” (Ibid.) Whether asserting a negligent or a strict liability failure-to-warn claim, the plaintiff must also establish that the manufacturer’s failure to warn “[was] a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff’s] injury.” (Stevens

2018But the court appeared to conclude that even in the absence of that testimony, the jury could find that the doctor's negligent prescription of the drug was a "foreseeable consequence of the extensive advertising and promotional campaign." ( Stevens , supra , 9 Cal.3d at p. 69 , 107 Cal.Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 .) It is reasonable to expect that on remand liability could be found if the correct causation standard is utilized.