causation requirement in Florida

2025But the fraud on the court standard requires more than mere potential relevance—the asserted fraudulent omission or misrepresentation must be “directly related to the central issue in the case.” Gilbert, 34 So. 3d at 775 .

2022Clearly, as part of the Fourth Amendment's causation analysis, courts must evaluate whether there are intervening circumstances, or if sufficient attenuation exists, between the illegal police conduct and the illegally obtained evidence sufficient "to purge the primary taint of the [police misconduct]." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 .

2019A conviction under “vehicular homicide or any other offense in which the crime actually involved the impact that caused the death . . . would have satisfied the causation requirement for the imposition of victim-injury points.” Id.

2018Id.

2013The court warned of the injustices created when health care providers are forced to defend cases “where serious disease processes are not arrested because another course of action could possibly bring a better result.” 445 So.2d at 1019-20 .

2011We also agree that the JCC erred in substituting the causation standard expressed in Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), for the more exacting statutory causation standard for mold exposure claims enacted by the Legislature.

2011We also agree that the JCC erred in substituting the causation standard expressed in Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), for the more exacting statutory causation standard for mold exposure claims enacted by the Legislature.

1999Magaw, 537 So.2d at 565-67 .

1999The district court reasoned that "[m]odern manslaughter cases have broadly construed the causation requirement." Eversley, 706 So.2d at 1365 .

1999The district court stated that "instead of using the old `but for' test for causation, causation may be satisfied when a defendant's action is a material contributing factor in the victim's death." Id.

1999Based on these multiple possibilities, I do not feel as confident as the majority does that an average juror would understand that implicit in this causation requirement is the fact that the defendant's *569 manner of operation caused or contributed to cause the accident. [33] Both the majority opinion and the Fourth District's opinion in Melvin v. State, 677 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), apparently agree that there must have been something about the defendant's driving that caused the accident.

1998Either under the causation test or the criminal episode test, however, an argument can be made that driving without a legal right either caused the accident or began the criminal episode during which the accident occurred. [1] The trial court herein interpreted the last paragraph in Williams to distinguish rather than reverse our opinion in Bowling v. State, 479 So.2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), in which we held that if the evidence is clear that the defendant caused the accident which resulted in damages then he may be assessed the cost of restitution even if he is convicted only of the offense

1998The Aguilar court adopted a current causation analysis and further noted that it may be possible for the employer to obtain a determination that employees who have unconditionally offered to return to work continue to be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation because their current unemployment is caused by their post-strike activities which constitute a “labor dispute in active progress.” Id. at 1065 .

1989The supreme court has held that the significant relationship test, enunciated in J.S.H. v. State, 472 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1985), should be used in conjunction with the causation test required by the statute.

1987Because the jury's verdict in the present case was a "No" to the question, "Was there negligence on the part of GUSTAVO LEON, M.D. which was a legal cause of damage to GILBERTO GONZALEZ and ESTELA GONZALEZ, his wife," and because such a verdict may be interpreted either as a finding of no negligence or as a finding of no legal cause, the plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must, see § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1985); Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(d); Whitman v. Castlewood International Corp., 383 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1978); Variety Children's Hosp

1987Because the jury's verdict in the present case was a "No" to the question, "Was there negligence on the part of GUSTAVO LEON, M.D. which was a legal cause of damage to GILBERTO GONZALEZ and ESTELA GONZALEZ, his wife," and because such a verdict may be interpreted either as a finding of no negligence or as a finding of no legal cause, the plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must, see § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1985); Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(d); Whitman v. Castlewood International Corp., 383 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1978); Variety Children's Hosp

1987We believe the same considerations that led the Florida Supreme Court in an analogous situation to adopt the "two issue" rule, see Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181 , obtain here.

1987Because the jury's verdict in the present case was a "No" to the question, "Was there negligence on the part of GUSTAVO LEON, M.D. which was a legal cause of damage to GILBERTO GONZALEZ and ESTELA GONZALEZ, his wife," and because such a verdict may be interpreted either as a finding of no negligence or as a finding of no legal cause, the plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must, see § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1985); Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(d); Whitman v. Castlewood International Corp., 383 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1978); Variety Children's Hosp

1985See Business Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 751 F.2d 361 (10th Cir.1984); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 575 F. Supp. 901 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (W.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1982).

1985See Business Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 751 F.2d 361 (10th Cir.1984); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 575 F. Supp. 901 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (W.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1982).

1985See Business Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 751 F.2d 361 (10th Cir.1984); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 575 F. Supp. 901 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (W.D.Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1982).