7 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Contois v. Town of West Warwickgreen2 sentences2008See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , *451 1023 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in negligence actions); Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc., 848 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in the products liability context); Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I. 309, 314-15 , 342 A.2d 622, 626 (1975) (concluding that, even under strict liability, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the defect and the injury”). 2008Rather than prove proximate cause, “the plaintiff need only establish that ‘defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the lost chance to avoid the ultimate harm.’ ” Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023 (quoting Mead, 670 N.W.2d at 186 ). | 1 | 2 |
Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , *451 1023 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in negligence actions); Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc., 848 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in the products liability context); Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I. 309, 314-15 , 342 A.2d 622, 626 (1975) (concluding that, even under strict liability, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the defect and the injury”). | 1 | 1 |
Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , *451 1023 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in negligence actions); Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc., 848 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in the products liability context); Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I. 309, 314-15 , 342 A.2d 622, 626 (1975) (concluding that, even under strict liability, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the defect and the injury”). 2008See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , *451 1023 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in negligence actions); Clift v. Vose Hardware, Inc., 848 A.2d 1130, 1132 (R.I.2004) (discussing the causation requirement in the products liability context); Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I. 309, 314-15 , 342 A.2d 622, 626 (1975) (concluding that, even under strict liability, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the defect and the injury”). | 1 | 1 |
Glenn v. Aikengreen2 sentences2002In Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991), the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held that “in order to justify a right to recover, a plaintiff asserting an error of the type Glenn asserts in this case [failure to object to a faulty jury instruction] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, not only that the negligence of the attorney defendant caused his harm, but also that he is innocent of the crime charged.” The defendant urges us to adopt this heightened standard for malpractice claims against the criminal defense bar. 2002In Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699 , 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (1991), the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held that “in order to justify a right to recover, a plaintiff asserting an error of the type Glenn asserts in this case [failure to object to a faulty jury instruction] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, not only that the negligence of the attorney defendant caused his harm, but also that he is innocent of the crime charged.” The defendant urges us to adopt this heightened standard for malpractice claims against the criminal defense bar. | 1 | 1 |
Lutz Engineering Co. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc.green1 sentence1994We find that the trial justice’s proximate-cause instruction was “too subtle to inform the jurors fully [of their obligations].” Lutz Engineering Co. v. Industrial Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 637 (R.I.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mead v. Adrian
green
1 sentence2008Rather than prove proximate cause, “the plaintiff need only establish that ‘defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the lost chance to avoid the ultimate harm.’ ” Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023 (quoting Mead, 670 N.W.2d at 186 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
cluster 718203
green
1 sentence1999Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.'" Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. , 83 F.3d 610 , 626 (3rd Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
green
1 sentence1999Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry.'" Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. , 83 F.3d 610 , 626 (3rd Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Busby v. Crown Supply
green
1 sentence1997The Court is persuaded primarily by the Circuit Court's analysis of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank Trust Company v. Haroco Inc., 473 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 3291 , 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985) (per curiam): "Rather than construing § 1962 (a) as imposing a direct injury requirement in § 1964 (c) actions, we believe that Sedima instructs us to employ a traditional causation analysis in determining whether a RICO plaintiff has been injured `by reason of a section 1962 violation." 896 F.2d, at 839 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997The Court is persuaded primarily by the Circuit Court's analysis of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank Trust Company v. Haroco Inc., 473 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 3291 , 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985) (per curiam): "Rather than construing § 1962 (a) as imposing a direct injury requirement in § 1964 (c) actions, we believe that Sedima instructs us to employ a traditional causation analysis in determining whether a RICO plaintiff has been injured `by reason of a section 1962 violation." 896 F.2d, at 839 . 1997The Court is persuaded primarily by the Circuit Court's analysis of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank Trust Company v. Haroco Inc., 473 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 3291 , 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985) (per curiam): "Rather than construing § 1962 (a) as imposing a direct injury requirement in § 1964 (c) actions, we believe that Sedima instructs us to employ a traditional causation analysis in determining whether a RICO plaintiff has been injured `by reason of a section 1962 violation." 896 F.2d, at 839 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.
green
2 sentences1997The Court is persuaded primarily by the Circuit Court's analysis of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank Trust Company v. Haroco Inc., 473 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 3291 , 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985) (per curiam): "Rather than construing § 1962 (a) as imposing a direct injury requirement in § 1964 (c) actions, we believe that Sedima instructs us to employ a traditional causation analysis in determining whether a RICO plaintiff has been injured `by reason of a section 1962 violation." 896 F.2d, at 839 . 1997The Court is persuaded primarily by the Circuit Court's analysis of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank Trust Company v. Haroco Inc., 473 U.S. 606 , 105 S.Ct. 3291 , 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985) (per curiam): "Rather than construing § 1962 (a) as imposing a direct injury requirement in § 1964 (c) actions, we believe that Sedima instructs us to employ a traditional causation analysis in determining whether a RICO plaintiff has been injured `by reason of a section 1962 violation." 896 F.2d, at 839 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Youst v. Longo
green
2 sentences1993The California Supreme Court elaborated on this need for a definite economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party when it said, "as a matter of law, a threshold causation requirement exists for maintaining a cause of action for either tort; namely, proof that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant's interference." Youst v. Largo, 43 Cal.3d 64 , ___, 23 Cal.Rptr. 294 , ___, 729 P.2d 728 , 733 (1987). 1993The California Supreme Court elaborated on this need for a definite economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party when it said, "as a matter of law, a threshold causation requirement exists for maintaining a cause of action for either tort; namely, proof that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant's interference." Youst v. Largo, 43 Cal.3d 64 , ___, 23 Cal.Rptr. 294 , ___, 729 P.2d 728 , 733 (1987). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.