causation standard in District of Columbia

2018See Davis-Dodson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp't Servs., 697 A.2d 1214, 1216-17 (D.C. 1997) (a workers’ compensation claimant successfully satisfied the causation requirement when medical examinations showed that she had a pre-existing disc degeneration condition that was aggravated by her entirely sedentary job), .

2018The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may have also contributed to, or additionally aggravated [a] claimant‟s malady, does not affect his right to compensation under the „aggravation rule.‟”8 An individual may satisfy the causation requirement by showing that work activities, even if they are not strenuous, aggravated a condition not initially caused by her employment.9 “Once the presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring forth „substantial evidence‟ showing that death or disability did not arise out of and 7 Id. at 656-57 (adding that “[n]umerous cases in

2018Ferreira, 531 A.2d at 655 . .

2018The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may have also contributed to, or additionally aggravated [a] claimant‟s malady, does not affect his right to compensation under the „aggravation rule.‟”8 An individual may satisfy the causation requirement by showing that work activities, even if they are not strenuous, aggravated a condition not initially caused by her employment.9 “Once the presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring forth „substantial evidence‟ showing that death or disability did not arise out of and 7 Id. at 656-57 (adding that “[n]umerous cases in

2024See Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1994) (“A point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative.” (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989))); id. (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as 4 The District conceded in its brief, and we have since explicitly held, that the motivating-reason standard applies to status-based discrimination claims under the DCHRA.

2024See Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1994) (“A point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative.” (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989))); id. (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as 4 The District conceded in its brief, and we have since explicitly held, that the motivating-reason standard applies to status-based discrimination claims under the DCHRA.

2024See Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1994) (“A point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative.” (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989))); id. (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as 4 The District conceded in its brief, and we have since explicitly held, that the motivating-reason standard applies to status-based discrimination claims under the DCHRA.

2024The question whether “substantial contributing factor” was the proper causation standard for a DCHRA retaliation claim was “brought to the attention of the court” and “ruled upon.” See Murphy, 650 A.2d at 205 .

2024In 1993, this court discussed and ruled upon the appropriate causation standard in Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 , 369 & n.32, 370 (D.C. 1993).

2024See id.

2022This necessity prong is a causation requirement; it requires a claimant to demonstrate that “but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.” Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)).

2022This necessity prong is a causation requirement; it requires a claimant to demonstrate that “but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.” Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)).

2020In adopting a but-for causation standard, we do not restrict a description of such causation to the words “but for,” but instead recognize that such language reflects a causation standard similar in meaning to language such as “based on,” “because of,” and “results from.” See Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 601 (D.C.

2020Proximate cause “defies easy summary.” Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014).

2020Because of the lack of clarity in 7 After Stalder, a Florida intermediate court analyzed the causation standard applicable to Florida’s “evidencing prejudice” statute – which the court in Stalder interpreted as requiring that the “perpetrator intentionally selects the victim because of the victim’s” protected characteristic, 630 So. 2d at 1077 – and held that “[t]he essence of criminality under section 775.085 is that prejudice be a significant factor in bringing about the commission of the underlying crime, i.e., but for the racial enmity, the underlying crime would not have occurred.” State

2020See Fleming v. United States, 148 A.3d 1175 , 1187-89 (D.C. 2016) (Easterly, J., concurring in the judgment), vacated, 164 A.3d 72 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that causation has two parts, but-for and proximate cause; that “only if . . . but for cause is established do we ask whether the defendant’s actions are the . . . proximate cause of the harm”; that “the causation analysis in Roy is flawed both as to actual cause, which it failed to consider, and as to proximate cause, which 48 Alternatively, assuming the government can identify and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fleming took some

2020See Fleming v. United States, 148 A.3d 1175 , 1187-89 (D.C. 2016) (Easterly, J., concurring in the judgment), vacated, 164 A.3d 72 (D.C. 2017) (explaining that causation has two parts, but-for and proximate cause; that “only if . . . but for cause is established do we ask whether the defendant’s actions are the . . . proximate cause of the harm”; that “the causation analysis in Roy is flawed both as to actual cause, which it failed to consider, and as to proximate cause, which 48 Alternatively, assuming the government can identify and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Fleming took some

2020We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 9 Aboye v. United States, 121 A.3d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 2015).

2018The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may have also contributed to, or additionally aggravated [a] claimant‟s malady, does not affect his right to compensation under the „aggravation rule.‟”8 An individual may satisfy the causation requirement by showing that work activities, even if they are not strenuous, aggravated a condition not initially caused by her employment.9 “Once the presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring forth „substantial evidence‟ showing that death or disability did not arise out of and 7 Id. at 656-57 (adding that “[n]umerous cases in

2018The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may have also contributed to, or additionally aggravated [a] claimant‟s malady, does not affect his right to compensation under the „aggravation rule.‟”8 An individual may satisfy the causation requirement by showing that work activities, even if they are not strenuous, aggravated a condition not initially caused by her employment.9 “Once the presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring forth „substantial evidence‟ showing that death or disability did not arise out of and 7 Id. at 656-57 (adding that “[n]umerous cases in

2014See Weakley v. Burnham Corp., 871 A.2d 1167, 1173 (D.C.2005) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) test for legal cause in deciding whether to reverse summary judgment motion in products liability case); Majeska v. District of Columbia, 812 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C.2002) (determining that a missing stop sign was the “cause-in-fact” of the accident injuring the plaintiff based on § 431’s “substantial factor” test); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) (establishing that an “actor’s negligent conduct is the legal cause of harm to another if ... [the conduct] is a substant

2014See Weakley v. Burnham Corp., 871 A.2d 1167, 1173 (D.C.2005) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) test for legal cause in deciding whether to reverse summary judgment motion in products liability case); Majeska v. District of Columbia, 812 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C.2002) (determining that a missing stop sign was the “cause-in-fact” of the accident injuring the plaintiff based on § 431’s “substantial factor” test); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) (establishing that an “actor’s negligent conduct is the legal cause of harm to another if ... [the conduct] is a substant

2008For example, in Gartrell v. Dep’t of Correction, 259 Conn. 29 , 787 A.2d 541, 548-49 (C2002), the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition was compensable as a distinct injury when it was the direct consequence of a work-related physical injury; the court so held in part in recognition of “a fundamental tenet of workers’ compensation law ... that an employer takes the employee in the state of health in which if finds the employee.” Id. at 549 (internal quotation omitted).

2008For example, in Gartrell v. Dep’t of Correction, 259 Conn. 29 , 787 A.2d 541, 548-49 (C2002), the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that the aggravation of a preexisting psychiatric condition was compensable as a distinct injury when it was the direct consequence of a work-related physical injury; the court so held in part in recognition of “a fundamental tenet of workers’ compensation law ... that an employer takes the employee in the state of health in which if finds the employee.” Id. at 549 (internal quotation omitted).

2000The court recognized that if the words “arising out of’ were construed as imposing a causation requirement, 5 “the statute would limit our courts to the exercise of ‘specific’ jurisdiction and prohibit our courts from exercising any ‘general’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 600-01.

2000The court recognized that if the words "arising out of" were construed as imposing a causation requirement, [5] "the statute would limit our courts to the exercise of `specific' jurisdiction and prohibit our courts from exercising any `general' jurisdiction." Id. at 600-01.

1990See also S.D. v. Faulkner, 705 F.Supp. 1361, 1364-65 (S.D.Ind.1989).