causation standard in Texas

2025Adverse Personnel Action and Causation of Rodriguez's claim. 1 The Texas Supreme Court has recently clarified the causation standard that In its first issue, MHMR challenges the legal was first announced in Texas Department of and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support Human Services v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. the jury's finding that Rodriguez suffered adverse 1995).

2022These factors do not replace the causation standard “that the employee’s protected conduct must be such that, without it, the employer’s prohibited conduct would not have occurred when it did,” nor must every factor weigh in favor of the employee; “[s]ome of the factors may actually be a distraction.” Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d at 335–36 (quoting Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 636 ).

2022Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Indem.

2016Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting the causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause)); see Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 (“Section 101.021(2) requires that for immunity to be waived, personal injury or death must be proximately caused by the condition or use of tangible property.”).

2023Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (concluding that based on the statement “if the x-rays had been correctly read and the appropriate medical personnel acted upon those findings then Wright would have had the possibility of a better outcome . . .” the trial court could have reasonably determined that the report was conclusory); see Hutchinson 20 v. Montemayor, 144 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (concluding that the expert’s claim that if arteriogram had been done, there was a “possibility” of a correctable lesion such that an amputation may have been avoided was conclusory).

2011See, e.g , Wright , 79 S.W.3d at 52-53 (expert report did not constitute a “good-faith effort” where the report “simply opine[d] that [plaintiff] might have had ‘the possibility of a better outcome’ without explaining how [defendant’s] conduct caused injury”); Walgreen, 243 S.W.3d at 186-87 (expert opinion that plaintiff’s symptoms were “consistent with” known side effects of medication did not establish causation); Ehrlich v. Miles , 144 S.W.3d 620, 627-28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (expert opinion that “negligent activity . . . listed above is the proximate cause of [plaintiff’

2025Id. (citing Pagosa Oil and Gas, L.L.C. value of the property was in “flux,” and that at most, his v. Marrs and Smith Partnership, 323 S.W.3d 203, 215 (Tex. prior testimony constituted an estimate of the property's value, App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied)).

2014Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995) (stating that under a DTPA misrepresentation claim, “[the alleged] . . . acts constituted a producing cause of the consumer’s damages”); Pagosa Oil & Gas, LLC v. Marrs & Smith P’ship, 323 S.W.3d 203, 215 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (noting that the last element of a 7 breach of contract claim, the plaintiff incurred damages as a result of the defendant’s breach, includes a causation requirement); Elliot v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 118 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (stating that

2020The causation requirement in § 101.021(2) is less than proximate cause—"not a heightened standard such as sole cause.” Wise Reg’l Health Sys. v. Brittain, 268 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).

2012See generally Brittain, 268 S.W.3d at 808 (―The causation requirement in section 101.021(2) is one of proximate cause-not a heightened standard such as sole cause.‖).

2012“To the extent that Jones Act jurisprudence recognizes a special standard for proving causation, federal cases have held that this causation standard does not exempt Jones Act cases from the general rules for admission of expert testimony.” Id. at 487 .

2012“To the extent that Jones Act jurisprudence recognizes a special standard for proving causation, federal cases have held that this causation standard does not exempt Jones Act cases from the general rules for admission of expert testimony.” Id. at 487 .

2009Strong v. University Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir.2007).

2009Strong v. University Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5 th Cir. 2007).

2024Under that issue, the Burford Parties assert the following reasons as to why the trial court erred: (1) The Burford Parties provided the trial court with more than a scintilla of evidence constituting direct, scientifically reliable proof of causation as required by Havner;3 (2) The Burford Parties provided the trial court with more than a scintilla of evidence establishing the dose of asbestos that doubles the risk of developing asbestosis, as required by Bostic;4 (3) The Bostic causation standard should not apply in an asbestosis case given that the mathematical equation for calculating rela

2022Code § 90.004(e); see also Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. 2015) (in mesothelioma case, proof of “some” or “any” exposure is insufficient to establish causation); Borg- 4 We do not hold that to survive a motion to dismiss under Chapter 90 that the expert report must meet the causation standard required to win at trial.

2015Hurley, 232 S.W.3d at 786 (citing Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)). 17 Typically, a causal link between the employee’s report of illegal conduct and the adverse employment action may be established by circumstantial evidence, including knowledge of the report of illegal conduct, expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s report of the conduct, failure to adhere to established policies regarding employment decisions, discriminatory treatment of the reporting employee in comparison to similarly situated employees, and evidence th

2015Hurley, 232 S.W.3d at 786 (citing Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)). 17 Typically, a causal link between the employee’s report of illegal conduct and the adverse employment action may be established by circumstantial evidence, including knowledge of the report of illegal conduct, expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s report of the conduct, failure to adhere to established policies regarding employment decisions, discriminatory treatment of the reporting employee in comparison to similarly situated employees, and evidence th

2014Pagosa Oil and Gas, L.L.C. v. Marrs and Smith Partnership, 323 S.W.3d 203, 215 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2010, pet. denied), citing Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Haugland, 973 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied).

2010See Prudential See., Inc. v. Haugland, 973 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, pet. denied).

2009In light of our conclusion that ERS cannot establish the cause-in-fact component of proximate cause, we hold that ERS also fails to satisfy the causation standard applicable to consequential damages in a breach-of-contract claim, where such damages "must be foreseeable and directly traceable to the wrongful act and result from it." Stuart v. Bayless, 964 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. 1998). 8 .

2009In light of our conclusion that ERS cannot establish the cause-in-fact component of proximate cause, we hold that ERS also fails to satisfy the causation standard applicable to consequential damages in a breach-of-contract claim, where such damages “must be foreseeable and directly traceable to the wrongful act and result from it.” Stuart v. Bayless, 964 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. 1998). 9 According to ERS, Putnam’s misrepresentations led ERS to place advisory responsibility for 40% of its international portfolio with Putnam, rather than Templeton and DuPont.

2006Id .; see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller , 510 U.S. 443, 456 , 114 S. Ct. 981 , 989–90 (1994); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. Wade , 510 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. Civ.

2006Id.; see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 , 114 S.Ct. 981, 989-90 , 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. Wade, 510 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2026“The causation standard for the McDonnell Douglas prima-facie-case element is not onerous and can be satisfied merely by proving close timing between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 782 (citation omitted).

2025“The causation standard for the McDonnell Douglas prima-facie-case element is not onerous and can be satisfied merely by proving close timing between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 782 7 Also fatal to Sanders’s claim is his failure to provide dates for most of the conduct alleged in both his petition and EEOC charge.

2002Corp. v. Toennies , 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001) (concluding that A a motivating factor @ is the correct causation standard for unlawful-employment-practice claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act). [5] Based on this finding, we need not address appellants = eighth issue, complaining that Luxemburg failed to submit competent evidence supporting the amount of attorney = s fees. [6] Appellants raise no complaint regarding the use of reinstatement as a remedy for a violation of the Texas Constitution = s free-speech provision.

2002Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex.2001) (concluding that "a motivating factor” is the correct causation standard for unlawful-employment-practice claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act). .

2020Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 (citing Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. 2010)).

2019Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 532-33 .

2003Tex. Natural Resource Conservation Comm’n v. McDill, 914 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ).

2003Tex. Natural Resource Conservation Comm'n v. McDill, 914 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ).

2026Velvet Snout, LLC v. Sharp, 441 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).

2023Velvet Snout, LLC v. Sharp, 441 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).

2025To satisfy the causation requirement, “the expert need not prove the entire case or account for every known fact; the report is sufficient if it makes ‘a good-faith effort to explain, factually, how proximate cause is going to be proven.’” Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 (quoting Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460 ).

2025In short, to satisfy the causation requirement, “the expert need not prove the entire case or account for every known fact; the report is sufficient if it makes ‘a good-faith effort to explain, factually, how proximate cause is going to be proven.’” Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 (emphasis added) (quoting Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tex. 2017)).

2015In other words, the plaintiff must prove that he would not have suffered an adverse employment action “‘but for’ engaging in the protected activity.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 685 (5th Cir.2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 , 305 n. 4 (5th Cir.1996) (“[E]ven if a plaintiff's protected conduct is a substantial element in a defendant's decision to terminate an employee, no liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct.”).

2013In other words, the plaintiff must prove that he would not have suffered an adverse employment action “ ‘but for’ engaging in the protected activity.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 685 (5th Cir.2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 , 305 n. 4 (5th Cir.1996) (“[E]ven if a plaintiffs protected conduct is a substantial element in a defendant’s decision to terminate an employee, no liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct.”).

2025To satisfy the causation requirement, “the expert need not prove the entire case or account for every known fact; the report is sufficient if it makes ‘a good-faith effort to explain, factually, how proximate cause is going to be proven.’” Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 (quoting Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460 ).

2025In short, to satisfy the causation requirement, “the expert need not prove the entire case or account for every known fact; the report is sufficient if it makes ‘a good-faith effort to explain, factually, how proximate cause is going to be proven.’” Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 224 (emphasis added) (quoting Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tex. 2017)).

2019Posey, 290 S.W.3d at 872; Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 ; Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587 .

2016The supreme court articulated the proximate cause requirement as it applies to drugs in Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 588 .

2020Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013) (Title VII retaliation claims require “but for” causation); Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782–83 (stating Texas Supreme Court had “yet to determine the appropriate causation standard for a TCHRA retaliation claim”); Crutcher v. Dallas Indep.

2015Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 , 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (discussing the causation requirement for a retaliation claim brought under Title VII).

2018Agency, Inc. v. Lin , 304 S.W.3d 830 , 835 (Tex. 2009) (explaining effect of the 1979 amendments).

2018Agency, Inc. v. Lin, 304 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Tex. 2009) (explaining effect of the 1979 amendments). 25 the insurer’s statutory violations prejudice the insured, the insurer may be estopped “from denying benefits that would be payable under its policy as if the risk had been covered.” Id.

2016Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting the causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause)); see Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343 (“Section 101.021(2) requires that for immunity to be waived, personal injury or death must be proximately caused by the condition or use of tangible property.”).

2005See Michael v. Travis County Housing Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) ("The supreme court has consistently construed the causation requirement in section 101.021(2) to be one of proximate cause, not a different standard such as immediate cause, direct cause, or sole cause . . . .").